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by Brian L. Cox
Abstract: Recent high-profile reporting by the New York Times and other media organizations
involving U.S. military combat operations has elevated public awareness related to Department of
Defense targeting and accountability practices. While scandal generated by media coverage forms
the basis for demands for reform of DoD practice from civil society groups and select members of
Congress, the narratives developed in the investigative reporting have thus far not been exposed to
comprehensive scrutiny. This article conducts a critical analysis of recent New York Times
reporting involving U.S. military combat operations to assess the legitimacy of the narratives
developed therein. After considering various ways in which the reporting is used to shape public
opinion, three case studies of media coverage are selected as the basis of the critical analysis:
reporting involving the Kabul drone strike in August 2021 that punctuated the end of the presence
of U.S. ground forces in Afghanistan; airstrikes in Baghuz, Syria in 2019; and attacks on and around
Taqba Dam in Syria in 2017. Part I of the inquiry evaluates some of the central narratives presented
in media reporting involving each case study, while Part II conducts an analysis of each incident by
drawing on sources of doctrinal law and policy that apply to actual targeting operations in practice.
Part III then expands beyond these three case studies to consider New York Times and other highprofile media reporting in the broader context of public discourse and the current perceptions of
select members of Congress. Finally, the concluding reflections section presents suggestions for
pursuing true “accountability” for individuals and groups that have thus far remained largely
unaccountable: media companies, civil society organizations, and select members of Congress.
Preface for working paper: What is now the current draft of this article in progress was initially
intended to be a much shorter blog essay on a separate but related topic. As I began the focused
research of recent high-profile media coverage for that initial topic, I realized just how much a
separate critical assessment of the reporting is needed in the forum of public discourse and
legislative deliberations alike. The dedicated critical analysis of media coverage, then, started off as
a standalone blog essay, and then it expanded to a potential series of blog posts, and finally
developed into a journal-length article. This progression is reflected in the format of the current
draft of the article, such as the line breaks rather than indentations between paragraphs and the
hyperlinks rather than Bluebook-compliant footnotes for references. The current draft also reflects a
general dearth of dedicated editing, as I have engaged in some light proofreading throughout the
drafting but have not yet been able to devote exclusive effort to the editing process. I am publishing
the current draft of the working paper now so at least the substance of the critical analysis can be
made available to co-participants for an ASIL Lieber Society webinar scheduled for November 7,
2022, which is two weeks from the publication of the working paper. The critical analysis
conducted in the working paper will form the foundation for my remarks during the webinar, so I
decided to make the paper available to co-participants and the general public alike in advance of the
webinar. Due to competing priorities, I will not be able to reengage on the article until after the
Thanksgiving break, and from then until the beginning of the spring (2023) semester I will be able
to engage in more thorough editing and proofreading endeavors. The intent is to have an initial
review draft completed in time to be circulated when the next law review cycle opens in Spring
2023. While it is useful to emphasis the “working” component of the working paper, future editing
and proofreading endeavors should make for a more orderly finished product.
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Introduction
Recent high-profile media coverage of U.S. military targeting operations has heightened awareness
of and shaped public discourse related to combat operations abroad. In large part as a result of the
current heightened public scrutiny, Congress now seeks to perform a more assertive role in
regulating internal military targeting operations and processes. With the encouragement and
backing of a number of NGOs that are active in the field of civilian harm mitigation, legislation
introduced at the end of April in both the House and Senate would direct a fundamental overhaul of
current processes utilized by the DoD to conduct and evaluate targeting operations.
At the same time, legislators in both the House and Senate likewise introduced bills that would
significantly expand upon existing requirements for the DoD to provide reports to Congress related
to suspected or confirmed incidents of civilian harm. These legislative proposals have since been
introduced as potential amendments to the fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act for
both the House and the Senate. At the time of writing, Congress is on recess during the November
election period, but both chambers are set to pick back up on deliberations for the must-pass NDAA
soon after the session resumes.
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If passed, the pending legislation would represent a successful strategic outcome for civil society
groups that have long pursued a dual-track strategy of shaping public opinion and influencing
government officials – whether in the executive or legislative branches – to shift the center of
gravity in U.S. military operations in favor of enhanced protections for civilians. This article
explores recent media coverage that has sparked a clamor for reform of U.S. military operations and
provided the tinder from which NGOs and other activists have drawn to ignite the pyre of public
opinion in order to advance their strategic objectives.
Even though media reporting is at the core of the current progressive civilian harm mitigation
movement, surprisingly little critical analysis of the characterizations of U.S. military operations
presented therein exists in present discourse. If this core of the current movement presents a skewed
and incomplete depiction of purported deficiencies in military operations, which in this article I
assert to be the case, the “solutions” being proposed by Congress and in public discourse to address
the apparent set of problems “exposed” by recent media coverage are themselves defective and
must be reevaluated.
This article conducts a critical assessment of the media coverage that is propelling the current public
outcry for “reform” of U.S. military targeting operations and of the corresponding attempts by
Congress to achieve the suggested “reforms” through the legislative process. After first framing the
examination by assessing the ways in which media reporting is utilized by those seeking to shape
perspectives in contemporary public discourse, the substantive portion of the critical analysis is
centered on three separate case studies of targeting incidents that have been the focus of recent
award-winning New York Times media coverage.
The first case study examined below assesses NYT reporting involving civilian casualties inflicted
in the drone strike in Kabul as the military closed out operations in Afghanistan last August. Next,
the second case study presents an in-depth examination of NYT media reporting involving the 2019
attacks on an ISIL target in Baghuz, Syria as coalition forces fought to wrest control of the last bit
of territory controlled by the terror group. Then, the third case study conducts a critical analysis of
NYT media coverage of a series of strikes on the Tabqa Dam near Raqqa, Syria in 2017.
In Part I of the article, I examine each case study in turn and conduct a critical assessment of some
of the central narratives presented in reporting related to each incident. Part II then addresses each
case study again in sequence in order to present a doctrinal analysis of actual provisions of law and
policy that apply to the incidents that form the basis of the reporting related to each individual case
study. Then, in Part III, I expand beyond these three case studies to situate the substantive analysis
conducted herein in the broader context of social and political discourse involving U.S. military
combat operations. Finally, in concluding reflections, the article explores measures for holding
individuals and groups responsible for distortions in public opinion that are generated by biased and
uniformed media coverage that is the focal point of the present inquiry.
A primary suggestion for supporting actual accountability, at least in the near term, is for the
respective leadership of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees to ensure that any draft
legislative provision involving civilian harm mitigation and response is excluded from the final
version of the FY23 NDAA. This measure is necessary to allow time for the leadership of both
chambers of Congress to account for and correct distortions of the current legislative agenda that
have been caused by sensationalized media reporting and by lobbying and other efforts to influence
elected officials that may constitute violations of federal law. These matters are addressed below in
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due course and are summarized in the section presenting concluding reflections. For now, the
inquiry transitions to consider the ways in which media coverage is utilized to influence public
discourse before then initiating the substantive inquiry with the case studies presented in Part I.
Framing the Examination: Utilization of Media Coverage in Contemporary Public Discourse
The plenary goal of the article is to address a current gap in public discourse involving U.S. military
targeting operations abroad by engaging in a critical assessment of the media coverage that is
largely responsible for defining and shaping prevailing perceptions involving these operations. That
is, if recent high-profile NYT media coverage of U.S. military operations is the driving force behind
the current progressive “reform” movement and this media reporting has yet to be subjected to an
in-depth critical analysis, then this constitutes a gap in current public discourse that must be
addressed. In addressing the existing gap in prevailing discourse, I make the case that the current
“solutions” being presented by activists and legislators must be reassessed because they have been
developed based on an ill-informed, ill-defined, and, therefore, illegitimate understanding of the
“problems” the purported solutions seek to address.
Although NYT media coverage examined in the substantive portion of this article is not alone in
defining and shaping public perceptions involving U.S. military targeting operations, the thread of
NYT coverage explored herein has emerged as the primary tool upon which legislators, advocates,
activists, and academics have seized to create and sustain momentum to make the case for
“reforming” targeting processes. As I point in the final analytical section of this article, media
coverage from organizations other than New York Times is largely shaped by the reporting
presented in NYT articles examined below. It is this thread of reporting, then, that has so
significantly shaped public perception and coverage presented by other media organizations that
must be the primary subject of a critical analysis such as that conducted in this article.
As I likewise describe below in the final analytical section, a palpable sense of frustration related to
a purported lack of “progress” from engaging directly with the Department of Defense has led NGO
activists and other advocates to a shift in focus for the endeavor to achieve purported “solutions” to
problems “exposed” primarily in this thread of media coverage. In addition to pressing the DoD to
enact “reforms” suggested by activists and other advocates, legislators have now been encouraged
to assume a more assertive role in compelling the military to alter current processes involving
targeting and post-strike assessments. As the final analytical section of this article examines, the
legislators involved in the “reform” movement are not only attempting to force legislative
“solutions” that have been developed based on an illegitimate understanding of existing “problems,”
members of Congress involved in the process are also exceeding the bounds of their constitutional
authority in attempting to do so. To frame the current critical analysis of NYT stories that have been
so vital in shaping public perception involving U.S. military targeting operations abroad, the current
section turns now to describe some of the specific ways in which the media coverage has recently
been invoked to support calls to “reform” military targeting and accountability processes.
“Substantial Flaws” Exposed by Recent Media Reporting? Congressional Perspectives
Although the movement to “reform” DoD targeting processes to improve outcomes related to
civilian harm is by no means a new phenomenon, the undertaking has taken on a renewed sense of
urgency following a spate of recent high-profile media coverage. As the letter signed by 46
members of Congress in March and directed to the Secretary of Defense observes, “After the New
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York Times brought to light substantial flaws in the US military’s procedures to prevent, investigate,
and respond to civilian deaths in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria,” Secretary Lloyd Austin directed the
DoD to present him with “a plan to address civilian harm within 90 days.”
In a press release announcing publication of the congressional dispatch, Representative Ruben
Gallego observes that the “letter comes after an investigation by the New York Times shed light on
flaws in how the US military prevents, investigates, and responds to civilian deaths” in the theaters
noted above. The press release notes that the letter “requests specific issues be addressed in [a]
forthcoming DOD Instruction, Center of Excellence, or the Civilian Harm Mitigation Response
Action Plan.”
The specified topics include “reforms” related to: “resources and staffing; targeting procedures;
tracking and analysis; investigations; amends; lessons learned; accountability; and [a] Center for
Excellence.” However, the factual predicate invoked to warrant this call for systemic “reform” is,
again, “an investigation by the New York Times” that ostensibly “shed light on flaws” in US
military targeting operations. If the factual foundation for this demand for “reform” is found to be
deficient, the specific measures demanded by Congress are not supported by reality and must
therefore be reexamined and reassessed.
Senator Elizabeth Warren likewise cites directly to media coverage by the New York Times in a
recent letter directed to Senator Jack Reed, Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In the
letter, Senator Warren focuses on NYT coverage of a 2019 airstrike in Baghuz, Syria to request that
SASC “immediately launch a formal inquiry into this alleged war crime and cover-up, including
hearings.”
Throughout the letter, Senator Warren refers to NYT reporting, apparently with no independent
critical analysis, as though the coverage itself presents a trustworthy and incontrovertible account of
the airstrike and the DoD response to the incident. As but one example, Senator Warren’s letter
claims that the NYT “report succinctly described the scope of the failure” before going on to
incorporate a lengthy excerpt directly from one article on the incident.
Later, Senator Warren’s letter likewise cites directly to media reporting to support the assertion that
the NYT investigation:
“[A]lso found that the Special Operations task force that undertook the strike repeatedly
skirted rules designed to prevent and respond to civilian harm, and that after the strike was
flagged as a potential war crime, U.S. military officials at multiple levels circumvented
legally mandated reporting and investigation requirements, falsified strike log entries to
cover up the incident, bulldozed the blast site, and repeatedly stalled inquiries.”
Based on these supposed revelations exposed by NYT reporting, Senator Warren claims that the
Baghuz “incident raises serious questions about the U.S. military’s adherence to international
humanitarian law…as well as the duty to investigate potential war crimes and hold responsible
individuals to account.”
As the analysis below in the second case study related to media coverage of the Baghuz airstrike
demonstrates, the NYT “investigation” presents an incomplete and sensationalized account of the
attack and follow-on response by the military. In doing so, the coverage fundamentally distorts
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relevant law of armed conflict requirements, applicable operational rules of engagement, and
“accountability” standards.
The perspectives expressed in this letter by Senator Elizabeth Warren, then, are just as ill-informed
and misguided as the media coverage on which she relies to support her claims. The resulting
request that SASC “launch a formal inquiry into this alleged war crime and cover-up…as
expeditiously as possible” is likewise just as fundamentally flawed as the media coverage on which
Senator Warren relies to substantiate her request.
“Accountability Deficit” and “Structural Problems” in DoD? Activist and Academic Perspectives
These members of Congress are certainly not alone in claiming that recent New York Times
reporting has exposed substantial flaws in existing DoD processes. In an announcement for a
conference involving “justice in war” held in April, for example, the National Institute of Military
Justice refers to “recent New York Times reports” in support of the claim that the DoD is plagued
by an “accountability deficit” when it comes to holding anyone in uniform accountable for
“killings” in armed conflict.
This conference announcement follows a letter submitted to Secretary Austin by the NIMJ board of
directors in which the signatories claim that recent media reporting involving a 2019 airstrike in
Baghuz, Syria indicates that “U.S. military personnel may have committed serious violations of the
law of armed conflict.” Likewise, the NIMJ letter asserts that recent media reporting suggests that
military members may have demonstrated “willful or criminally negligent failures to report and
investigate” the airstrike.
In a similar manner, a letter submitted in November 2021 to the current leadership of the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees by a coalition of 24 NGOs cites recent New York Times media
reports to support the call for “urgent and sustained congressional action to address and investigate
these specific civilian harm incidents as well as the systemic shortcomings of U.S. protection of
civilians policies more broadly.”
According to this coalition of NGOs, New York Times “reporting on the 2019 Baghuz strike and
the alleged cover-up of a possible war crime [raises] serious concerns about the U.S. military’s
commitment to accountability and adherence to international humanitarian law.” The call to action
based on this characterization of recent media reporting claims that “despite years of good-faith
engagement,” the organizations “have seen little to no progress on implementing many of these
recommendations” and congressional intervention is now required.
For yet another example, the respective authors of a recent two-part series on Just Security calling
for congressional action to address civilian harm resulting from U.S. military operations cite media
reporting to make the case for robust legislative intervention. Annie Shiel of CIVIC and Sarah
Yager of Human Rights Watch assert in Part I that “a series of New York Times investigations
revealing systemic flaws that led to civilian deaths and injuries” demonstrates the need for
congressional action to complement ongoing DoD efforts related to civilian harm mitigation.
Likewise, Laura Dickinson, Brianna Rosen, and Rachel VanLandingham claim in the second
installment of the series that media reporting related to the Baghuz airstrike “underscores structural
problems with DoD assessments of civilian casualties” and that robust congressional intervention is
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necessary, among other endeavors, to correct “systemic problems with civilian harm” that
contribute “to a military culture of impunity.”
Summarizing Current Public Discourse and the Present Legal Landscape
From across this spectrum of concerned lawmakers, activists, and academics, the message is clear:
recent high-profile media coverage demonstrates that current DoD procedures related to preventing
and accounting for civilian harm are a sustained and abject failure, and Congress must intervene
through the legislative process to right the ship because the military has demonstrated an
unwillingness or inability to do so. However, each of these perspectives shares at least one common
characteristic: an assumption that recent media reporting presents a complete, accurate, and
impartial depiction of the present state of targeting and accountability processes in U.S. military
operations.
As the substantive analysis in the present article demonstrates, blind reliance on characterizations
presented in relevant media reporting is a deficiency that afflicts all of the “reform” perspectives
examined above. If New York Times reporting has not, in fact, brought to light “substantial flaws in
the US military’s procedures to prevent, investigate, and respond to civilian deaths” as members of
Congress claim in the letter cited above, the “solutions” proposed by advocates and advanced by
selected legislators have been crafted to “correct” deficiencies that have been distorted, fabricated,
sensationalized, or, at the very best, mischaracterized by journalists and those who base demands
for reform on this recent media reporting.
With current public discourse and the present lawscape thus in focus, the substantive analysis in the
following case studies is centered on three specific case studies that are the focus of recent highprofile New York Times media coverage related to the current state of U.S. military targeting
operations. The critical analysis of reporting of the three case studies reveals that media coverage
routinely mischaracterizes the law and policy applicable to these incidents as well as the subsequent
military response to each.
The series of case studies begins now with a critical assessment of recent media coverage of a drone
strike conducted by the U.S. military in August 2021 that punctuated the close of active combat
operations in Afghanistan with the tragic loss of civilian life – an incident that has become known in
media discourse simply as the “Kabul drone strike.”
Part I: Individual Case Studies of NYT Media Reporting
Relevant Media Coverage Beyond the Case Studies Analyzed Above
As I mention briefly above in the introductory remarks near the beginning of this article, the line of
New York Times reporting examined in the present inquiry is by no means the only example of
high-profile media coverage of U.S. military targeting operations abroad that features prominently
in the current collective public consciousness. However, for a number of reasons, the collection of
media coverage examined herein represents the centerpiece of current discussions involving the
purported need to “reform” U.S. military targeting processes.
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A related thread of NYT coverage involving U.S. military targeting operations abroad, for example,
is centered on reporting on airstrikes from the perspective of those on the receiving end of the
attacks. The first article in this line of reporting was written by NYT journalist Azmat Khan and
published in 2017. A second article published by Khan four years later in 2021 adopts a similar lens
to report on, to draw from the headline for the article, “the human toll of America’s air wars.” As
Dave Phillips, who is on the team of journalists responsible for the media coverage examined in the
three case studies above, described during remarks presented in a newsroom ceremony celebrating
receiving the Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting, while his team was “digging deep” into a
“top secret Special Operations strike cell…another reporter, Azmat Kahn, was digging from another
direction.” The reporting conducted from this “other direction” by Azmat Khan and her team
represents a separate but related thread of high-profile NYT reporting related to U.S. military
operations abroad.
Likewise, media coverage from organizations other than the New York Times explores U.S.
military operations in a similar manner. For example, Washington Post recently published a story
purporting to provide “the most complete picture yet of the depth and breadth of U.S. support for
the Saudi-led air campaign” in Yemen. Nick Turse, a contributing writer for Intercept, also
frequently publishes stories involving various aspects of U.S. military operations abroad for that
media platform. Both within and beyond the New York Times, then, there is certainly no shortage
of media coverage that examines American military operations abroad from many different angles.
While other NYT reporting as well as various coverage from other media organizations warrants
critical scrutiny in the manner presented in herein, the three case studies analyzed above were
specifically selected primarily for two reasons. First, NYT reporting on these three incidents in
particular has emerged practically as a primary source upon which other media organizations in the
business frame their own related coverage. NYT reporting involving the Kabul drone strike, for
example, forms the central foundation for articles examining the attack published by other media
organizations such as Rolling Stone, Politico, Global News, Independent, Task & Purpose,
Washington Post, and CNN. The same can be said for the 2019 airstrikes in Baghuz, for which
NYT stories formed the basis of reporting presented by media organizations such as Washington
Post, BBC, NPR, Al Jazeera, Guardian, and Rolling Stone. Likewise, it is the NYT story about the
Taqba Dam airstrikes from which media organizations such as Jerusalem Post, Times of Israel,
Arab News, Times (of the UK), and Business Insider draw to frame their own coverage of the
attacks.
It is this central role of these NYT articles in shaping media coverage involving U.S. military
operations abroad that is likely responsible for the second reason these case studies were selected
for the present article: the coverage examined in the substantive analysis above likewise has
emerged as a primary foundation for the movement to “reform” current U.S. military targeting and
accountability processes. As the overview of congressional, activist, and academic perspectives
presented in the “Framing the Examination” introductory section of this article reveals, current
demands to enact structural changes involving DoD-wide targeting and accountability procedures
rely heavily on the media coverage examined above as evidence of supposed systemic deficiencies
that must be “fixed” by the “reforms” sought by legislators and activists alike. As the critical
analysis conducted above demonstrates, however, the media coverage at the center of the current
“reform” movement is itself plagued by fundamental and systemic deficiencies.
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Case Study #1: Kabul Drone Strike; August 29, 2021
The possibility that a drone strike in Kabul in fact affected a civilian family rather than ISIS-K
operatives as intended by the U.S. military was first reported by the New York Times the day after
the attack. At the time, Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby reportedly indicated that the military was
“not in a position to dispute” that civilian casualties may have resulted from the attack and that an
investigation was then ongoing.
While the military conducted its own inquiry, the New York Times Visual Investigations team
performed a parallel external assessment. The team obtained and examined security camera footage
and conducted “interviews with more than a dozen of the driver’s co-workers and family members
in Kabul.”
As the NYT VI team reported just over a week after the strike, their inquiry “raises doubts about the
U.S. version of events, including whether explosives were present in the vehicle, [and] whether the
driver had a connection to ISIS.” The outcome of the NYT examination is a meticulous and
incredibly detailed description, to draw from the headline associated with the visual product of the
investigation, of “how a U.S. drone strike killed the wrong person.”
The investigations by the military and the media both correctly conclude that only civilian persons
and objects – rather than ISIS-K personnel and equipment – were present at the site of the strike.
However, throughout the NYT coverage of the attack, the various articles routinely reflect two
fundamental flaws that skew the tenor of the reporting and distort the actual standards by which the
military evaluates the incident.
Fundamental Flaw #1: Evaluating the Strike Based on Outcome Rather than Process
The first fundamental flaw presented in the reporting is that it persistently characterizes the strike
based on the outcome of the attack rather than the process that led to the decision to engage. For
example, an early NYT article includes a quote from a British Army veteran and security consultant
claiming that examining photos and videos provided by the Visual Investigations team raises
serious questions involving “the credibility of the intelligence or technology utilized to determine
this was a legitimate target.”
However, this assessment was published just over a week after the attack and a full week before the
military released specific details regarding the pre-strike analysis. As the DoD account relates,
strike cell personnel “deliberately followed and observed [the target] vehicle and its occupants for
eight hours while crosschecking what they were seeing with all available intelligence to develop a
reasonable certainty of the imminent threat that this vehicle posed to our forces.”
Divining an assessment of the credibility of the intelligence or technology utilized before the attack
based only on visual evidence collected after the strike – especially before details about the
targeting process were released to the public – allows for only incomplete conclusions based on the
outcome of the attack rather than the process that preceded it.
As the DoD Law of War Manual summarizes, “Decisions by military commanders or other persons
responsible for planning, authorizing, or executing military action must be made in good faith and
based on their assessment of the information available to them at the time.” By relying solely on
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visual information collected after the strike, the security consultant quoted in the early NYT article
did the opposite. Nonetheless, the articles published by the NYT team throughout the coverage of
the incident continue to characterize the strike based on the outcome of the attack rather than on an
assessment of the process that led to the decision to engage.
For example, journalist Eric Schmitt repeated the conclusion that was offered by the British security
consultant before the results of the investigation were announced – that the outcome of the strike
“calls into question the reliability of the intelligence that will be used to conduct the operations” – in
a story published three days after the details regarding the pre-strike process were released to the
public.
Indeed, the headline of this later story refers to the attack as a “botched drone strike in Kabul” – a
characterization that relies solely on the outcome of the attack rather than an assessment of the
process that led to the decision to strike. That is, the word “botch” connotes “to do (something)
badly” or “to ruin (something) because of carelessness or a lack of skill.” Nothing about the results
of the official investigation suggests that civilians were killed in the strike because of carelessness
or lack of skill of the personnel involved in the attack.
Nonetheless, the media constructs an account early in the coverage of a “botched” drone strike
based on the outcome of the attack – and this is an impression that permeates the coverage and the
public discourse that is shaped by the coverage still today. The result is an impression, at best, that
the U.S. military is simply incompetent at performing the targeting process or, even worse, was
engaged in an attempt to mischaracterize or even cover up the incident.
As a NYT story published six weeks after the strike asserts, “almost everything senior defense
officials asserted in the hours, days and weeks after the drone strike turned out to be false.” While
the factual predicate supporting the decision to strike, along with the initial account presented days
after the attack by senior defense officials, has been demonstrated to be inaccurate, this ex post
assessment has no bearing on the process that led to the strike.
In evaluating whether personnel complied with applicable legal and policy requirements, it is the
process that is relevant – not details that emerged in the hours, days, and weeks after the attack. As
the next section demonstrates, the deficiency of evaluating the strike by facts that surfaced after the
attack rather than information that was reasonably known to relevant personnel at the time of the
strike results in an erroneous and unjustified perception that the U.S. military experiences an
“accountability” deficit in relation to targeting operations.
Fundamental Flaw #2: Assessing “Accountability” Measures Based on Outcome Rather than
Process
This persistent deficiency in media coverage of evaluating the attack based on outcome rather than
process gives rise to the second fundamental flaw that permeates existing press coverage: demands
for “accountability” based on the outcome of the attack.
Emotive Demands for Accountability from Family and Close Associates
For example, the initial NYT story, published the day after the attack, concludes with a powerful
and impassioned plea from the daughter of Zemari Ahmadi, who was one of ten civilians killed in
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the strike, demanding, “Whoever dropped this bomb on our family, may God punish you.” Months
later, an article that begins by observing that “none of the military personnel involved in a botched
drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed 10 civilians will face any kind of punishment,”
includes a quote from Mr. Ahmadi’s former employer asking, “How can our military wrongly take
the lives of 10 precious Afghan people and hold no one accountable in any way?”
While such emotional demands for punishment and “accountability” are reasonable to expect from
family members or close associates of those who were killed in the attack, these moving appeals do
not represent a recognizable basis upon which actual determinations involving culpability are made
in practice. As the most recent edition of the U.S. Army Operational Law Handbook observes in
describing what is commonly referred to in practice as the “Rendulic Rule,” “commanders and
personnel should be evaluated based on information reasonably available at the time of decision”
rather than on the aftermath of an attack.
Based on this standard, the decision to refrain from initiating adverse action against any personnel
involved in the attack is reasonable and completely justifiable. While concluding prepared remarks
during a press briefing during which he described the results of the official military investigation
involving the drone strike, General Kenneth McKenzie, then the commander of U.S. Central
Command, asserted that the responsible personnel conducted the strike “in the honest belief that
they were preventing an imminent attack on our forces and civilian evacuees, [though] we now
understand that to be incorrect.”
When applying the so-called Rendulic Rule, then, the decision to refrain from initiating adverse
action against military members involved in the attack is entirely reasonable given that they had an
“honest belief” that the attack was directed against an identified military objective and since their
actions “should be evaluated based on information reasonably available” at the time.
Throughout the coverage of the incident, the New York Times presents an incomplete and
inaccurate depiction of the standards by which “accountability” measures are actually evaluated
following targeting mishaps. In addition to reflections from family members or close associates of
civilians killed in the attack, three examples of an incomplete assessment related to accountability
are likewise presented in an article published days after details of the official investigation were
released to the public. These three examples of post hoc “accountability” characterizations are
addressed in turn below.
John Sifton via Email: Strike Demonstrates a “Terrible Track Record” of “Failed Accountability”?
In the first such example, John Sifton of Human Rights Watch claims that the U.S. military has a
“terrible track record” following “decades of failed accountability” in Afghanistan. However, the
article presents no analysis whatsoever from Sifton to support this assertion.
This observation from Sifton, then, amounts to a conclusory proclamation purporting to impugn not
only the U.S. military response to this drone strike in particular but also the record of accountability
for the duration of the armed conflict in Afghanistan. That John Sifton would mischaracterize and
sensationalize U.S. military accountability processes should come as no surprise given that his
public commentary demonstrates a long history of doing so – as I examine in more detail in this
essay on Lawfire.
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However, on this occasion his reflections set the stage for the journalistic depiction of a failure to
properly hold personnel accountable for the August 2021 Kabul drone strike as well portraying the
unsubstantiated impression that this is but one in a long-running pattern of such failures.
Luke Hartig on Twitter: Strike Evinces “Bungled Operational Things”?
This portrayal is expanded later in the same article by citing to and incorporating text from a thread
of social media posts involving the drone strike from Luke Hartig of Just Security. Although Hartig
observes in the thread that “[y]ou never want to judge too much from a single incident,” in the very
next clause of the same entry he appears to do so anyway with the assertion that the way the
personnel involved in the attack “bungled fundamental operational things is really troubling and
suggests more than a one-off mistake.”
The other passage from Hartig’s thread that is quoted in the NYT article likewise seems to judge
much from a single incident by claiming that the “interpretation of an innocent man's set of
movements as those of a terrorist or an attack facilitator show some massive flaws in targeting
methodology.” This assertion joins an observation near the end of the Twitter thread that is not
quoted in the article (but is accessible from the link included in the story) wherein Hartig claims that
the strike “suggests the need for a bigger evaluation of the drone program as we draw down the
Forever War rather than insisting on the need for ‘persistent pressure.’”
Like the characterizations presented earlier in the article from John Sifton, these observations by
Luke Hartig do not address any data offered days earlier during a press briefing during which thenCENTCOM commander Gen. McKenzie announced the results of the official investigation
involving the drone strike. In the absence of such an analysis, it is not possible to determine
precisely what “fundamental operational things” Hartig believes the relevant personnel “bungled”
and that suggest the incident is therefore “more than a one-off mistake.”
Drawing from the transcript of that briefing, could it be that the personnel “deliberately followed
and observed [the target] vehicle and its occupants for eight hours while crosschecking what they
were seeing with all available intelligence to develop a reasonable certainty of the imminent threat
that this vehicle posed to” U.S. forces? Or that the personnel “were very concerned that the vehicle
could move quickly and be at the airport boundary in a matter of moments” and that the strike was
executed when it was because the target vehicle was stationary in an attempt “to reduce the
potential for civilian casualties”?
Perhaps Hartig concludes that delaying the fuse on the Hellfire “to detonate inside the vehicle to
further minimize the chance for civilian casualties” was one of the “fundamental operational things”
the personnel involved “bungled”? It is difficult to assess the basis for – and therefore the validity of
– Hartig’s conclusions since the quoted passages from his Twitter thread provide only conclusory
observations with no supporting context.
Of course, this absence of contextual support should be expected given that the NYT article is here
drawing quotes from a thread of tweets posted on Twitter as a source for expert analysis. The
perspectives presented should come as no surprise, either, since Hartig offers in the thread, “If you
follow my writing, you know that I support strong policy restraints on drone strikes.”
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In any event, the expert analysis presented by Luke Hartig suggests that current DoD practice is
plagued by a systemic accountability gap and that, according to Hartig, “a bigger evaluation of the
drone program” is required as a result.
Like the assertions by John Sifton presented earlier in the article, however, these observations from
Luke Hartig claiming that the strike evinces “massive flaws in targeting methodology” are
conclusory and appear to be based on the outcome of the attack rather than supported by factual
evidence involving the process that led to the strike.
Senator Chris Murphy on Twitter: “Killing Kids and Civilians Will Be Tolerated”?
Finally, this particular NYT story ends with one concluding reflection involving accountability that
also happens to be extracted from Twitter – from Senator Chris Murphy this time. Of the
accountability characterizations presented in the NYT article, this final one is perhaps the most
perplexing yet certainly the most sensational.
As the article notes, Senator Murphy asserts in the Twitter post, “There must be accountability” for
the strike. In the post, Murphy continues, “If there are no consequences for a strike this disastrous, it
signals to the entire drone program chain of command that killing kids and civilians will be
tolerated.” The current brief analysis of Sen. Murphy’s reflections focuses on the apparent standard
for accountability articulated in his social media post since this is the subject of the present
engagement.
However, it is worth noting that the concern that a lack of consequences will signal to “the entire
drone program” that it is fine to kill kids and civilians is rather bewildering. Although I have
combed through organizational formations described on the Department of Defense website, as far
as I can tell there exists no unified command structure anywhere in the DoD known as the “drone
program” that must be taught a lesson in accountability from this attack.
Back to the substantive topic of accountability, Sen. Murphy fails to articulate an actual standard for
which imposition of “consequences” would be appropriate in the wake of a targeting operation that
results in civilian casualties.
If personnel involved in the attack deliberately engaged civilians and did so in the knowledge that
the anticipated incidental damage would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage expected from the strike, thereby violating the LOAC distinction and proportionality
rules, respectively, severe consequences would absolutely be warranted. If an assessment
determined that the personnel failed to take feasible precautions in the attack or violated applicable
rules of engagement or other existing use of force policy, consequences would likewise be
appropriate.
However, neither existing LOAC rules nor ROE requirements call for imposition of “consequences”
simply because a strike is “this disastrous.” This, of course, represents a demand for accountability
based on the outcome of the attack rather than the process that led to the strike – and this constitutes
a fundamental misapplication of relevant law and policy involving the conduct of hostilities.
The same is true regarding the assertion that a lack of consequences will indicate to “the entire
drone program” that “killing kids and civilians will be tolerated.” If the personnel involved in the
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attack were aware that the attack would kill children and civilians and the children and civilians
were assessed not to be taking a direct part in hostilities at the time and the anticipated incidental
damage were assessed to be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
expected and the personnel conducted the strike anyway, then a failure to impose consequences
would indeed send a corrosive message to personnel throughout the DoD.
Otherwise, the demand, from a currently-serving United States Senator, that “there must be
accountability” is misguided. Nonetheless, the NYT article currently being examined closes with
Sen. Murphy’s ill-informed Twitter post, and in so doing the story advances the media depiction of
a failure of accountability for the Kabul drone strike.
Consolidating Reflections Related to “Accountability” Perceptions Fashioned in NYT Coverage of
the Kabul Drone Strike
Taken together, the sustained NYT reporting involving the “Kabul drone strike” cultivates the
appearance that this “bungled” attack is merely one exhibit demonstrating “massive flaws” in
existing systemic targeting methodology that is likewise part of a “terrible track record” following
“decades of failed accountability” and that a failure to impose “consequences” sends the message
throughout the military that “killing kids and civilians will be tolerated.”
Unfortunately for the integrity of the reporting, not one of the commentators to which the journalists
turn for expert analysis apparently applies the known facts of the attack to existing doctrinal law
and policy in a dispassionate manner to develop informed and balanced conclusions, which is the
method by which actual “accountability” measures must be assessed. Given the appearance of longstanding and widespread failures that is manufactured throughout the NYT coverage, it should
come as no surprise that this brand of reporting has been embraced by activists and scholars
advocating for a more intrusive role for Congress in regulating DoD targeting processes.
Unfortunately for the legitimacy of the emerging progressive civilian harm mitigation “reform”
movement, then, the factual predicate upon which fervid demands for outside intervention are built
are, quite simply, ill-informed and misguided. Given that this method of reporting has been
described by those in the media industry as “accountability journalism,” the skewed and
sensationalized nature of the coverage begs the question: Who is holding the media, as well as those
who would exploit the coverage to support their own agendas, “accountable” for distortions in
public perception manufactured by the reporting?
This is a question to which I return in the final analytical section of the article. First, the substantive
aspect continues in the next case study with an evaluation of recent NYT reporting involving a 2019
pair of airstrikes in Baghuz, Syria.
Case Study #2: Baghuz Strikes; March 18, 2019
The NYT headline that first “broke” the scandal involving airstrikes in Baghuz, Syria that may have
caused civilian casualties in March 2019 frames the full story well: “How the U.S. Hid an Airstrike
That Killed Dozens of Civilians in Syria.”
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What follows in the article is a harrowing account of a small band of brave service members risking
everything to doggedly hold the military to account for a devastating targeting mishap, of a rogue
special operations element bending the rules and recklessly bombing civilians along with ISIS
fighters with callous disregard for innocent human life, and of a massive coverup of a potential war
crime that represents yet another example of a systemic failure at every echelon of command to
hold military members accountable for potentially committing serious violations of the law of war
and applicable rules of engagement.
The NYT article is a genuinely compelling read in that it purports to present a disturbing and
incredibly damning inside account of how U.S. targeting operations are really conducted and
evaluated afterward across the DoD as an institution.
Unfortunately for the integrity of the journalistic account presented therein, none of it is true.
Factual Accord Between Media Reporting and Official Accounts
That is, there is no dispute that at least two airstrikes did occur and that some number of civilian
casualties resulted from the attacks. The initial DoD public accounting of the incident acknowledges
as much.
The day after the NYT article broke the “scandal,” DailyMail.com reported that CENTCOM
spokesperson Captain Bill Urban acknowledged the attack and the likelihood of civilian casualties
in an email sent to the latter news organization.
In that statement, which was also posted separately for a Just Security article available here, Captain
Urban indicates that a civilian casualty credibility assessment and a full “15-6” investigation
“concluded that at least 4 civilians were killed and 8 were wounded” in the series of two strikes and
that the “investigations were unable to conclusively characterize the status of more than 60 other
casualties that resulted from these strikes.”
So, there is no dispute between the media reporting and official accounts that two airstrikes were
directed by U.S. special operations forces on behalf of Syrian Democratic Forces partners against
ISIS targets in Baghuz Syria on March 18, 2019, and that ISIS fighters along with an indeterminate
number of civilians were killed or injured in the attacks.
Although the foundation of the NYT article is factually accurate and accords with the official
account of the incident, the portrayal of a sweeping conspiracy to cover up a potential war crime
and a corresponding systemic refusal to properly investigate or hold anyone accountable for
potentially serious violations of international law and rules of engagement has no basis in reality –
and it never has even from the day the attacks occurred.
Possible War Crime “Flagged” by a “Legal Officer”?
The portrayal of war crimes and cover ups begins in the immediate aftermath of the strikes, when an
unnamed analyst on a secure group communication platform (commonly referred to in military
parlance as “mIRC chat”) reportedly declared, “We just dropped [munitions] on 50 women and
children.”
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The NYT article goes on to chronicle the experience of a “legal officer [who] flagged the strike as a
possible war crime that required an investigation” and of an agent named Gene Tate who worked at
the time in an inspector general office. The story sets the stage for the alleged coverup by reporting
a number of reflections by Tate, whose quotes presented in the article claim, “Leadership just
seemed so set on burying this. No one wanted anything to do with it.”
In response to the supposed widespread conspiracy to cover up a potential war crime, Tate laments,
“It makes you lose faith in the system when people are trying to do what’s right but no one in
positions of leadership wants to hear it.”
The trouble is, the beleaguered protagonists in this story appear not to comprehend fundamental law
of armed conflict requirements with which the military must comply in order to “do what’s right”
when conducting targeting operations or evaluating compliance afterward. This conclusion is
apparent based on even a cursory understanding of the reported facts and the most basic
understanding of legal and policy requirements.
Unfortunately, declaring in a headline, “U.S. Forces Comply with Legal Obligations but Analysts
Mistakenly Believe Attacks May Qualify as War Crimes” does not make for a compelling media
story. Instead, every attempt is made to characterize the attack as a war crime and the response as a
cover up, and the trusted purveyors of public knowledge responsible for the media account are all
too eager to provide a platform for our courageous protagonists to shine a light on the military’s
dastardly deeds.
“‘Credible Information’ Supporting a Law of War Violation”?
The assessment of the factual predicate that may have constituted credible information indicating
that a law of war violation may have been committed with the strikes begins with an observation
presented by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Charlie Dunlap, editor of the Lawfire blog site, in an essay he
published that engages with a separate article published by Ryan Goodman on Just Security. In Maj.
Gen. (ret.) Dunlap’s article, he correctly points out that the “existence of civilian casualties, even if
‘significant in number’ do not alone necessarily constitute ‘credible information’ supporting a law
of war violation – and nothing in the DoDI suggests it does.”
The military publication to which Dunlap refers in that passage is Department of Defense Directive
2311.01, which establishes the foundation of the DoD law of war program. In his essay, Maj. Gen.
(ret.) Dunlap likewise points out that the directive requires all military members, employees, and
contractors to “report through their chain of command all reportable incidents, including those
involving allegations of non-DoD personnel having violated the law of war.”
This is the requirement the legal officer, identified in the NYT article as “Air Force lawyer” Lt. Col.
Dean Korsak and IG evaluator Gene Tate appear to have been resolutely pursuing following the
incident. When one echelon of command or inspector’s office did not respond in a manner that
satisfied Korsak and Tate, they reportedly went to the next higher echelon, and the next.
Eventually, still not satisfied with the results, the dynamic duo reportedly notified members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee of the incident and potential coverup. When that pursuit failed to
achieve adequate results, Tate was eventually reportedly fired and “escorted from the building by
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security” because of his dogged pursuit for accountability – after which he apparently decided to
take his account of supposed war crime and coverup to the press.
All along, the heroes of this harrowing story appear to have genuinely believed that they had
witnessed evidence of an incident for which Lt. Col. Korsak reportedly advised relevant authorities
to “preserve all video and other evidence” of a potential war crime. Unfortunately, this fervent
belief that a “reportable incident” has been committed and was not being properly investigated
never was based on credible information.
Instead, the allegation was founded upon an unmitigated misunderstanding of fundamental LOAC
rules and reporting requirements.
Mission Command Doctrine: Centralized Command, Distributed Control, and Decentralized
Execution
The entire narrative of violation and coverup rests on the premise that a legal advisor positioned in
the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Al-Udeid AFB in Qatar “believed he had
witnessed possible war crimes.” Throughout the explosive NYT story, there is not a shred of
evidence presented to support this characterization.
This is the case because, as an organization, the CAOC exists to serve as “the operational bridge
that integrates and synchronizes strategic decisions to tactical-level execution.” To provide that
bridge, the CAOC “commands and controls the broad spectrum of what air power brings to the
fight.” As such, the CAOC, where Korsak and Tate were located, has aptly been described as “the
nerve center of the air campaign.”
Those who are familiar with culture of the U.S. Air Force will recognize the motto that is declared
with almost charming repetition throughout the ranks, “Flexibility is the key to air power.” As a
matter of doctrine, this flexibility is implemented by executing “mission command through
centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution.”
Because the function of an air operations center (here, the CAOC) is to provide “the capability to
plan, coordinate, allocate, task, execute, monitor, and assess the activities of assigned or attached
forces,” this element is responsible for managing “distributed control” in the “centralized command,
distributed control, and decentralized execution” mission command model.
In the case of the Baghuz airstrikes, elements of Task Force 9 were reportedly responsible for the
decentralized execution aspect of mission command. Special operations ground elements would
have been under the command of Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve
(SOJTF-OIR) at the time of the battle for Baghuz, and SOJTF-OIR, in turn, was a subordinate
command of Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, or CJTF-OIR.
In that phase of the counter-ISIS campaign, CJTF-OIR was the senior echelon of command in
theater that was engaged in “conduct[ing] strikes in support of decisive battles against” ISIS. It is
this chain of command, from TF 9 to SOJTF-OIR to CJTF-OIR and ultimately to US Central
Command, then, that had responsibility for providing terminal control of air assets operating in
theater – and for evaluating LOAC compliance of those who called in airstrikes in support of
counter-ISIS operations. The CAOC is not represented in this chain of command that was
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responsible for the conduct of the airstrikes or the post-strike assessment of LOAC and ROE
compliance.
Lt. Col. Dean Korsak “Believed He Had Witnessed Possible War Crimes”?
This description of the applicable mission command structure, which situates the relevant
organizational elements in the context of their respective doctrinal responsibilities, illustrates why
Lt. Col. Dean Korsak, IG evaluator Gene Tate, and members of the CAOC in general were not in a
position to assess whether the airstrikes in question constituted war crimes. In short, their
organization exercised distributed control, while ground elements in theater conducted decentralized
execution.
When the unnamed analyst reportedly declared on mIRC chat that “we just dropped on 50 women
and children,” the observers were forming an assessment founded upon the outcome of the attack.
As the analysis related to the Kabul drone strike in the initial case study of this article describes,
endeavoring to evaluate an attack “based on the outcome of the attack rather than the process” is a
misapplication of the relevant LOAC rules.
This is a point Maj. Gen. (ret.) Charlie Dunlap makes in his Lawfire essay regarding the Baghuz
strikes when he succinctly observes, “mistakes, errors and accidents are inevitable consequences of
combat, and they are not necessarily ‘war crimes’ even where significant civilian casualties result.”
The initial NYT story involving the Baghuz strikes notes that the responsible command initially
determined that “no formal war crime notification, criminal investigation or disciplinary action was
warranted” in part because an inquiry determined that the incidental damage caused by the attacks
was “accidental.”
This should have been the end of the inquiry for the concerned protagonists at the CAOC. Instead
they continued to press the issue, mistakenly believing that a reportable incident had occurred and a
potential war crime had been committed because of the extent of the civilian casualties they
assessed were inflicted as a result of the attack.
As I explained in the comments section of a CAAFlog (2.0) entry the day after the NYT story was
published, the “relevant war crime [here, of violating the LOAC proportionality rule] is
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that the incidental damage will be clearly
excessive in relation to the direct overall military advantage anticipated.” (emphasis in original)
Operators situated in the CAOC were not in a position to assess the intent of the personnel
responsible for carrying out the attack.
Unfortunately, it appears that they simply did not know any better. Although they reportedly found
the “topic and incidents” to be “dead on arrival” when raising the issue with their supervisors, this
was not a reflection of institutional indifference or, worse, a grand conspiracy to cover up a war
crime. Rather, it was a function of the attacks correctly being assessed by the appropriate echelon of
command not to constitute a violation of applicable LOAC rules or ROE requirements.
In short, to borrow the relevant terminology from DoDD 2311.01, there was no “credible
information” to support the allegation that a “violation of the law of war” had been committed. As
such, the attack did not constitute a “reportable incident” for Lt. Col. Korsak, Mr. Tate, or anyone
else from the CAOC to doggedly pursue “through the chain of command to the Combatant
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Commander” and beyond – and ultimately, for Mr. Tate it seems, all the way to the New York
Times.
Sensationalized Reporting and Anticlimactic Conclusion
Of course, journalists with the New York Times have little incentive to portray the story in a
manner consistent with applicable LOAC rules and ROE requirements – even if the journalists are
qualified to accurately assess compliance with international law and military policy involving the
use of force in the first instance. Instead, the initial story and the subsequent reports construct a
narrative that creates the impression that military targeting operations are plagued by incompetence
and that accountability processes are inadequate and readily manipulated.
An unnamed person who it seems was stationed at the CAOC reported that a “number of officers in
the operations center suspected that the [special operations] task force was including misleading
information in the logs to justify strikes.” A self-styled “human rights organization” known as
“Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently” reportedly “posted photos of the bodies” that remained after
the battle for Baghuz and described the scene as a “terrible massacre.” A witness to the carnage left
in the wake of the battle noted that the site was bulldozed soon after the fighting ceased.
And all of these revelations are utilized to carefully spin a narrative describing, to return to the
headline of the article, “how the U.S. hid an airstrike that killed dozens of civilians in Syria.” Two
days after the initial NYT story was published, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reportedly
requested to be briefed on the incident. Less than two weeks later and partially in response to the
public outcry that ensued following the initial story, Secretary Austin directed General Michael
Garrett, commander of Army Forces Command, to conduct an independent review of the incident.
That review was completed on 11 May, and a two-page executive summary was published by the
DoD a few days later. According to the executive summary, Gen. Garrett “established a joint review
committee” that consisted “of 20 personnel, including four general officers and 16 additional
personnel, all with various subject matter expertise.”
The committee spent approximately 2 months (presumably accounting for holiday block leave
period that occurred during the review) evaluating “all relevant reports of investigation and
associated documents” and “sought additional information when necessary from all relevant
operating units.” The results of this extensive review were consistent with the findings of the initial
investigation conducted by the responsible echelon of command: no violations of applicable law
and policy were committed and, therefore, no one involved should be considered for adverse
personnel action as a result of the incident.
Throughout this review, no evidence is identified of falsified logs. There was no indication that
relevant personnel stretched or mischaracterized applicable rules of engagement to obtain approval
for the attacks. There was no war crime and, as a result, nothing to conspire to cover up.
Nonetheless, (now) former IG evaluator Gene Tate remains unconvinced – and this is the narrative
NYT media accounts continue to market.

Page 19 of 87

Official Findings: A “Cascade of Mistakes” and a Faulty Review?
On the same day the executive summary was released to the public, the New York Times published
yet another story involving the Baghuz strikes. Although the headline of this latest article suggests
that Gen. Garrett’s assessment “faults [the initial] review of [the] deadly airstrike,” this headline
presents the misleading impression that the subsequent evaluation found the initial investigation to
be faulty.
This is a mischaracterization of Gen. Garrett’s summarized findings. So too is the assertion in the
NYT article that Garrett found a “cascade of mistakes that led to the strike.” The findings Gen.
Garrett actually presents in the executive summary are that ground force commander “demonstrated
awareness and concern for CIVCAS and took steps to mitigate harm” but that “through no fault of
his own, the [commander] relied on data that was not fully accurate.” (emphasis added)
This finding does not reveal a “cascade of mistakes that led to the strike” but rather a determination
that the commander “acted reasonably and within the bounds of the ROE and LOW.” Likewise,
regarding the actual initial reviews of the incident, Gen. Garrett found that “decisions throughout
the process were made by the individual with the authority to do so, and decisions were made
within their scope of authority” but the proper “administrative steps to close the incident” did not
occur in accordance with timelines established in relevant policies. (emphasis added)
So, in the end, the actual initial review of the incident was not determined to be faulty, as the NYT
headline indicates. Even so, the media report remains steadfastly committed to maintaining the
appearance that the initial investigations were deficient.
“Standard Government Line” – or “No Evidence to Support These Allegations”?
Indeed, the article returns to one of our original protagonists who was first convinced that a war
crime had been committed and the responsible command had not adequately investigated the
incident. As former IG evaluator Gene Tate opines after the results of the subsequent review were
announced to the public, “It’s the standard government line: Mistakes were made but there was no
wrongdoing.”
Tate then continues, “None of the worker bees involved believe it was delayed.” Instead, “[w]e
believe there was no reporting.” Although this latest NYT story provides a link to Gen. Garrett’s
executive summary and spins the findings to suggest that a “cascade of mistakes” led to the civilian
casualties and the initial reviews were faulty, there are several important aspects of the executive
summary that appear to have escaped the attention of the journalists involved.
That is, Gen. Garrett directly addresses the allegations of LOAC violations and coverup that formed
the basis of the original NYT story.
On one such occasion, Gen. Garrett recalls that an initial allegation filed as a “DoD Inspector
General Hotline Complaint” was originally closed as “unsubstantiated.” Incidentally, this appears to
be the same “hotline complaint with the inspector general’s office in August 2019” the initial NYT
story reports was filed by Lt. Col. Dean Korsak from the CAOC.
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In addressing this initial complaint (apparently) filed by Lt. Col. Korsak, Gen. Garrett details that
based on his “extensive review of the facts and circumstances,” he agrees the complaint “was
unsubstantiated” and he further finds “a number of assertions made that are not supported by
evidence and/or are based on inaccurate or false information.”
After dismissing this original IG complaint, Gen. Garrett goes on to explain that a “secondary basis
for the allegations of concealment and wrongdoing was a series of three articles published by the
New York Times.” In relation to this reporting, Gen. Garrett finds determines that a “thorough
analysis of all available information indicates there is no evidence to support these allegations as
they relate to the strikes” examined by his review.
Pervasive Errors in NYT Reporting, Not Airstrikes or Official Response
In the end, then, the information upon which the NYT media story was built and from which the
flames of scandal and coverup were fanned was found to be baseless – all of it. The war crime, the
refusal to investigate, the widespread conspiracy to cover up the “crime,” and the failure to hold
anyone to account. The allegations were unsubstantiated and not supported by evidence all along.
These are findings that New York Times journalists Eric Schmitt and Dave Philips elected not to
emphasize when reporting on the secondary review conducted by Gen. Michael Garrett. Indeed, this
omission appears to be in the best interests of their employer and the team of journalists involved in
this series of reporting.
Although these seemingly significant findings expressed in Gen. Garrett’s executive summary
appear to have escaped the attention of the journalists involved, the article does not miss the
opportunity to point out that the team was awarded a Pulitzer Prize earlier in May for the series of
reporting regarding U.S. military “airstrikes gone wrong” – including reporting related to the
Baghuz airstrikes.
How inconvenient must it be to receive a Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting and then a few
weeks later to report on a high-level review that involved 20 personnel and took over two months to
complete that determines the sensational complaints upon which a centerpiece of your prizewinning reporting was built were actually unsubstantiated and not supported by evidence all along?
It is hard to say for sure without asking Eric Schmitt, Dave Philipps, and their editorial team
directly, but this query may help explain why these seemingly central findings presented in Gen.
Garrett’s executive summary are not reflected in the most recent NYT story.
It appears that Gen. Garrett and his team conclusively determined that the airstrikes and the
subsequent initial inquiries complied with relevant legal and policy requirements, even if one of our
original protagonists who is quoted in the most recent story was and remains unconvinced.
With the narratives and perceptions created by NYT reporting involving the airstrikes in Baghuz,
Syria demonstrated to be built upon baseless assertions and inaccurate understandings of relevant
law and policy, the substantive analysis now transitions to the final case study, which conducts a
critical assessment of NYT reporting involving a series of airstrikes on Taqba Dam near Raqqa in
Syria.
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Case Study #3: Tabqa Dam Strikes; March 26, 2017
The central media reporting involving strikes on and around the Taqba Dam conducted by the U.S.
military in 2017 is limited primarily to one NYT article. However, the coverage provided therein
contributes to and reinforces many of the narratives and perceptions crafted in this line of reporting:
those of a U.S. military element bending (and perhaps even breaking) the rules with impunity and
with no accountability and with reckless disregard for the wellbeing of civilians who may be
affected by the use of force.
As is the case for the other case studies conducted above, these carefully-curated perceptions do not
withstand the scrutiny of a balanced and informed critical assessment.
It is worth noting at the outset of the analysis that an active duty U.S. Army judge advocate, Maj.
Matt Montazzoli, has already performed an assessment of international law applicable to the strikes
on Taqba Dam in a guest essay on Lawfire. While the focus of Maj. Montazzoli’s essay is an
explanation of international law involving dam strikes in general along with the U.S. view
specifically of relevant rules, the impetus for his essay was NYT coverage of a series of U.S.
airstrikes on the Tabqa Dam near Raqqa, Syria that occurred in March 2017.
Although Maj. Montazzoli does address the reporting and it is the coverage that inspired his essay,
then, an assessment of the media story is not the direct focus of his analysis. Engaging with NYT
reporting is the central focus of the present article, so I will engage with or build upon a number of
topics Maj. Montazzoli addresses in his work on the subject.
No-strike List: Administrative Classification “Largely Divorced” from Legality of Strike
The headline for the NYT article currently being assessed sets the stage for the tone of the narrative
engineered in the substantive coverage: “A Dam in Syria Was on a ‘No-Strike’ List. The U.S.
Bombed It Anyway.” The ensuing coverage cultivates a depiction of a rogue, secretive U.S. special
operations element bending – or perhaps breaking – the rules related to the use of force in order to
accomplish victory against ISIS in Syria but, in doing so, jeopardizing civilians and doing so with
impunity.
The central hook utilized to shape this carefully-cultivated portrayal is an emphasis on the fact that
the Tabqa Dam was listed on the operational “no-strike list” at the time of the attacks. Maj.
Montazzoli correctly observes in passing that a no-strike list is “an administrative classification
largely divorced from the legality of a strike under international law” in his essay.
However, Maj. Montazzoli does not explain why that is since the focus of his analysis is compliance
with international law rather than with administrative requirements. For present purposes, an
explanation of the actual function and use of a no-strike list is central to assessing the validity of the
narratives presented in the NYT story.
Characterization in Media Reporting of Airstrikes in the Context of Applying a No-Strike List
According to the media report, ISIS was using the dam and the surrounding area as weapons depot,
command center, and fighting position. The NYT article notes that CENTCOM spokesperson Capt.
Bill Urban described in a press briefing that “U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces tried to take
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control of the dam and came under fire from enemy fighters, taking ‘heavy casualties.’” To support
the SDF effort, the article notes that the coalition then “struck the dam.”
The NYT story goes on to assert that attacking the dam, or other “key civilian sites on the
coalition’s ‘no-strike list’” required “elaborate vetting and the approval of senior leaders.” Instead,
the article cites unnamed and unidentified “current and former military personnel” who reportedly
claimed the “solution” to the “problem” of burdensome restrictions on the use of force that was
developed by the secretive special operations element supporting the SDF “too often was to set
aside the rules intended to protect civilians.”
According to these unnamed “current and former military personnel,” soon the special operations
element “was justifying the vast majority of its airstrikes using emergency self-defense
procedures…even when not troops were in danger” and this allowed the secretive task force “to
quickly hit targets – including no-strike sites – that would have otherwise been off limits.”
(emphasis added) As the commentary presented by the journalists observes, “Perhaps no single
incident shows the brazen use of self-defense rules and the potentially devastating costs more than
the strike on the Tabqa Dam.”
In a similar characterization, the NYT article likewise asserts that unidentified “former officials”
who claim that because of the “dam’s protected status, the decision to strike it would normally have
been made high up the chain of command.” However, according to these unnamed former officials,
the special operations task force on the ground in Syria routinely “used a procedural shortcut
reserved for emergencies, allowing it to launch the attack without clearance.”
After noting that these “two former officials” claim that some other unnamed and unidentified
“officers overseeing the air war viewed the task force’s actions as reckless,” the NYT story then
transitions to remarks that are attributed to an identified source. Here, the article attributes to retired
Air Force Colonel Scott F. Murray an observation suggesting, “Even with careful planning, hitting a
dam with such large bombs would likely have been seen by top leaders as unacceptably dangerous.”
According to Col. (ret.) Murray, “Using a 2,000-pound bomb against a restricted target like a dam is
extremely difficult and should have never been done on the fly.”
With these characterizations of a task force routinely bypassing required procedures for approving
attacks against otherwise protected objects thus in focus, what of the claim that the inclusion of
Taqba Dam on the no-strike list should have required “elaborate vetting” and that the dam would
have “otherwise been off limits” but the task force on the ground circumvented these constraints
that are “intended to protect civilians” by “brazenly” abusing “self-defense rules”? Answering this
question begins with a basic understanding of the actual purpose and operational use of a no-strike
list.
Purpose and Use of a No-Strike List
The NYT story is correct to cite and link to the military publication known as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3160.01A here, for this instruction establishes doctrinal policy
related to “No-strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology” – as the name of the
publication describes. The version linked in the NYT article was published in October 2012 and has
since been superseded, though the current version – CJCSI 3160.01D of the same title – is only
available for military and other selected government officials with an active Common Access Card.
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However, for present purposes the guidance established in 3160.01A is adequate and has not
changed substantially across the 3 successive updates.
The first task in assessing the characterization of a no-strike list depicted in the NYT story is to
describe exactly what an NSL is and what it does. As the glossary to CJCSI 3160.01A summarizes,
an NSL is simply a list of no-strike entities (NSE). No-strike entities, in turn, are described as
objects that are “functionally characterized [by the law of war] as civilian and/or noncombatant in
nature and, therefore are protected from the effects of military operations under international law
and/or rules of engagement.”
A no-strike list, then, is simply a catalog of known civilian objects within a given theater of
operations. The catalog is collected in a Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB), which “is the
vehicle to archive requisite data on” no-strike entities. The list is compiled by utilizing a
standardized approval and development process, and each known NSE is assigned a standardized
category code – or “CATCODE” – that summarizes its function as a civilian object. Incidentally,
based on the description of Taqba Dam provided in the NYT story, the MIDB CATCODE for
Taqba Dam was likely 43910, which is the code for concrete dams.
Because the structure can be described as a “dam or dike whose engagement may result in the
flooding of civilian areas,” Taqba Dam was almost certainly characterized as a “Category I” nostrike facility (which is a term used throughout the Instruction synonymously with no-strike entity).
The “Category I” (or CAT I) no-strike facility/entity, in turn, is the group that “includes the most
sensitive subset of NSFs addressed by the LOW, other international and domestic laws, and
significant policy concerns.” CAT I no-strike entities are further described as objects that “typically
constitute the core of the” no-strike list.
Although the definitions of NSL and NSE both describe objects that are known to be protected from
being made the object of attack pursuant to the law of armed conflict – a description that essentially
summarizes the LOAC distinction rule since this is the central aspect of international law that is
relevant for present purposes – why would Maj. Matt Montazolli assert that an NSL is “an
administrative classification largely divorced from the legality of a strike under international law”?
There are two processes that are also summarized in the glossary to CJCSI 3160.01A that help
answer that question.
First is the “no-strike process,” which is defined as the “process used to identify, analyze, verify,
catalog, and disseminate information about entities that are to be protected from negative effects of
military operations.” Second is a term with broad application in the targeting process known as
positive identification, or PID. As the glossary describes, PID “is defined as the reasonable certainty
that a functionally and geospatially defined object of attack is a legitimate military target in
accordance with the LOW and applicable ROE.” As the next section related to practical application
of the NSL explains, obtaining “positive identification” of adversarial ISIS personnel and
equipment resulted in at least the temporary loss of protection that had been accorded to the Taqba
Dam by virtue of its identified status as a civilian object during the no-strike process.
When applying basic rules of the law of armed conflict, the dam qualified as a military objective at
the time of the airstrikes – and this is the case whether or not Taqba Dam had been identified during
the no-strike process as a CAT I NSE at the time. As Maj. Montazolli observed, then, inclusion of
the dam on the NSL genuinely is an administrative classification that is largely divorced from the
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legality of the strikes. However, as the next section describes, an administrative process still guided
the conditions under which the dam could be attacked even with the temporary loss of protected
status. With the general purpose and use of a no-strike list thus in focus, characterizations presented
in the NYT story of the way in which U.S. personnel reportedly skirted the rules involving no-strike
entities in practice can be evaluated.
Practical Application and Loss of Protected Status
The analysis related to practical application of the NSL and no-strike process in general picks up
with the assertion presented in the NYT story by two unnamed “former officials” that “[g]iven the
dam’s protected status, the decision to strike it would normally have been made high up the chain of
command.” According to the general rule established in CJCSI 3160.01A, this claim is correct. The
same is true of the journalistic commentary observing that attacking an object listed on the no-strike
list would have “required elaborate vetting and the approval of senior leaders.”
The general rule established in the Instruction – for which there are two primary exceptions – is that
a combatant commander “or authorized designee may approve the [no-strike] entity for attack” if
the NSE is determined to be “used to advance military or hostile force objectives” as Taqba Dam
was at the time of the strikes. Although the presence of a possible operational delegation from the
combatant commander, here the head of U.S. Central Command, would be classified and therefore
not generally known to the public, the general rule established by default in the Instruction certainly
supports the characterization in the NYT article that approval for the strikes “would normally have
been made high up in the chain of command.” The paragraph that establishes the general rule in
CJCSI 3160.01A goes on to refer the reader to a later section in the Instruction – a segment labeled
“Change of Status – for further guidance.
The additional guidance in the “Change of Status” further clarifies that the “CCDR [combatant
commander] or his/her designated representative is the only level of command authorized to change
the status of” a no-strike entity unless “designated by a higher authority.” Because combatant
commanders are subordinate only to the Secretary of Defense and the president, these are the only
two positions with “higher authority” to permit delegation below the combatant command level.
According to the general rule, then, it is certainly accurate to observe that “elaborate vetting and the
approval of senior leaders” would be necessary prior to attacking military objectives on Taqba Dam.
However, the next paragraph of the “Change of Status” section in the Instruction provides two
exceptions to the general rule.
The first exception occurs when “intelligence confirms the use of the NSE for a military purpose
and the need to strike is time sensitive (whereupon it is nominated as a TST [time-sensitive
target]).” The second exception arises if “troops are in contact and taking hostile fire from
traditional” no-strike entities. When either exception applies, the Instruction reverses the general
rule requiring high-level approval for a change of status by establishing, “Unless this authority is
expressly limited in SecDef-provided supplemental ROE [rules of engagement], operational
imperatives and established ROE, including the inherent right and obligation of self-defense,
provide the requisite authority to engage in these instances.” (emphasis added)
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NSL Exception #1: Time-Sensitive Targets
Based on these two exceptions to the general rule requiring combatant commander approval for a
change of status, the factual background reported in the NYT article reveals that both exceptions
applied and, therefore, “elaborate vetting and the approval of senior leaders” was not in fact
required based on the prevailing circumstances prior to the airstrikes. The media story goes to great
lengths in an attempt to cast doubt on a potential claim that the self-defense exception would have
applied at the time. The self-defense characterization, therefore, is addressed in further detail below
in the next section of this article.
However, guidance established in CJCSI 3160.01A, for which the NYT article provides a direct
hyperlink when claiming that “elaborate vetting” was required prior to obtaining approval for the
strikes, provides for an exception to the general rule that does not involve a self-defense
engagement. The glossary of the Instruction goes on to define a time-sensitive target – for which the
first of two listed exceptions applies – as a “target requiring immediate response because it is a
highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly
forces.” (emphasis added) There are a number of factual conditions presented in the NYT story
supporting the conclusion that the dam qualified as a military objective (and had therefore lost
protection as a no-strike entity) but also qualified as a time-sensitive target at the time that the
airstrikes were approved.
As the NYT story describes, for example, the Taqba Dam was one of several “no-strike sites” being
used by ISIS “as weapons depots, command centers and fighting positions.” Indeed, the NYT article
opens by noting that the dam was a “strategic linchpin” and that “the Islamic State controlled it.”
The factual depiction presented in the story further describes that ISIS “militants kept a small
garrison in the dam’s towers, where the thick concrete walls and sweeping view created a readymade fortress.” As the article notes, U.S. and coalition forces were aware that ISIS would need to be
dislodged from Taqba Dam in part “to prevent the enemy from intentionally flooding allied forces
downstream.”
When describing the conditions that existed prior to conducting the airstrikes, the NYT article notes
that “the U.S.-led coalition controlled the north shore of the reservoir and the Islamic State
controlled the south” and that the “two sides had been in a standoff for weeks.” The article then
presents an observation from a spokesperson from U.S. Central Command, Capt. Bill Urban, who
“said that U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces tried to take control of the dam and came under
fire from enemy fighters, taking ‘heavy casualties.’” The next sentence of the NYT story glosses
over any potential operational developments that may have occurred after the SDF took “heavy
casualties” while trying to take control of the structure by concluding, “Then the coalition struck the
dam.”
Whether or not the prevailing factual conditions activated the self-defense exception to the general
rule regarding vetting and senior-leader approval for a strike against a no-strike entity, then, the
scenario presented directly in the NYT article unambiguously establishes that the exception
involving time-sensitive targets did apply. That is, the dam qualified as a “target requiring
immediate response” both because it was “highly lucrative” and because it posed (or soon would
pose) “a danger to friendly forces.” Indeed, yet another quote from Capt. Urban that is presented in
the article, in which the spokesperson observes that the attacks “prevented ISIS from weaponizing”
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the dam and that ISIS “would have inflicted further suffering on the people of Syria” if the
insurgents had not been dislodged from Taqba Dam, further supports the TST characterization.
As such, applying the factual narrative presented in the NYT story to the guidance established in the
Instruction for which the article provides a hyperlink refutes the claim made by the journalists that
attacking the dam “required elaborate vetting and the approval of senior leaders.” By virtue of
qualifying as a time-sensitive target, strikes on Taqba Dam under these conditions would have been
permitted based on the prevailing “operational imperatives” and would not have required approval
from senior leaders – specifically the commander of U.S. Central Command. This is the case
whether or not the other exception involving self-defense applies. Nonetheless, because the NYT
story goes to great lengths to discredit a potential self-defense characterization, the next section
continues the analysis involving application of the no-strike list by engaging with the requirements
for self-defense strikes and how these are characterized in the NYT article.
NSL Exception #2: Self-Defense
The manner in which the journalists responsible for writing the story related to the attacks on Taqba
Dam characterize invocation of self-defense rules by U.S. military ground units is consistent with
one overarching theme that permeates recent NYT coverage of DoD targeting operations abroad.
Ground forces are typically represented as shadowy, secretive special operations elements operating
with little oversight while bending, or outright breaking, rules intended to safeguard innocent
civilians – and then taking deliberate measures to conceal their activities and to cover up evidence
when allegations of wrongdoing are levied against them. Depictions of these shadowy units
routinely abusing rules permitting engagements in self-defense are one primary tool that is
leveraged by the journalists to help shape this narrative, and the story involving the airstrikes at
Taqba Dam abounds with such characterizations.
The first mention of self-defense rules presented in the story is offered near the beginning of the
article in conjunction with the claim that attacking “a dam, or other key civilian sites on the
coalition’s ‘no-strike list,’ required elaborate vetting and the approval of senior leaders.” After
noting that ISIS “sought to exploit” rules designed to protect civilian objects by using “no-strike
sites as weapons depots, command centers and fighting positions,” the story cites unidentified
“current and former military personnel” claiming that the U.S. military ground “task force’s
solution to this problem too often was to set aside the rules intended to protect civilians.”
According to the story, “Soon, the [ground] task force was justifying the vast majority of its
airstrikes using emergency self-defense procedures intended to save troops in life-threatening
situations, even when no troops were in danger.” Doing so reporting allowed the task force “to
quickly hit targets — including no-strike sites — that would have otherwise been off limits.”
Consistent with this trend of purportedly abusing rules related to self-defense, the NYT story
claims, “Perhaps no single incident shows the brazen use of self-defense rules and the potentially
devastating costs more than the strike on the Tabqa Dam.” After the journalists dedicate a
significant portion of the article to supporting this characterization, the story claims among the
concluding lines that even after the attacks on Taqba Dam, the “secret unit continued to strike
targets using the same types of self-defense justifications it had used on the dam.”
According to the narrative careful curated by the NYT journalists, then, the “secret unit” operating
on the ground in support of the SDF in Syria routinely bypassed more exacting restrictions on the
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use of force by providing a fraudulent self-defense justification for airstrikes. This was purportedly
the case well before the airstrikes at Taqba Dam as well as long after, and during the entirety of the
counter-ISIS campaign the attacks on the dam were perhaps “the most brazen use of self-defense
rules” in order to circumvent more stringent constraints on the use of force. Just like the
characterizations related specifically to implementation of the no-strike list described above,
however, these claims presented in the NYT story do not constitute an accurate analysis of the
actual relevant rules.
Although the story never does cite to or articulate actual rules involving the use of force in selfdefense, the journalists do present a number of reflections that contribute to the narrative suggesting
that the “secret unit” broke those rules on this occasion. Here, the article links to what it describes
as a “military report obtained through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.” The “report” is
merely a two-page memorandum (with only one substantive sentence and a signature block on the
second page) with the subject line that reads, “CIVCAS [Civilian Casualty] Allegation Closure
Report, Allegation No. 1067, Raqqa, Syria, 26 March [20]20.”
As the title suggests, this internal memorandum is not intended to present a detailed review of
airstrikes on or around Taqba Dam. Rather, it is simply a report that provides a record
demonstrating that the U.S. military received an allegation that an attack resulted in civilian
casualties, that the allegation was evaluated, and ultimately determined to be “not credible” based
on a review of available evidence. This summary memorandum closing the civilian casualty
credibility assessment implements reporting requirements established by executive order as well as
obligations established by statute.
Notwithstanding the inherently perfunctory purpose of this CIVCAS Allegation Closure Report, the
journalists responsible for the NYT article utilize the memorandum as the foundation from which to
develop several significant analytical assumptions. For example, although the primary substantive
paragraph of the report is heavily redacted, the story points out that the term “terrain denial” is used
in the memorandum – at least to describe an undetermined number of the three targets that were
attacked in the relevant strikes. Relatedly, the story points out that the memorandum “makes no
mention of enemy forces firing or heavy casualties.”
Based on these observations, the NYT article presents analytical conclusions developed from two
anonymous “former officials” who determine that allied forces “were not in danger of being
overrun by enemy fighters” when the airstrikes were requested. Instead, according to these
unidentified analysts, “the task force’s goal was likely to preemptively destroy fighting positions in
the towers.” As a result, the “two former officials” reportedly conclude that “[l]aunching that type
of offensive strike under self-defense rules was a stunning departure from how the air war was
supposed to work.” Unfortunately for the legitimacy of the conclusions presented in the NYT story,
neither the facts that are presented in the article nor the actual existing military doctrine support the
conclusions presented by the two former officials quoted in the article.
As an initial matter, it is impossible to extrapolate any analytical conclusions based on the use of the
term “terrain denial” in the perfunctory memorandum. As U.S. Army judge advocate Maj. Matt
Montazzoli correctly describes when explaining the issue of “terrain denial fires on the modern
battlefield,” this is a “non-doctrinal” term. Instead, it is utilized in a fairly colloquial manner in a
number of different contexts in military fire support community. Because “terrain denial” is not a
doctrinal term, it is impossible to determine the intent of the personnel who requested the air
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support at the time of the strikes or the rules of engagement justification presented for the attacks.
Likewise, there is no legitimate basis upon which the unidentified “former officials” to determine
whether the goal of the personnel from the special operations task force “was likely to preemptively
destroy the fighting positions in the towers.”
Regarding the specific characterizations presented in the story related to rules for using force in
self-defense, referring to actual existing doctrine reveals that the analysis offered by the journalists
and two unidentified former officials is also not sustainable. Although classified operational ROE
will expand upon foundational doctrine, guidance presented in the unclassified portion of the
current Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) establishes “fundamental policies and procedures
governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders and their forces during all military
operations…occurring outside U.S. territory.”
The basic rule related to self-defense established in the SROE is that U.S. forces may use force “in
response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent,” and this authorization extends to the
defense “of designated non-U.S. military forces.” The SROE goes on to define “hostile act” as “an
attack or use of force” against U.S. or other designated forces and “hostile intent” as a “threat of
imminent use of force” against the same. Regarding the ambiguous term “imminent” that is utilized
in the definition of “hostile intent,” the SROE clarifies that a “determination of whether the use of
force against U.S. forces is imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances
known to U.S. forces at the time” and that the determination “may be made at any level.” The
SROE then clarifies, “Imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.”
When the anonymous “former officials” conclude that mention of “terrain denial” fire support
suggests that “allied forces were not in danger of being overrun by enemy fighters” when the
airstrikes on Taqba Dam were requested, the conclusion not only rests on an erroneous
characterization based on the non-doctrinal term “terrain denial,” it also constitutes a fundamental
misapplication of actual U.S. military doctrine. That is, self-defense rules of engagement do not
require U.S. or partnered elements to be “in danger of being overrun” to allow for a self-defense
ROE justification. If U.S. forces determined that ISIS fighters at Taqba Dam presented a “threat of
imminent use of force,” a self-defense attack would be justified regardless of whether U.S. or
supported elements were “in danger of being overrun.”
The factual conditions reported in the NYT story suggest that a self-defense engagement was, in
fact, permissible. If CENTCOM spokesperson Capt. Bill Urban was correct when he claimed that
the SDF had tried to take control of the dam and took “heavy casualties” after taking fire from
enemy fighters, and assuming that the ISIS fighters were still present at the dam (which is apparent
from the CIVCAS Allegation Closure Report linked in the story), it is reasonable to conclude that
ISIS fighters at the dam presented a “threat of imminent use of force” against the SDF if the
partnered forces did intend to try again to retake Taqba Dam. If so, the requested airstrikes would
qualify for a self-defense engagement, regardless of whether U.S. or partnered forces were “in
danger of being overrun” at the time.
As such, the claim offered by the unidentified former officials that “[l]aunching that type of
offensive strike under self-defense rules was a stunning departure from how the air war was
supposed to work” is categorically erroneous. Regardless of the specious conclusions presented
from these unidentified officials, there is no information presented in the NYT article that would
conclusively support an assertion that a self-defense ROE justification was unwarranted. Indeed, the
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CIVCAS Allegation Closure Report memorandum linked by the story concludes that the attacks
“complied with” the law of armed conflict and were “authorized under the relevant” rules of
engagement. This is a conclusion that was reached by the reviewing official after a “thorough
review of all available strike records.”
In the end, nothing presented in the NYT story actually does support the claimed characterization
that “[p]erhaps no single incident shows the brazen use of self-defense rules and the potentially
devastating costs more than the strike on the Tabqa Dam.” Nor do the airstrikes support the general
narrative the journalists attempt to careful craft of a special forces task force that is out of control
and that routinely abuses rules involving self-defense to justify otherwise unjustifiable attacks. If
the “secret unit” indeed did continue “to strike targets using the same types of self-defense
justifications it had used on the dam” as the journalists contend, there is nothing in the story to
demonstrate that the airstrikes on Tabqa Dam or anywhere else actually did violate existing rules.
This may well explain why, as the anonymous “officials” reveal, “[n]o disciplinary action was taken
against the task force” for claiming a self-defense justification for the airstrikes. Applying the
reported facts to actual existing policy supports the conclusion that the requests for air support
complied with rules involving the use of force, despite the concerted efforts undertaken by the
journalists responsible for this story to demonstrate otherwise. As the concluding section of the
Taqba Dam case study describes, these self-defense narratives seem to be part of a broader scheme
to discredit official claims and replace them instead with narratives developed in the relevant media
coverage – though these substitute narratives are themselves of questionable merit.
Calculated Efforts to Refute Official Claims – With Misleading Narratives
Characterizations purporting to present the abuse of rules related to the use of force in self-defense
contribute to a theme curated throughout NYT coverage of airstrikes in Baghuz and on Taqba Dam
of a “secret” special operations unit operating with minimal oversight and with minimal regard for
the safety and wellbeing of any unfortunate civilians who may happen to be in the area. This
perception contributes to the sense that additional oversight – perhaps from an entity external to the
Department of Defense – is needed in order to keep these rogue elements in check where the DoD
has seemingly demonstrated it is unable or unwilling to do so. However, this overarching theme of
out-of-control secretive elements bending and at times breaking relevant rules supports a perception
of arguably even wider importance.
In short, the nature of the media coverage seems to be calculated to create the appearance that
claims presented from official sources are either ill-informed or perhaps even deliberately
misleading. As such, according to the appearance created by the reporting, it is up to the trustworthy
journalists in the independent media to uncover the truth and expose it to the public. While this is a
theme that will be visited again in broader context below in the final analytical section of the article,
it is also appropriate to close analysis of the Taqba Dam story on this note since the perspectives
presented in the NYT article contribute to this plenary premise.
One conspicuous example of this ostensive trend of exposing the truth from among misinformed or
misleading official claims is set up by the journalists’ observation that a “senior Defense
Department official disputed that the task force overstepped its authority by striking [Taqba Dam]
without informing top leaders.” Here, the NYT article notes that the military official “said the
strikes were conducted ‘within approved guidance’ set by the commander of the campaign against
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the Islamic State, General Townsend” and that there was “‘no requirement that the commander [of
CJTF-OIR] be informed beforehand.’”
This official claim is presented at the beginning of a thread of editorial analysis creating the
appearance that, contrary to the official characterization, the strikes on Taqba Dam in fact were not
conducted “within approved guidance.” The article then presents details regarding one airstrike at
the dam, an “unusual truce” between adversaries as attempts were made to repair damage to the
control room, and then “another strike” on the dam. With the factual details of the airstrikes
described, the story returns to commentary mode to claim that an anonymous former official “who
reviewed the operation” recalled that unidentified “senior officials” at the “air operations center”
(presumably the CAOC in Qatar) “were shocked to learn how the top secret operators had bypassed
safeguards and used heavy weapons” while attacking Taqba Dam.
This commentary is presented as a contrast to the official characterization – that the airstrikes were
conducted “within approved guidance.” The impression that emerges is that the intrepid
investigative journalists have discovered the truth behind the official claims and that the secretive
special operations ground elements in fact routinely bypassed or circumvented rules established in
the “approved guidance.” Purportedly bypassing rules involving the no-strike process and abusing
rules of engagement related to self-defense are the primary analytical tools on which the
manufactured media narrative relies, along with persistent commentary derived from unnamed and
unidentified “former officials.”
However, it is the narratives crafted by the journalists and commentary routinely presented by the
anonymous former officials that misrepresents existing rules involving the use of force. In the
endeavor to discredit official claims, then, the media coverage distorts the actual law and policy and
thereby “counters” the truth with misleading characterizations that are given the veneer of
legitimacy. In reality, it is the coverage – and not the official claims – that are misinformed or
duplicitous.
The same phenomenon emerges in the same article when the journalists attempt to discredit an
official claim involving the airstrikes made by then-Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend, who was the
commander of CJTF-OIR at the time of the attacks. Early in the article, the NYT story presents a
link to a transcript of a press conference at which Townsend claims, “The Tabqa Dam is not a
coalition target.” The NYT story presents the quote from the press conference by claiming
Townsend “declared” it “emphatically two days after the blasts.” (emphasis added)
The article next observes, “In fact, members of a top secret U.S. Special Operations unit called Task
Force 9 had struck the dam using some of the largest conventional bombs in the U.S. arsenal.” The
commentary then continues to provide factual details about the strikes and describe that anonymous
“former officials said the task force used a procedural shortcut reserved for emergencies, allowing it
to launch the attack without clearance.” The impression created, then, is that the official claim
presented by Lt. Gen. Townsend – that the dam is “not a collation target” – is either uninformed or
an outright lie. After all, Townsend did “emphatically” declare this two days after the attacks.
This characterization crafted in the NYT story is misleading, and perhaps even deliberately so.
While it is true that Townsend observed during the press conference linked in the NYT article that
Taqba Dam is “not a coalition target,” it is clear from the entirety of his remarks that Townsend is
aware that attacks had occurred at and around the dam. Likewise, a full accounting of his remarks
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demonstrates further that he is not attempting to conceal the attacks by claiming the dam is “not a
coalition target.”
The full sentence reflected in the transcript of the press conference from which the reporters draw
the partial quote reveals that Lt. Gen. Townsend observed, “The Tabqa Dam is not a coalition target
and when strikes occur on military targets, at or near the dam, we use non-cratering munitions to
avoid unnecessary damage to the facility.” The reference here to non-cratering munitions likely
alludes to bombs that are programmed with variable time fuzing to achieve an air burst detonation,
which “mitigates blast and debris effects and eliminates penetration effects.” Indeed, this seems to
correspond with the claim presented in the NYT story from an anonymous “senior military official”
that a B-52 dropped “bombs set to explode in the air above the targets to avoid damaging the
structures.”
The NYT article continues with the claim from the unidentified military official suggesting that
when the bombs rigged with variable timing fuzes “failed to dislodge the enemy fighters, the task
force called for the bomber to drop three 2,000-pound bombs, including at least one bunker-buster,
this time set to explode when they hit the concrete.” However, given that none of the bombs seemed
to explode on contact and the NYT article describes that a “dud” was found “[f]ive floors deep in
the dam’s control tower” and two other bombs dropped “on the southern tower penetrated three
floors down,” it seems likely that these three bombs were fused not to detonate at all and, instead, to
penetrate into the towers in an attempt to kill or incapacitate any ISIS fighters located there.
Because “non-cratering munition” is not a doctrinal term, it is difficult to determine precisely what
Lt. Gen. Townsend meant when he claimed that these were dropped “at or near the dam.” However,
both a variable timed fuse rigged for an air burst and a “bunker buster” fused to penetrate on contact
but not explode could be described as “non-cratering munitions.” Although the NYT article notes
that a “crater” could be seen from satellite imagery “in the concrete of the dam next to the headgates” after the strikes, targeting jargon uses the term “crater” in a slightly different manner. In
targeting vernacular, the term “cratering” is used in the context of debris that is ejected – or “crater
ejecta” – when a bomb or missile explodes on contact with the ground. As such, a bomb that is
fused not to explode on contact is described colloquially as a “non-cratering munition” because it is
not expected to expel a significant amount of crater ejecta – even if it leaves a “crater” from
penetrating into a building or tower on contact.
In any event, the NYT story does not present any evidence that would refute Lt. Gen. Townsend’s
claim that the dam was “not a collation target.” Based on the entire sentence presented in the
transcript of the press conference, it is clear that he is aware that the coalition has attacked targets
“at or near” the dam. Likewise, there is no indication that he is attempting to conceal these attacks
from public disclosure. By observing that the dam is not a target, Townsend appears to be indicating
that the dam is not the object of attack. To the contrary, ISIS personnel and equipment are the
“target” – even if they are located “at or near” the dam.
While the distinction between the dam itself and ISIS fighters at or near the dam may seem
pedantic, there is a significant difference between the two both in practice and as a matter of
international law. Pursuant to the law of armed conflict, the enemy personnel and equipment
qualified as military objectives – defined as “any object which by its nature, location, purpose or
use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.” In
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practice, endeavoring to destroy or neutralize the enemy personnel and equipment – the actual
military objectives – calls for a much different operation than, say, destroying a major hydroelectric
dam.
Every indication from the facts reported in the NYT article and from the actual official sources from
which the story draws is that coalition forces made adversarial ISIS fighters and equipment the
object of attack. Lt. Gen. Townsend, then, was not uninformed or intentionally deceitful when he
claimed that Taqba Dam was “not a coalition target.” It appears he was well aware that attacks had
occurred “at or near” the dam, and his claim that the coalition took steps to “avoid unnecessary
damage to the facility” and “to preserve the integrity of the dam because it's a vital resource for the
people of Syria” is supported by the factual circumstances presented in the NYT article. Throughout
the story involving the attacks on Taqba Dam, it is attempts by the journalists to cast doubt on
official claims that are actually misleading – not the official characterizations themselves. As I
describe below, this is a common characteristic in this line of so-called “accountability journalism”
involving U.S. targeting operations abroad.
Part II: Consolidated LOAC and ROE Analysis for the Three Case Studies
[pulled intro for “pervasive misapplication” section. add and develop intro here]
To give shape to the contours of this plenary deficiency, it is useful to at least briefly summarize
some of the rules involving the use of force that are primarily relevant to the scenarios that are the
subject of NYT reporting examined above.
The primary reason it is so vitally important to at least briefly articulate relevant use of force
obligations is that it is these rules that are actually applied by commanders in the military
organization that is the plenary subject of the media coverage when determining what accountability
measures are appropriate in the aftermath of a targeting operation. If the U.S. military as an
organization truly is beset by an accountability crisis, as characterized by the media coverage
presented in the three substantive case studies examined above, this systemic shortcoming must be
demonstrated by applying factual scenarios to the legal and policy obligations that are actually
evaluated by those with the responsibility to make “accountability” decisions in practice. Because
the relevant NYT articles never do present formulations of legal and policy rules that actually apply
in practice, the analysis conducted herein does so and, thereby, addresses one central deficiency of
the media coverage.
The substantive analysis in the present section begins, then, by summarizing rules established in
international law, specifically the law of armed conflict. Next, an overview of U.S. policy involving
the use of force established in relevant rules of engagement and other doctrinal publications is
presented. With summaries of applicable rules involving the use of force distilled from relevant
sources of international law and U.S. military policy, these rules can be applied to the factual
circumstances presented in the media coverage of the three case studies analyzed above. The
conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the depiction presented in the NYT stories of a
military organization afflicted by an accountability crisis is not actually supported by the
circumstances reported in the coverage. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that characterizations
presented in the NYT reporting are fundamentally flawed – not the U.S. military targeting
operations as the media coverage attempts to portray.
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Summarized Articulations of Relevant International Law Rules
The first international law provision to be addressed here is the distinction rule, which is often
correctly described as a “cornerstone” of LOAC. As the DoD Law of War Manual summarizes, the
distinction rule in practice establishes that “combatants may make enemy combatants and other
military objectives the object of attack, but may not make the civilian population and other
protected persons and objects the object of attack.” This articulation is based on a fundamental rule
described in a multilateral treaty the United States has not ratified. Nonetheless, the U.S.
government routinely recognizes the distinction rule as a component of customary international law
and, as such, a rule that is binding on all countries – including the United States.
Proportionality is another central law of armed conflict rule, even though the actual formulation for
the rule does not directly refer to the word “proportionality.” In U.S. military parlance, applying the
rule in practice is unnecessarily complicated because the same term – proportionality – is used in
other contexts, such as a “proportionate” use of force in self-defense pursuant to the Standing Rules
of Engagement or a “proportionate” attack in an economy of force connotation. Nonetheless, the
U.S. military articulation of the actual LOAC proportionality rule is derived directly from a widelyratified multilateral treaty. The basic articulation for the proportionality rule in the DoD Law of War
Manual describes, “Combatants must refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.”
The final law of armed conflict rule that is central to the analysis of the incidents described in the
case studies examined in this article is the requirement to take feasible precautions in an attack. The
feasible precautions rule, like the distinction and proportionality rules, is drawn from a multilateral
treaty the United States has not ratified. Unlike the two LOAC rules summarized immediately
above, the U.S. military articulation and application of the feasible precautions rule represents a
fairly significant departure from the formulation presented in the multi-lateral treaty.
For present purposes, though, the basic articulation for the feasible precautions rule described in the
DoD Law of War Manual is sufficient. That is, “Feasible precautions are those that are practicable
or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including
humanitarian and military considerations.” As the Manual succinctly summarizes after presenting
some factors relevant to the matter, determining “what precautions are feasible depends greatly on
the context and other military considerations.”
Summarized Articulations of Relevant Use of Force Policy Rules
Although binding obligations are established in international law, specifically here the law of armed
conflict, service members are also required to comply with guidance established in military rules of
engagement and other use of force policy during combat operations. The foundation for this
guidance is the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), which establishes “fundamental policies
and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders and their forces during all
military operations…occurring outside U.S. territory…and outside U.S. territorial seas.” While
supplemental rules of engagement, which are typically classified and therefore not available to the
general public, “allow commanders to tailor ROE for mission accomplishment during the conduct
of DoD operations,” the unclassified SROE establishes basic guidance upon which operational ROE
build and expand. The foundational definitions and rules presented in the SROE, while basic and
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not mission specific, are sufficient for present purposes of evaluating the general themes that are
derived from the media coverage examined herein.
As the SROE observes, military members are required to comply with relevant LOAC rules during
all “military operations involving armed conflict.” The SROE, then, builds upon applicable aspects
of international law, and operational ROE and any other relevant regulatory guidance further
expand upon the requirements established in the SROE. In this progression of sources that establish
the rules involving the use of force, it is international law that defines the categories of people and
objects that qualify as military objectives that can be made the object of attack. The SROE and
other regulatory guidance, in turn, establish the conditions pursuant to which military objectives can
be attacked and the procedures for doing so based on the operational circumstances prevailing at the
time of the proposed or actual attack.
The SROE establishes two broad categories of personnel who are determined to be adversarial to
U.S. forces, along with the general conditions pursuant to which each category may be attacked.
The first category – described as a “declared hostile force” – is defined as “[a]ny civilian,
paramilitary or military force or terrorist(s) that has been declared hostile by appropriate U.S.
authority.” The SROE establishes that for this category, which is sometimes referred to as a statusbased target in operational vernacular, U.S. forces “need not observe a hostile act or demonstrated
hostile intent before engaging the declared hostile force.”
In contrast, the second broad category permits military members to exercise “individual self-defense
in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent” unless otherwise directed by an
appropriate commander. As the analysis conducted in the Taqba Dam case study above explains,
the SROE defines “hostile act” as an “attack or other use of force” against U.S. personnel and other
persons or objects designated by operational ROE. The SROE further describes “hostile intent” as
the “threat of imminent use of force” where “imminent…does not necessarily mean immediate or
instantaneous.”
Additional clarification in the SROE establishes that the “determination of whether the use of force
against U.S. forces is imminent will be based on an assessment of all facts and circumstances
known to U.S. forces at the time and may be made at any level.” A potential target that qualifies for
engagement on the basis of self-defense (which includes so-called collective self-defense pursuant
to the SROE) is sometimes described as a “conduct-based target” in operational military vernacular.
With these foundational components of LOAC and ROE in focus, the analysis transitions now to
describe how these and other relevant rules involving the use of force apply in practice to the factual
scenarios presented in the three case studies examined above.
Applying Fundamental Legal and Policy Rules Involving the Use of Force to Factual Scenarios
Presented in Media Coverage
As the analysis presented above in the three specific case studies of NYT reporting examined herein
suggests, narratives crafted in media coverage and presented to the public generally do not engage
in a thorough and informed evaluation regarding whether U.S. military operations comply with
relevant legal and policy obligations. There is, of course, no absolute need for media organizations
to do so since journalists, editorial teams, and the consumers that constitute the intended audience of
the media coverage have no actual responsibility for assessing compliance or making decisions
related to pursing accountability for personnel who are involved in or otherwise responsible for
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attacks conducted in armed conflict. Nonetheless, narratives involving legal and policy compliance
– either by directly articulating purported rules or by referring to notions of accountability (or lack
thereof) – represent one theme that connects and pervades all the media coverage examined above.
The analysis presented below in this section, then, provides what the media stories do not – an
informed assessment of compliance with relevant legal and policy rules involved in the factual
scenarios presented in each of the three case studies examined above. The evaluation of compliance
with actual legal and policy rules is accompanied by an explanation of the ways in which the media
coverage is itself fundamentally flawed in relation to each case study. Following the consolidated
analysis related to legal and policy compliance, the present inquiry pauses to ponder whether this
line of media coverage truly does represent “accountability journalism” as it is sometimes described
before then transitioning to consider some implications of defective media narratives in the broader
context of prevailing public and political discourse.
Kabul Drone Strike
Like nearly all attacks that occur during the conduct of hostilities in armed conflict, analysis
regarding compliance with relevant LOAC rules related to the Kabul drone strike begins by
considering the distinction rule. The analysis of nearly all targeting operations begins here because
the rule constitutes the “cornerstone” of the law of armed conflict. Although the rule is never
articulated in the relevant NYT media coverage, the DoD Law of War Manual summarizes the
practical application of the distinction rule by observing that “combatants may make enemy
combatants and other military objectives the object of attack, but may not make the civilian
population and other protected persons and objects the object of attack.”
Based on the factual scenario presented in the media coverage and from official sources, there is no
question that the personnel involved in the Kabul drone strike complied with the LOAC distinction
rule. That is, the “object of attack” was believed at the time to be a vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device, or VBIED in contemporary military parlance, that was intended to be used in an
attack against U.S. forces located at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul. Media and
official sources alike reveal that the target was not, in fact, a VBIED, but both categories of sources
demonstrate that the personnel involved in the attack were not aware of this factual condition at the
time of the attack.
Nonetheless, U.S. military doctrine unequivocally requires that “any decision by any military
commander, military personnel, or any other person responsible for planning, authorizing, or
executing military action shall only be judged on the basis of that person's assessment of the
information reasonably available to the person at the time the person planned, authorized, or
executed the action under review, and shall not be judged on the basis of information that comes to
light after the action under review was taken.” This obligation to assess combat activities based on
information reasonably available at the time rather than on the basis of information that comes to
light afterward is sometimes described in military parlance as the “Rendulic rule.” Because there is
no question – even from the factual narrative presented in applicable media coverage – that relevant
personnel believed the target of the Kabul drone strike to be a VBIED that qualifies pursuant to
international law as a military objective. This was the “object of the attack” that was targeted by the
relevant personnel, even though the car was correctly determined afterward not to actually be a
VBIED. As such, the personnel unequivocally complied with the LOAC distinction rule.
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Another significant factual condition that emerges from both media and official sources is that the
personnel involved in the attack did not expect the attack to result in, to draw from the general
description presented in international law, “loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof.” As a shorthand for this description, U.S. military
doctrine summarizes “incidental damage” as “damage to the civilian population and civilian
objects.” Whether the full LOAC description or the shorthand definition for “incidental damage” is
adopted, there is no question based on the factual circumstances presented in media and official
narratives that the Kabul drone strike does not constitute a violation of the LOAC proportionality
rule.
This is the case because applying the proportionality rule requires an assessment of whether the
incidental damage anticipated at the time of the attack was excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage expected. As I have explained elsewhere when analyzing application of
the proportionality rule in the context of the 2015 attack on the Médecins Sans Frontières trauma
center by U.S. forces in Kunduz, Afghanistan, proportionality “is not relevant in the absence of at
least some expected incidental damage – regardless of whether the collateral damage was, as a
factual matter, ‘disproportionate’ in result.” If personnel involved in or otherwise responsible for an
attack do not expect that the engagement will cause any damage to civilian persons or property, as
was the case with the Kabul drone strike, by definition there is no incidental damage anticipated at
the time of the attack. As long as there was at least some modicum of military advantage expected,
which was also the case with the Kabul drone strike, it is impossible for the incidental damage
anticipated (which, in this instance is none) to be excessive in relation to the anticipated damage to
civilian persons or property. This results in an irrefutable conclusion that the Kabul drone strike
complied with the LOAC proportionality rule.
Turning next to an assessment of the LOAC requirement to take feasible precautions in the attack,
the outcome of the analysis is, unlike for the distinction and proportionality rules, a matter of
judgement. The factual record described in the first case study above, which is derived from both
official and media characterizations, presents ample evidence to support the conclusion that the
personnel involved in or otherwise responsible for the Kabul drone strike did comply with the
feasible precautions rule. Receiving a credible intelligence report involving a potential VBIED but
waiting to engage the target until additional information can be acquired, gathering and considering
multi-source intelligence while observing the target vehicle for approximately 8 hours before the
strike, deciding to attack the target while the vehicle was stationary in order to reduce the risk of
injuring or killing civilians who happen to be passing by the moving target when it is attacked,
striking the vehicle when the travel time for the perceived VBIED was just a few minutes from the
suspected insurgent target of Hamid Karzai International Airport, and delaying the fuse on the
Hellfire used in the attack in an attempt to limit the potential for inflicting damage on surrounding
civilian infrastructure all constitute precautions that were taken to reduce the risk of incidental
damage.
Whether any one of these measures, or all of them collectively, constitute feasible precautions is a
matter of judgment. As U.S. military doctrine involving the practical application of the LOAC
feasible precautions rule succinctly summarizes, “what precautions are feasible depends greatly on
the context and other military considerations.” While reasonable perspectives may differ, applying
relevant aspects of the factual record described immediately above to “the context and other
military considerations” involved with the Kabul drone strike adequately supports the conclusion
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that the personnel involved in or otherwise responsible for the attack complied with the LOAC
requirement to take feasible precautions in the attack.
Turning now to a brief evaluation of compliance with relevant aspects of the rules of engagement
that are available to the public, the official narrative reveals that the attack was a “self-defense”
engagement. This means the strike was not conducted against a “declared hostile force,” which is
sometimes referred to as a “status-based” target. Among the broad two categories of self-defense
engagements, attacks in response to a “hostile act” or demonstrated “hostile intent,” the former does
not apply since the suspected VBIED had not engaged in an actual “attack or other use of force” at
the time of the strike. In ROE terms, then, this leaves a self-defense strike in response to the
perceived hostile intent of the suspected target as the sole available policy justification for the
attack.
Recalling the summary of the standard established in the SROE that is described above, “hostile
intent” exists when a target is perceived to be engaged in an “threat of imminent use of force”
where “imminent…does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.” Rather, the assessment
may be made “at any level” based on “all facts and circumstances known to U.S. forces at the time”
of the attack. Because the explanation regarding the justification for the engagement that was
presented by official sources indicates that the decision to strike was based on an assessment of an
“imminent threat [the target vehicle] posed to our [U.S.] forces” and that the responsible personnel
had an “honest belief that they were preventing an imminent attack on our [U.S.] forces and civilian
evacuees,” there is adequate information by which to conclude that the Kabul drone strike complied
with relevant ROE requirements.
Although relevant LOAC and ROE provisions are not a central aspect of NYT media coverage
involving the Kabul drone strike, characterizations related to “accountability” are a significant
theme presented in the news stories. The LOAC and ROE provisions examined immediately above
represent the standards for which personnel involved in or otherwise responsible for the attack are
actually held “accountable” in practice. Based on these foundational requirements, the conclusion
that relevant personnel complied with legal and regulatory obligations is reasonable. As such, there
is no basis upon which to impose adverse personnel action in order to hold personnel involved in or
otherwise responsible for the Kabul drone strike “accountable.”
A central, fundamental flaw of NYT media coverage involving the attack is that it fails to present
standards by which personnel are actually held accountable and it, instead, presents a distorted
depiction of culpability to support the narrative that the strike is evidence of a “terrible track record”
following “decades of failed accountability” in Afghanistan. The observations presented by family
or close associates of those who were injured or killed in the attack, by Luke Hartig, John Sifton, or
Senator Chris Murphy, among others, all contribute to the journalistic depiction of a failure of
accountability. However, it is ultimately the media narratives, rather than official “accountability”
mechanisms, that are fundamentally and irredeemably flawed.
Baghuz Strikes
Because media coverage of the airstrikes in Baghuz, Syria directly addresses a number of relevant
provisions of LOAC and ROE, the second case study analyzed above likewise engaged with several
pertinent legal and policy standards. However, in the current section presenting a consolidated
analysis of LOAC and ROE compliance for the incidents that form the basis of each case study,
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there are some relevant factors to consider here that are not directly addressed in the second case
study above. As such, the LOAC/ROE analysis here is limited only to the specific factors that are
not examined extensively above.
To begin the LOAC assessment, there is no question that the relevant personnel complied with the
distinction rule. A contrary conclusion would require evidence that the attack was not directed
against an identified military objective and/or ISIS fighters. Although an unnamed analyst
reportedly asserted on mIRC chat that U.S. forces “dropped [munitions] on 50 women and children”
in the attack, this anonymous characterization does not suggest that only “women and children”
were present at the site of the attack.
Even the concern that was raised by the would-be “whistleblowers” indicating that the attack
inflicted “disproportionate destruction and civilian deaths” does not indicate that only civilians were
targeted. The official narrative indicates that the strike was directed against “ISIS positions” and
“ISIS fighters that were engaged in attacks against SDF positions.” This supports the conclusion
that the personnel responsible for the attack complied with the LOAC distinction rule, regardless of
whether incidental damage resulted from the strike and, if so, to what degree.
The primary issue related to LOAC that is raised by the narratives presented in the NYT media
coverage involves application of the proportionality rule. This is the concern that was raised, for
example, by “whistleblower” Lt. Col. Dean Korsak when he claimed in the message directed to the
Senate Armed Services Committee that the attacks resulted in a “shockingly high” death toll. In this
regard, the depiction developed in the media coverage supports the overall narrative that NYT
reporting “revealed” a “legacy” of “disproportionate destruction and civilian deaths.” (emphasis
added) However, these depictions involving proportionality fundamentally misrepresent the manner
in which compliance with the rule is actually evaluated in practice.
Like the evaluation related to the LOAC proportionality rule in the context of the Kabul drone strike
describes above, the initial matter of assessing compliance requires a determination of the degree of
incidental damage anticipated at the time of the attack. If no incidental damage was anticipated yet
at least some modicum of military advantage was expected, the only supportable conclusion is that
the attack complied with the LOAC proportionality rule. Like the Kabul drone strike, this is the case
for the Baghuz airstrikes.
As the initial official account describes, the remotely piloted aircraft that was on station before the
attack “was unable to discern any civilians in the area at the time of the SDF request.” Likewise, the
subsequent review of the strikes conducted by determined that the ground force commander
responsible for the attack “repeatedly received confirmation that no civilians were in the strike
areas.” Regardless of whether the attack resulted in civilian casualties, which is a conclusion
reached by both media and official accounts, the official findings indicate that the personnel
involved in the strikes did not anticipate that incidental damage would occur.
That Lt. Col. Korsak assessed the civilian death toll to be “shockingly high” is of no consequence to
the assessment of whether the strikes complied with the proportionality rule, nor is the apparent
characterization that the strikes were “disproportionate” in result. The result of an attack is not
outcome determinative when assessing compliance with the LOAC proportionality rule. The factual
record developed in relation to the Baghuz airstrikes demonstrates that no incidental damage was
anticipated at the time of the attack and some degree of military advantage was expected. As such,
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the only supportable conclusion is that relevant personnel did, in fact, comply with the LOAC
proportionality rule.
As with most attacks that occur in the course of an armed conflict, an assessment involving whether
the strikes complied with the LOAC feasible precautions rule is a matter of judgement. In
summarizing the findings of the initial investigation the day after the NYT first published a story
about an purported coverup of a potential war crime, Capt. Bill Urban relays that the investigation
determined the “appropriate steps were taken [by the element requesting the airstrike] to rule out the
presence of civilians at the time of the strike.” In the subsequent examination of the airstrikes, initial
investigation, and “concerns and allegations made to the Department of Defense Office of Inspector
General and to the media,” Gen. Michael Garrett describes in the executive summary of his full
review that he found “clear evidence that the GFC [ground force commander] demonstrated
awareness and concern for CIVCAS [civilian casualties] and took steps to mitigate harm.” Gen.
Garrett also determined that “multiple efforts to distinguish civilians from ISIS were made” prior to
the attacks. Details developed from both the initial investigation and the subsequent review, then,
support the conclusion that personnel involved in the attack complied with the LOAC feasible
precautions rule – even if reasonable perspectives may well certainly differ regarding whether the
measures taken were adequate in this regard.
Although the primary focus of the analysis conducted in relation to the second case study above
focuses primarily on the allegation of a potential war crime and ensuing coverup, characterizations
presented in NYT reporting involving the Baghuz airstrikes contributes to the general narrative
suggesting that “secretive” special operations ground forces routinely abuse self-defense rules of
engagement to circumvent more stringent requirements associated with status-based targets. The
primary example depicted in the initial NYT story about a supposed war crime and coverup presents
a characterization provided by three unnamed “people who viewed the footage” of the attacks.
These unidentified sources claim the footage reveals that some people at the site “have rifles but do
not appear to be maneuvering [or] engaging coalition forces or acting in a way that would seem to
justify a self-defense strike with 2,000-pound bombs.” Like the self-defense characterizations that
feature even more prominently in the NYT story involving the airstrikes on and around Taqba Dam,
this purported standard is not consistent with actual self-defense requirements established in the
SROE.
As described above, the definition for “hostile intent” established in the SROE requires a
determination that the target presents “a threat of imminent use of force” against “U.S. forces or
“other designated persons.” There is no requirement that the target must “appear to be
maneuvering” or “engaging coalition forces” in order to “justify a self-defense strike.” The
unattributed claim to the contrary from three unnamed sources described in the NYT story
represents a fundamental mischaracterization of actual existing ROE requirements.
This conclusion presented herein is likewise supported by both the description of the initial
investigation presented by Capt. Urban and the executive summary of the ensuing review by Gen.
Garrett. According to the statement attributable to Capt. Urban, the initial investigation found that
“an SDF position under heavy fire and in danger of being overrun called for defensive airstrikes on
ISIS fighter positions” on the day of the attack. In the executive summary of his subsequent review,
Gen. Garrett describes the factual determination that, on the day of the airstrikes, ISIS “launched a
successful counterattack against” the SDF and, in response, the SDF requested defensive Coalition
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air support.” According to Gen. Garrett, the U.S. military ground force commander “responsible for
support validated ISIS' hostile act/intent” prior to authorizing “supporting airstrikes.”
Although the initial NYT story asserts that “law of armed conflict — the rule book that lays out the
military’s legal conduct in war — allows troops in life-threatening situations to sidestep the strike
team lawyers” by providing a self-defense justification for the attack, the media coverage
mischaracterizes applicable LOAC rules and relevant ROE provisions in constructing this narrative.
The law of armed conflict does not address in any manner whatsoever the conditions pursuant to
which troops may “sidestep the strike team lawyers” in seeking approval to engage in an attack.
Procedures related to justifying and approving an attack are established in ROE and related use of
force policy, not in the law of armed conflict.
Likewise, the rules of engagement do not require a “life-threatening situation” in order to “sidestep”
more stringent requirements related to status-based targets. While it is worth noting that the ISIS
fighters targeted in the Baghuz airstrikes likely qualified as a “declared hostile force” pursuant to
classified operational rules of engagement, official sources have also repeatedly determined that the
justifications presented for the relevant Baghuz airstrikes are consistent with the self-defense
provisions of the applicable rules of engagement. This determination has been reached by multiple
official sources following a review of all available evidence and when applying actual standards
established in the ROE, notwithstanding the unattributable conclusions to the contrary described by
unnamed sources in media reports while presenting erroneous descriptions of the law of armed
conflict and the rules of engagement.
Taqba Dam
Like the media coverage related to the airstrikes in Baghuz, the primary NYT story addressing the
attacks on and around Taqba Dam incorporates claims related to LOAC and ROE compliance
directly into the central narrative of the article. This sets coverage involving the Baghuz and Taqba
Dam attacks apart from the Kabul drone strike, for which “accountability” is a central theme but
explicit characterizations related to LOAC and ROE compliance is not. As such, examining the
depictions presented in media coverage of the Taqba Dam attacks here in the consolidated LOAC
and ROE compliance section can focus primarily on aspects not directly addressed in relevant NYT
articles, as does the corresponding assessment of coverage related to the Baghuz strikes presented
immediately above.
Starting with the cornerstone of LOAC analysis, there is no question that the attacks complied with
the distinction rule. That is, the attacks were directed against ISIS personnel and equipment located
in, on, and around Taqba Dam. This is apparent even from the factual narrative presented in the
primary NYT story, which describes that ISIS “militants kept a small garrison in the dam’s towers,
where the thick concrete walls and sweeping view created a ready-made fortress.” The article also
includes an assertion from CENTCOM spokesperson Capt. Bill Urban describing that the “mission,
and the strikes that enabled it, helped return control of the intact Tabqa Dam to the people of
Northeast Syria and prevented ISIS from weaponizing it.” These factors derived directly from the
primary NYT story involving the strikes on Taqba Dam demonstrate that the attacks were directed
against persons and objects determined to be military objectives. As such, the strikes complied with
the LOAC distinction rule.
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As the analysis presented in the third case study above describes, the U.S. interpretation of
international law involving attacks on dams and other structures dictates that a standard LOAC
assessment be conducted. This interpretive policy affects, among others, application of the
proportionality rule. That is, the standard process of identifying the anticipated incidental damage
and determining whether it is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
expected applies to a dam that is being used for adversarial purposes just like any other military
object.
Although there are no details explicitly addressing the LOAC proportionality rule apparent in either
the media or official narratives involving the strikes on and around Taqba Dam, some points that are
raised in both can at least inform the analysis related to the proportionality rule. Regarding the
military advantage expected from attacks aimed at forcing ISIS to abandon the dam, the
introduction to the primary NYT article offers a succinct summary: “The Tabqa Dam was a
strategic linchpin and the Islamic State controlled it.” Combined with the observation by Capt.
Urban that the purpose of the overall mission was to “return control of the intact Tabqa Dam to the
people of Northeast Syria and [to prevent] ISIS from weaponizing it,” the military advantage
expected from attacks directed against ISIS personnel and equipment in, on, and near Tabqa Dam is
readily apparent.
Like the assessment of the potential military advantage expected from the attacks on and near Taqba
Dam, the incidental damage anticipated from the airstrikes can only be inferred through
circumstantial evidence. However, the commitment described by Capt. Urban to returning control
of the “intact Tabqa Dam” (emphasis added) to the local population combined with the fact that
ISIS was ultimately removed from the area while control of the intact – rather than destroyed – dam
was indeed returned to the populace suggests that measures were implemented to mitigate the
incidental damage anticipated from the attacks. Similarly, the progression from an attempted but
ultimately unsuccessful mission by the SDF to seize the dam using only an offensive by land to
utilizing air burst munitions and eventually to non-cratering munitions suggests that measures were
adopted to limit the incidental harm anticipated throughout the operation to clear ISIS personnel and
equipment from the dam.
For a proper LOAC analysis, of course each specific attack must be individually evaluated for
compliance with the LOAC proportionality rule. However, this progression of force used in the
operation constitutes at least circumstantial evidence that the incidental damage anticipated from
each attack was evaluated along with the expected military advantage that is itself apparent from the
factual circumstances presented in media and official narratives. As long as the incidental damage
anticipated from each individual attack was not excessive in relation to the rather considerable
apparent military advantage of expelling ISIS fighters from the “strategic lynchpin” (as described
by the NYT article) and preventing ISIS from weaponizing the dam (as described by Capt. Urban),
each attack would comply with the LOAC proportionality rule.
The same factors that inform the proportionality assessment are also relevant to the analysis related
to the LOAC feasible precautions rule. Just like almost any attack conducted in the course of an
armed conflict, the conclusion regarding whether any precautions taken were adequate is a matter of
judgement. Progressing from a ground assault that could limit the potential for harm to the dam if
successful to then using air burst munitions and then to non-cratering munitions indicates that
precautions were taken to limit the risk of incidental harm that may ultimately result from operation
to expel ISIS from the dam. While the determination regarding whether these precautions were
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adequate is a matter of judgement, the factual record developed from media and official sources is
sufficient to support a conclusion that the attacks complied with the LOAC feasible precautions
rule.
Turning then to an analysis of ROE compliance, it is quite likely that the ISIS personnel targeted in,
on, and around Taqba Dam qualified as a “declared hostile force” pursuant to classified operational
rules – as is the case for the Baghuz airstrikes. Also like the Baghuz strikes, the known factual
record regarding the Taqba Dam attacks suggests that the strikes against the ISIS fighters targeted at
Tabqa Dam qualified for designation as collective self-defense as well. An adequately
comprehensive analysis related to application of the ROE, particularly regarding the self-defense
provisions of the SROE, is conducted above in the third case study since ROE compliance is a
central aspect of the media story that primarily engages with the attacks.
For present purposes of the consolidated analysis regarding ROE compliance, it is sufficient to
recall two germane details that emerge from the NYT article that presents primary coverage of the
attacks. One important aspect is the observation reportedly provided by CENTCOM spokesperson
Capt. Bill Urban that SDF forces suffered “heavy casualties” after receiving heavy enemy fire while
attempting to retake the dam in a ground assault. The second significant detail is the report that ISIS
had established a “small garrison” at the dam that served as a “ready-made fortress” for the
insurgent group.
Applying these details to relevant provisions of the SROE supports the conclusion that the airstrikes
on the dam qualified for designation as self-defense – here, “collective” self-defense specifically.
The ISIS fighters in the “small garrison” at Taqba Dam had already engaged in an “attack or other
use of force” against the SDF, which took “heavy casualties” as a result, which meets the definition
for “hostile act” established in the SROE. Likewise, it is reasonable to conclude that ISIS fighters in
the “ready-made fortress” represented a “threat of imminent use of force” against the SDF, where
“imminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous,” such that the “hostile intent”
provision of the SROE applied.
Because the classified operational ROE almost certainly included the SDF as “designated non-U.S.
military forces” under the circumstances, U.S. military forces were presumably permitted to use
force in “collective self-defense” – in SROE terms – on behalf of the SDF. If ISIS committed
“hostile acts” by attacking the SDF or demonstrated “hostile intent” against the SDF, as the reported
facts indicate, the attacks against ISIS on and around Taqba Dam qualified as “self-defense”
engagements pursuant to the ROE. By neglecting to describe the actual doctrinal provisions of law
and policy that applied to the series of attacks conducted by U.S. forces on behalf of the SDF and
failing to apply the reported facts to these actual legal and policy provisions, the NYT story
detailing the airstrikes on Taqba Dam presents a distorted and unapprised account of compliance
with requirements that apply to the use of force in practice. In this regard, of course, the coverage of
the fight for Taqba Dam is not alone.
Pervasive Misapplication of Targeting Rules in NYT Reporting, Not in Airstrikes
Although the media coverage examined in the three substantive case studies in Part I above and in
the consolidated LOAC/ROE analysis here in Part II is a central component of a series of New York
Times reporting on “airstrikes gone wrong,” it is actually the reporting itself that has “gone wrong”
in a number of aspects that, taken together, lead to a fundamentally flawed representation of the
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purported defects in targeting and accountability processes supposedly exposed by the coverage.
Chief among the deficiencies in the reporting that permeates the coverage is a persistent
mischaracterization of the law and U.S. military policy related to the use of force in armed conflict.
This is a central theme that emerges throughout the NYT stories examined in the three substantive
case studies above.
For coverage of the Kabul drone strike, the primary plenary deficiency in the reporting is failing to
describe standards by which military commanders hold personnel accountable for conduct in armed
conflict while instead presenting anecdotal perspectives provided by sources to whom journalists
turn for commentary. Whether from family members and close associates of those killed in the
attack, analysts such as Luke Hartig and John Sifton, or legislators such as Sen. Chris Murphy, no
source represented in the reporting presents doctrinal standards by which accountability measures
are evaluated in practice. This flaw in the reporting allows media coverage to construct a narrative
suggesting that the attack is part of a systemic and persistent pattern of failures by the U.S. military
to hold personnel to account for targeting mishaps in armed conflict.
The fundamental flaws represented in coverage of the attacks in Baghuz and on Taqba Dam are
slightly different but no less significant. For both stories, the coverage does present source
assertions that address various provisions of applicable law and policy. However, the
characterizations related to LOAC and ROE compliance distort the relevant provisions of law and
policy. Unfounded assertions from Lt. Col. Dean Korsak and Mr. Gene Tate of a war crime and
subsequent coverup presented in the Baghuz coverage and non-doctrinal characterizations from
various unnamed sources claiming “secretive” special operations forces routinely misrepresented
self-defense rules to circumvent restrictions on the tactical use of force portrayed in coverage both
of the Baghuz and Taqba Dam attacks combine to create the appearance that the U.S. military is
unwilling or unable to enforce applicable standards and rules. However, named and anonymous
sources alike mischaracterize or misrepresent the doctrinal sources that actually apply in practice in
support of the “accountability gap” narrative.
Consequently, the actual fundamental and systemic flaws exist in media coverage of U.S. military
operations abroad rather than in the targeting processes and accountability determinations that are
the subject of the reporting. As the first substantive section following the introduction to Part III
below reveals, this systemic failure in relevant media coverage transcends the three case studies
examined herein and is indeed not limited to NYT reporting alone. With systemic flaws in highprofile media coverage rather than in actual targeting and accountability processes revealed,
situating the reporting in the broader context of public discourse requires a critical assessment of the
ways in which distorted media coverage is utilized to support the agendas of advocacy groups and
legislators seeking systemic changes to U.S. military operations. This is the primary task of Part III
below.
Part III: Situating the Substantive Analysis in the Broader Context of Public and Political
Discourse

With the substantive analysis of the three case studies examined complete, the present inquiry
transitions now to address a number of common themes that emerge from across this line of
reporting and to situate the present inquiry in the broader context of current public and political
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discourse. Although specific limitations inherent in media coverage emerge in the individual case
studies conducted above, several important themes that are common to the coverage in general are
inevitably obscured when the analytical aperture is narrowed to focus on one specific case study as
does the substantiative analysis above. Likewise, the broader context in which the present inquiry is
situated falls out of focus when the analytical lens is adjusted to examine individual groupings of
media coverage. The analysis in Part III, then, aims to bring these broader themes adequately into
focus.
In the first section of Part III, media coverage analyzed in the case studies above is considered
collectively along with similar examples of high-profile reporting involving military combat
operations to bring focus to the inherent limitations that exist when reporters pursue
“accountability” journalism in this context. The subsequent section broadens the analytical aperture
to evaluate ways in which advocacy groups routinely exploit public scandal ignited by high-profile
media coverage to support organizational objectives. Doing so brings focus to an assessment of why
these organizations have been largely unsuccessful in the effort to convince officials in the
Department of Defense to implement recommendations that reinforce the organizational objectives
of relevant advocacy groups. The final section in Part III then considers the role of Congress in
partnering with advocacy groups that lobby lawmakers to pass legislation in support of
organizational objectives in response to unsuccessful attempts to convince DoD officials to
implement recommendations presented by the groups.
As the analysis below demonstrates, scandal sparked by systemically flawed high-profile media
coverage is an essential ingredient in the narratives that fuel reform agendas pursued by advocacy
groups and legislators alike. If the apparent accountability gap “exposed” by flawed media coverage
has distorted public perception of existing deficiencies in U.S. military operational processes, the
“solutions” in the form of recommendations presented by civil society groups and now being
considered in Congress must be reevaluated. That reevaluation begins by assessing whether media
coverage that has inspired and fueled demands for reform truly represents “accountability
journalism” as it is often characterized in public discourse.
“Accountability” Journalism at Its Best, or “Gotcha” Journalism at Its Worst?
The substantive analysis of the case studies explored above reveals systemic deficiencies that exist
in the collection of high-profile media coverage featured in the critical assessment conducted in the
present work, though these shortcomings should come as no surprise given the nature of external
journalistic reporting on inherently internal and specialized operational and accountability
processes. Military decision makers are trained and advised by a cadre of lawyers who specialize in
the law and policy involving the use of force before and during most combat operations, and
experienced judge advocates (in U.S. military vernacular) likewise directly advise investigating
officers and commanders alike regarding options for pursuing accountability after targeting mishaps
occur. In the process – before, during, and after engagements – decision makers and their
supporting legal advisors have access to a degree of information that is neither possible nor
advisable to be divulged to the general public.
External media coverage of combat operations from outside the military, often long after an incident
occurs, benefits from none of this – and the journalistic product predictability bears the marks of
that deficiency. Failing to articulate standards by which military officials actually assess individual
responsibility while instead depicting an unfounded narrative of a systemic accountability gap is to
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be expected, as is the case for NYT coverage of the Kabul drone strike, from non-specialist
journalists who rely on external analysis from experts with access to only the degree of information
that is available to the public and who bring their own agendas and biases to the commentary
represented in the reporting. Crafting a narrative suggesting commission of a serious war crime and
subsequent coverup when even the basic factual record reported in the media coverage indicates
that the attack actually complied with applicable provisions of law and policy, as is the case for the
Baghuz strikes, is to be expected for the same reasons. The same is true of the journalistic narratives
developed in coverage of the attacks on and around Taqba Dam, as the substantive analysis above
demonstrates that, in fact, procedures involving application of the “no-strike list” did not apply to
the attacks under the circumstances and that the self-defense provisions of the applicable ROE
likely did apply in reality.
Although the critical assessment of journalistic reporting conducted in this article focuses on these
three case studies in particular in order to lend structure to the analysis, these examples of distorted
accountability narratives depicted in high-profile media coverage are certainly not alone.
Investigative reporter Azmat Khan has composed a number of high-profile NYT stories that distort
the actual legal and policy provisions that apply to the conduct of hostilities while developing
narratives reflected in her reporting. Revealing potential discrepancies between official assessments
and actual incidents of civilian casualties, as Khan’s reporting related to U.S. military operations
routinely does, is an effective journalistic angle that produces information that is valuable to official
and public sources alike. However, in developing the editorial narratives that support this important
reporting, Khan routinely distorts the standards by which personnel involved in combat operations
are held to account.
Distorted Accountability Narratives Presented in “The Civilian Casualty Files
In Part I of a NYT story described as “The Civilian Casualty Files,” for example, Azmat Khan
presents the findings of an investigative journalism project that examines “more than 1,300 reports
of civilian casualties, obtained by The New York Times.” As Khan describes in the story, the
investigative “reporting offers the most sweeping, and also the most granular, portrait of how the air
war [in Iraq and Syria] was prosecuted and investigated — and of its civilian toll.” After visiting
more than 100 sites of attacks that potentially resulted in civilian casualties, the central theme that
emerges from the story is vitally important. At its foundation, the media coverage describes that
“the reporting [conducted by the team of investigative journalists] closely matched basic
information from the documents” obtained by the Times, yet “the detailed accounts that ultimately
emerged from the rubbled ground were often in stark contrast to what had been assessed from the
air.”
If the journalistic narrative and commentary is stripped out of the article, from an operational
perspective there are three central and significant lessons that emerge from the reporting. One is that
official estimates of civilian casualties are not precise and may vastly underestimate the toll of
military operations on the civilian population. This should come as no surprise, as official accounts
do not purport to present a complete and accurate depiction of the civilian casualties that may result
from the conduct of hostilities. Central Command spokesperson, Capt. Bill Urban, alludes to this
phenomenon in quotes presented in the media story when he observes that official investigators are
often unable to interview “personnel on the ground” even though the military does “the best we can,
given the circumstances, to understand fully the effects of our operations and the harm done to
innocent life.” The media coverage does not break new ground in this regard, but it does reinforce
Page 46 of 87

an important lesson: developing a comprehensive depiction of the toll of armed conflict on the
civilian population is nearly impossible, and official accounts almost certainly underrepresent that
toll.
A second important lesson that emerges from reporting on the “civilian casualties files” from an
operational perspective is that the military should develop effective strategies to better identify
factors that contribute to unintended civilian casualties in order to learn lessons from such
engagements and thereby improve the targeting process in general. To this end, the coverage
presents an excerpt from a Department of Defense Inspector General report that finds “feedback to
subordinate commands on the cause and/or lessons learned from a civilian casualty incident is
inconsistent.” This is a lesson that resonates with the present author, as I identified this as a
persistent challenge as an operational law advisor while deployed to Afghanistan and consequently
developed specific methods by which the targeting community in the regional command to which I
was assigned could improve the process of providing “feedback to subordinate commands” on
lessons learned from targeting mishaps. While I do not endorse or fully agree with the specific
prescriptions suggested in a recent Lawfare blog post by Ben Waldman and Michel Paradis to
address the deficiency, the authors do, correctly by my assessment, identify “poststrike audits” as an
area of improvement for DoD targeting processes. The need to improve “poststrike audits” and
better use the information developed therefrom to learn and implement lessons that can enhance the
effectiveness of operational targeting processes resonates with me and many former colleagues with
experience providing legal advice to decision makers in armed conflict to whom I have spoken, and
this challenge is reflected in Azmat Khan’s reporting on the civilian casualty files.
A third lesson that is less apparent from the reporting but no less important is that strategic-level
messaging involving the conduct of combat operations needs to be fundamentally reassessed and
reimagined across the Department of Defense. While it may well be true that current technology
allows for extraordinarily precise airstrikes and that the protection of civilians is a priority for the
U.S. military, these talking points should be abandoned entirely in strategic level messaging. The
current focus on these two points of emphasis is counterproductive since targeting mishaps still
routinely occur despite precision strikes and attempts to avoid civilian casualties.
This phenomenon is apparent from comments from a source that are reported in the main story
involving the civilian casualty files. Throughout the article, Azmat Khan presents commentary from
Larry Lewis, a former Pentagon and State Department adviser. Near the end of the article, Lewis
recalls his impression that the level of destruction in Raqqa, Syria after ISIS was defeated there
appeared substantially similar to the devastation that was inflicted by Syrian and Russian forces in
the fight against rebel insurgents in Aleppo. The article quotes Lewis’s reflection revealing,
“Eventually I stopped saying that this was the most precise bombing campaign in the history of
warfare. So what? It doesn’t matter that this was the most precise bombing campaign and the city
looks like this.”
While my own perspectives diverge significantly from those of Larry Lewis that are reflected in his
scholarship involving the topic of civilian harm mitigation, on this account I enthusiastically agree
with Mr. Lewis. It actually does not matter how precise a bombing campaign is if a populated area
is reduced to rubble during the fighting, but rigorously applying fundamental rules of the law of
armed conflict during the campaign is arguably what distinguishes the conduct of the U.S. military
in Raqqa from that of Syrian and Russian forces in Aleppo. This needs to be the sole focus of
strategic level messaging for the U.S. government: American military forces rigorously comply
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with international legal obligations and internal policy requirements during targeting operations,
and these establish the standards to which servicemembers are held accountable after an attack.
Departing from this messaging invites unwarranted criticism to which there is no legitimate
response since the resulting condemnation becomes centered on the outcome of the attack rather
than the process that led to the attack. Presenting two rhetorical questions here may be useful to
illustrate this point: “If the technology supporting these attacks is so precise, why do targeting
operations still kill civilians anyway?”; and “If the military places such an emphasis on protecting
civilians, why is no one ever held accountable when civilian casualties occur?” There is no way to
adequately address these two rhetorical questions since legal and policy provisions that apply to
targeting operations are centered on the process that led to an attack based on the information that
was reasonably available to those responsible for an operation at the time of the attack, whereas the
only way to respond to the two rhetorical questions presented here is to focus on the outcome of the
attack.
This phenomenon is apparent throughout Azmat Khan’s reporting involving the civilian casualty
files. As the subheadline claims at the beginning of Part I of the story, “The promise was a war
waged by all-seeing drones and precision bombs. The documents show flawed intelligence, faulty
targeting, years of civilian deaths — and scant accountability.” As I described at the beginning of
the current subsection, the basic premise of this reporting is incredibly important in informing both
military and public perspectives: that official estimates quite likely vastly underestimate the toll of
armed conflict on the civilian population. Again, this is not a novel revelation since official
estimates do not purport to present an accurate estimate – though the reporting by Khan and her
team brings that toll into sharp focus in a manner that is truly worthy of the accolades bestowed
upon the team.
What is not warranted, though, is the theme of “scant accountability” that pervades this collection of
reporting along with the other media representations analyzed herein. While the intrepid reporting
of the NYT journalistic team often reveals that official reports erroneously conclude that an attack
did not result in damage to civilian persons and property, the methodology adopted by the
investigative journalists is simply not achievable or sustainable by military sources. As the article
describes, the team “visited more than 100 casualty sites and interviewed scores of surviving
residents and current and former American officials.” This is undoubtedly dangerous work for
investigative journalists, but for the DoD each one of those site visits would constitute a combat
operation that would endanger military personnel and the surrounding civilian population that could
be adversely affected by attacks directed against military personnel conducting a site visit alike.
Relatedly, there is certainly room for the DoD to improve what Ben Waldman and Michel Paradis
refer to as “poststrike audits,” but this current deficiency has almost no impact on existing
accountability processes. That is because a “poststrike audit” is centered on the outcome of the
attack, whereas actual accountability determinations are developed based on the process involved in
an attack. Strategic messaging emphasizing that “even with the best technology in the world,
mistakes do happen” and that the military works “diligently to avoid” harm to the civilian
population, as Central Command Capt. Bill Urban is quoted as claiming in the article, invites a
counter-representation that distorts the law and policy involved in targeting operations.
Emphasizing instead only that military personnel stringently apply rules established in relevant law
and policy and that these are the standards by which personnel are held to account would shift the
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focus back to where it belongs: the process that led to an attack and the information that was
reasonably available to personnel at the time.
Instead, the narratives developed by Azmat Khan in the primary article covering the civilian
casualty files paint a picture of “scant accountability.” On one occasion near the beginning of the
story, Khan claims the civilian casualty files reveal that “despite the Pentagon’s highly codified
system for examining civilian casualties, pledges of transparency and accountability have given way
to opacity and impunity.” To support this characterization, she notes that not “a single record
provided includes a finding of wrongdoing or disciplinary action.” Later in the story, in a section
entitled “Failures of Accountability,” Khan emphasizes that “no record of disciplinary action” is
noted in the files she and her team examined and that “only a quarter included any further review,
recommendations or lessons learned.” Again, the latter observation implies that the process of
“poststrike audits” – as Ben Waldman and Michel Paradis describe them – could be improved.
This revelation, however, has almost no bearing on accountability processes – and it does not
support the journalistic narrative of “Failures of Accountability” being developed by Azmat Khan
here. Simply put, personnel are not held “accountable” for the outcome of an attack. That not “a
single record provided includes a finding of wrongdoing or disciplinary action” should come as no
surprise – primarily because Khan and her team were investigating files that were used internally in
the DoD to assess the credibility of a claim of civilian casualties. A claim that civilian casualties
resulted from an attack is centered on the outcome of the attack after a strike has occurred. In the
exceedingly unlikely event that there were any indication suggesting personnel may have
deliberately targeted civilians, for example, a separate investigation would be convened and the
results would not be reflected in a CIVCAS incident report.
Nonetheless, the narrative involving “scant accountability” developed by Azmat Khan in this article
is part of a general trend in media reporting – depicting a seemingly systemic “failure of
accountability” without describing or applying the standards by which personnel are actually held to
account. The three case studies examined in Part I and Part II of this article exhibit the same
tendency to craft a narrative depicting an apparent accountability gap that is developed based on the
outcome of an attack. As the analysis turns now to demonstrate, these examples of investigative
reporting are part of a trend among journalists to focus with seemingly obsessive zeal on
accountability based on facts that emerge after targeting operations. The narratives that emerge
make it reasonable to question whether anyone is holding the journalists involved in this particular
brand of accountability journalism to account for the distortions in public perceptions that result
from the media coverage they purvey.
Assessing “Accountability” Characterizations Expressed by Reporters During Official Press
Briefings
Although the subheadline for Azmat Khan’s central NYT story covering the “civilian casualty files”
suggests that U.S. military targeting operations are beset by “scant accountability,” the deficiencies
revealed above in the analysis of that article and of the case studies examined herein reveals that the
brand of “accountability” journalists construct in media narratives does not reflect standards by
which personnel are actually held to account for conduct that occurs in armed conflict. In the
prevailing version of media accountability, a failure to impose adverse action on personnel based on
the outcome of an attack that results in unintended consequences such as civilian casualties is
evidence of “scant accountability.” However, for commanders making actual disciplinary decisions
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and military lawyers advising these officials in practice, the relevant legal and policy rules require
an assessment of the conduct of relevant personnel in light of information that was reasonably
available at the time of an attack. To illustrate the effect this disparity in perspective imposes on
journalistic narratives regarding accountability that are generated in media coverage, it is helpful to
broaden the analytical aperture beyond the New York Times reporting that has been the central
focus of the inquiry thus far.
One primary source that is rich with media perspectives related to “accountability” for targeting
mishaps is the media briefing held by Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby in May 2022 when the
results of the secondary review of the investigation related to the Baghuz airstrikes were announced.
Following his prepared remarks, the transcript of the briefing reveals that Kirby addressed a number
of questions presented by various media correspondents. A sampling of the questions posed and
characterizations presented by journalists related to responsibility for the Baghuz attacks and
civilian casualties in general provides useful context for the brand of “accountability” media
correspondents have in mind when covering targeting operations that occur during armed conflict.
Analysis of these characterizations begin with a question presented by a correspondent identified by
Kirby as “Oren.” After acknowledging the secondary review of the Baghuz attacks, the reporter
identified as “Oren” observes that “if you look back in Afghanistan, even with the Secretary's focus
on civilian casualties, there appears to be a pattern emerging here of no one being held accountable.
What does it take for accountability to be imposed, or for someone to be held accountable for
civilian casualties?” The comments continue, with the correspondent noting, “Because you seem to
be saying that look, as long as there's no malicious intent, the number is irrelevant of civilian
casualties.”
On the day of this press briefing, CNN Pentagon Correspondent Oren Liebermann published a story
with the headline, “Pentagon doesn’t hold anyone accountable for 2019 Syria strike that killed four
civilians following review.” After describing events involving the initial and secondary reviews
related to the Baghuz strikes, Liebermann notes that “despite the increased focus” on preventing
civilian casualties, “the Pentagon has not punished any of its commanders for civilian casualties.”
Liebermann’s narrative then pivots to the Kabul drone strike, observing that “the Pentagon said it
would not hold anyone accountable for a drone strike in late-August that killed 10 civilians,
including seven children” while including a link to his own CNN coverage of the incident and
official review.
Turning to the linked story involving the Kabul drone strike published by Liebermann, the headline
for this article is, “Pentagon decides no US troops will be punished over botched Kabul drone strike
that killed 10 civilians.” Like a primary NYT story involving the Kabul drone strike, the
Liebermann CNN article features a characterization related to accountability presented by a source
who was a close associate of a civilian who was killed in the attack. That is, the article presents part
of a statement made by Steven Kwon, who observes, “This decision is shocking. How can our
military wrongly take the lives of 10 precious Afghan people, and hold no one accountable in any
way?” The statement by Kwon continues to claim, “When the Pentagon absolves itself of
accountability, it sends a dangerous and misleading message that its actions were somehow
justified, increasing security risks and making evacuation even more urgent.”
This narrative suggesting the Pentagon routinely absolves itself of responsibility for attacks that
result in civilian casualties is presented against the backdrop of characterizations related to
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accountability presented by official sources. At the beginning of the article, Liebermann observes
that official recommendations involving the Kabul drone strike “did not include holding anyone
accountable or punishing anyone involved in the strike,” and “accountability” – Kwon’s
characterization competing with official findings – emerges as the primary theme for the story.
Returning to the story published by Liebermann the day the results of the secondary review of the
Baghuz strikes were announced, the opening observation there as well is that “the Pentagon has
decided to hold no one accountable for” the attacks. Like the story involving the Kabul drone strike,
accountability emerges as the primary theme in the article – and the resulting journalistic narrative
depicts that the DoD, despite “increased focus” on prevention, “the Pentagon has not punished any
of its commanders for civilian casualties.” (emphasis added)
There is no question from these articles published by CNN Pentagon Correspondent Oren
Liebermann that the standards by which personnel are actually held to account following targeting
operations have been described to him and other journalists during press briefings, as these
characterizations are a central component of his coverage. His story involving the Baghuz strikes
includes a quote from spokesperson John Kirby observing that there was no reason to “hold
somebody personally accountable for what happened” in the Baghuz airstrikes since the ground
force commander reportedly “made the best decisions he could in the fog of war, in the midst of
combat.” Likewise, Liebermann’s story following the secondary review of the Kabul drone strike
includes a quote from Lt. Gen. Sami Said, who conducted the review, noting that relevant personnel
“had a genuine belief based on the information they had that that was a threat to US forces, an
imminent threat to US forces” and that the attack therefore does not constitute “criminal conduct” or
“random conduct negligence.”
As suggested above when noting the strategic imperative to reimagine official narratives to focus
only on legal and policy compliance, this messaging from Kirby and Lt. Gen. Said could be
improved by explaining the standards of “accountability” in more precise detail. Nonetheless, these
official observations are correct to describe that actions taken during the conduct of hostilities is
evaluated based on information that was reasonably known at the time rather than on facts that
emerge afterward. Returning to Oren Liebermann’s question during the press conference involving
the Baghuz airstrikes regarding what it takes “for accountability to be imposed, or for someone to
be held accountable for civilian casualties,” the actual standards diverge from the narrative
Liebermann develops in his coverage. In his journalistic narrative, that “the Pentagon has not
punished any of its commanders for civilian casualties” is evidence of a systemic accountability
failure. For official disciplinary decisions, it is the process that led to a strike – and not the outcome
– that is relevant when deciding whether to hold personnel “accountable.”
Returning to the transcript of the press conference at which Oren Liebermann asked what it takes
for “someone to be held accountable for civilian casualties,” it is abundantly apparent that the
perspective of this CNN Pentagon correspondent that accountability should be assessed based on
the outcome of attacks that result in civilian casualties is in no way an outlier among journalists on
the Pentagon beat. During the question and answer period of the press conference following the
Pentagon spokesperson’s prepared remarks, a journalist identified by Kirby as “Jen” brings the
focus of the discussion “back to the Baghuz report” and asks “how come nobody is ever punished
when these reports come out?” The journalist follows this question by observing, “There's never any
accountability.”
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As part of a meandering response claiming that senior military officials take “the leadership and
accountability very seriously,” Kirby correctly points out that the general officer who was assigned
to conduct a review of the initial investigation did not “find that anybody acted outside the Law of
War, that there was no malicious intent” and that “the ground force commander, given the
information he had at the time, made the best decisions he could in the moment against a very
aggressive ISIS force.” Like other official claims, this response does not present specific details
regarding the findings that personnel involved in the airstrikes complied with relevant provisions of
the law of armed conflict. Nonetheless, the lamentation from the journalist identified as “Jen” –
whom Kirby describes as a reporter who “has been covering the Pentagon a long time” – that there
is “never any accountability” since “nobody is ever punished when these reports come out”
demonstrates a distorted perspective regarding the standards for “accountability” that actually apply
in practice. “Nobody is ever punished” because “these reports” determine that, as Kirby notes,
personnel involved in the attacks do not act “outside the Law of War.” As unsatisfying as that may
seem for journalists covering the Pentagon beat, these are the standards that personnel are expected
to apply during targeting operations and, likewise, that are used to assess whether adverse action
should be initiated following a targeting mishap.
Yet another potential basis for supporting a journalistic narrative depicting systemic failures of
accountability emerges in a question presented by a reporter Kirby identifies as “Gordon” involving
what the reporter indicates involves the issue of “background accountability.” Here, Gordon
expresses that “what fuels a lot of the questions” involving accountability “is this idea that even
when the Pentagon chooses a[n] independent four-star [general officer], separate from the operation
and all that, the person is still cut from the same cloth cultural, the rest of it.” After this setup, the
reporter identified as “Gordon” asks, “Has the secretary [of Defense] given any thought to like
further distancing some of these reviews, which are critical to your own scrutiny of these operations
away from, as best or more, so from the culture and the operations that...?”
Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby begins speaking before the reporter finishes the question and
initially points out that “it's got to be a balance, because somebody also has to be informed, and
educated, and experienced in military operations as well.” This perspective may well be true,
though Kirby once again engages in a meandering response involving the concept of accountability,
which includes a claim that “no other military in the world works harder than the United States
military to prevent and to not cause civilian harm.” As partial support for this assertion, Kirby notes
that investigators and senior leaders “want to look and see if those [targeting] decisions were the
right ones in the moment with the information that they had available to them…with the actual
tangible, lethal threat in their face.”
Yet again, Kirby addresses a question involving “accountability” for targeting mishaps with an
unsatisfactorily vague, though generally accurate, characterization of legal and policy standards,
which require an assessment of the information that was reasonably available at the time of an
attack. Nonetheless, the underlying point presented by the reporter identified as “Gordon” is that
assigning a senior leader who is “cut from the same [cultural] cloth” to review an initial
investigation that was also conducted internally by military personnel may impugn the findings of
the subsequent investigation and, relatedly, the determination not to hold personnel “accountable”
for an incident. Perhaps one potential explanation for the fact that, as the reporter identified as “Jen”
points out, personnel are routinely not “punished when these reports” of follow-on investigations
are published is that subsequent inquiries are conducted internally by military personnel.
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However, another explanation is that personnel routinely comply with relevant legal and policy
requirements even if the outcome of an attack is not consistent with what the responsible personnel
intended at the time. An initial investigation finding that personnel complied with the law of armed
conflict, rules of engagement, and other relevant legal and policy provisions does not support a
decision to impose disciplinary action following an engagement. A subsequent review validating the
initial findings is legitimate even if it is conducted internally by military personnel. As the critical
assessment that is the primary subject of the present inquiry indicates, nothing that has been
“revealed” to the public in media coverage of military targeting operations supports a
characterization that would impugn the validity either of initial investigations or subsequent reviews
of targeting incidents – even if both are conducted internally by military personnel. At best, the
concern appears to involve the perception of partiality or institutional bias, though there are no
apparent factors to suggest this perception is indeed a reality.
Journalistic Narratives and the “Danger of Equivalence” for Effects-based Accountability
One final characterization involving “accountability” expressed by a reporter during the press
briefing related to the subsequent review of the Baghuz strikes to be examined herein comes from a
journalist identified by spokesperson John Kirby as “Kasim.” This reporter notes that “we have seen
Russian [military forces] striking a building where kids [and] civilians were” located during the
conflict in Ukraine and journalists “have been reporting about this that could be…a war crime.”
Returning to the Baghuz report, the journalist observes that “in this case, we have seen that woman,
children are being killed” and even though the U.S. military is “coming out speaking to these issues
in a transparent way,” that “doesn't change the fact that the United States military have killed
dozens of kids and women.”
Yet again, Kirby’s response is characteristically meandering and imprecise involving how standards
of accountability are applied in practice. Nonetheless, the point raised by the reporter identified as
“Kasim” reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of applicable rules involving attacks that occur
during the course of hostilities. On the topic of assessing the lawfulness of targeting operations that
occur during the armed conflict in Ukraine, Professors Geoff Corn and Sean Watts recently warned
against conclusions drawn from “effects-based enforcement of targeting law.” In that article posted
on the blog site Articles of War, the authors correctly describe that characterizations involving
condemnation and accountability “require evidence that meets the law’s standards of proof and
persuasion” and that “the focal point of inquiry related to targeting operations must be the attack
judgment, not the attack outcome.” (emphasis in original)
While Corn and Watts are correct to criticize the validity of “effects-based” accountability
characterizations, the reflections presented by the journalist identified as “Kasim” give rise to an
even more insidious concern. Equating all attacks that result in civilian casualties based on the
outcome of the attack, as do the reporter’s reflections, risks eroding the legitimacy of international
law in actual practice. For example, a letter circulated to the UN General Assembly and Security
Council by the Permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations in March claims that a
“missile with a cluster warhead was fired at a residential block…from the territory controlled by the
Kiev regime” days earlier and that the “assault led to the killing of more than 20 civilians while 37,
including children, women and elderly people, were injured and taken to medical institutions.”
After citing a number of relevant provisions of international law, the characterization advanced by
Russia is that “the attack perpetrated by Ukrainian armed forces represents not only serious
Page 53 of 87

violation of IHL, but amounts to act of terror and a war crime against civilian population.” This
characterization by Russia of “war crimes against the civilian population” allegedly committed by
Ukrainian forces is based solely on the outcome of the attack and with no direct indication
regarding whether the civilians who were purportedly injured or killed in the strike were
deliberately targeted by Ukraine. Although concern has been expressed among the international
community that Russia has engaged in “indiscriminate attacks” during the conflict in Ukraine,
focusing on the outcome of attacks that result in civilian casualties will allow Russia to claim it is
Ukraine – not Russia – that is committing war crimes and other serious violations of international
law.
This gives rise to a phenomenon I will refer to here as the danger of equivalence. That is, effectsbased characterizations may allow a party to an armed conflict to disregard relevant rules of
international law by engaging in indiscriminate attacks while denouncing attacks conducted by an
adversary that may comply with international law but result in civilian casualties. Doing so creates a
mechanism whereby an offending party can seek to deflect criticism of its own violations.
Specifically in this example, characterizations such as those presented by the reporter identified as
“Kasim” in the press conference announcing the completion of the secondary review of the Baghuz
strikes based solely on the outcome of attacks provides a tool for Russian propaganda to deflect
responsibility for potentially indiscriminate attacks by pointing to media coverage claiming that
U.S. military forces engage in the exact same conduct. The journalistic narrative equating the
outcomes – “the fact that the United States military have killed dozens of kids and women” as one
example and Russian military forces “striking a building where kids [and] civilians were” located as
the other – creates this potential danger of equivalence. The apparent aspiration by journalists in the
West to use media coverage as a means to seek “accountability” for the outcome of attacks that
result in civilian casualties, then, may well produce the seemingly unintended – and
counterproductive – consequence of legitimizing offenses potentially committed by Russian
military forces in the Ukraine conflict.
Based on the names Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby utilizes to refer to journalists as he invites
questions following his prepared remarks at the press conference announcing the results of the
secondary review of the Baghuz attacks, it does not appear that reporters from the New York Times
team that is primarily responsible for the compilation of media coverage that is the primary focus of
the present inquiry were called upon during the briefing. However, in an earlier press conference
announcing actions taken following the secondary review of the Kabul drone strike, Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin calls upon a journalist identified as “Eric Schmitt” during a question and
answer period that follows Austin’s prepared remarks. Eric Schmitt, of course, is one of the
reporters listed on the bylines of all three collections of NYT stories that are the primary focus of
the present inquiry.
During the exchange between the reporter and defense secretary, Schmitt’s reflections and
comments reveal a focus on effects-based accountability – just like the comments by the journalist
identified as “Kasim” examined immediately above. That is, Schmitt begins what he describes as
his “second question” by observing that the U.S. “military has taken responsibility for the
casualties, again, both on August 29th [the Kabul drone strike], as well as the ones in Syria
[potentially a reference to the Baghuz strikes], and many others, but it's very…rare when the
military actually holds anyone…accountable or somebody -- there's administrative action or other -some kind of other disciplinary action.” The question posed by Schmitt following these introductory
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remarks is, “To what extent are you personally committed to holding people accountable now for
these kind[s] of actions?”
Although Eric Schmitt does not equate the conduct of U.S. military personnel and Russian forces
based on the outcome of attacks as “Kasim” does in the later press briefing (indeed, the full
invasion of Ukraine by Russia had not yet occurred at the time of the earlier briefing), the nature of
Schmitt’s comments is consistent with the effects-based accountability demonstrated by “Kasim’s”
later reflections that do equate Russian and American military conduct based on the outcome of
attacks. That is, Schmitt correctly observes that “it’s very…rare when the [U.S.] military actually
holds anyone…accountable” even though the military has routinely “taken responsibility for”
civilian casualties. However, the expectation that the Secretary of Defense should be “personally
committed to holding people accountable for” attacks for which the U.S. “military has taken
responsibility for the casualties” inadvertently inflicted is centered solely on the effects of the
attacks rather than the process that led to the decision to strike.
Dismay that “it’s very…rare” that the military imposes “administrative action or…some kind of
disciplinary action” is evident throughout high-profile NYT media coverage of U.S. military
operations examined herein, but the resulting perspective suggesting that this constitutes an
accountability gap – or “scant accountability” as Azmat Khan describes it – creates the risk that the
coverage may be used as a propaganda tool by Russia to deflect criticism of the conduct of Russian
military forces in Ukraine. Indeed, Russia has already demonstrated the proclivity to blame the
Ukrainian military and, by extension the U.S. government for supporting Ukraine, for the conduct
of hostilities based on the outcome of attacks. On one such occasion, for example, Alexander
Darchiev, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s North American Department claimed on statecontrolled media outlet TASS that “the lethal bombardments of the civilian population in the DPR
and the LPR [the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics] and on the liberated territories of
Ukraine” by Ukrainian forces “take place at least with the approval of American decision-making
centers.” (emphasis added)
In a similar example, Russian military Lt Gen Igor Konashenkov reportedly claimed, “It is the
Biden administration that is directly responsible for all rocket attacks approved by Kyiv on
residential areas and civilian infrastructure facilities in settlements of Donbas and other regions that
caused mass deaths of civilians.” (emphasis added) Separately, in a Newsweek article with the
headline “Russia Will Blame HIMARS for ‘War Crime’ POW Attack, U.S. Suggests,” a quote from
Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby indicates that the U.S. government has “reason to believe...that
Russia would go so far as to make it appear that Ukrainian HIMARS...were to blame” for an attack
that resulted in the deaths of Ukrainian prisoners of war. These HIMARS, or high mobility artillery
rocket systems, are widely reported to have been supplied to Ukraine by the United States.
All of these examples represent occasions in which the Russian government has blamed Ukrainian
forces, and by extension the American government for supporting Ukraine, for violating
international law based on the outcome of an attack – with no mention of the process that led to the
decision to strike. Whether or not Ukrainian military personnel are actually responsible for any of
the attacks is, of course, a separate matter altogether. However, even if Ukraine is demonstrated to
be responsible for an attack that results in civilian casualties or other unintended consequences, the
outcome alone is an insufficient basis upon which to expect personnel to be “held accountable”
afterward. As the substantive case studies conducted in this article demonstrate, this is a
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fundamental requirement of applying relevant provisions of international law…no matter who is
responsible for an attack.
If the United States or an allied government discovers evidence indicating that the Russian military
genuinely is engaging in indiscriminate attacks or is otherwise committing serious violations of the
law of armed conflict in the conduct of hostilities in Ukraine, New York Times and other American
media coverage of U.S. military combat operations may well be a central exhibit relied upon by the
Russian government to deflect responsibility for these breaches. “Who is America to criticize
Russia?”, will be the argument. “Whom did the U.S. military hold accountable for the Kabul drone
strike?”
In this plausible scenario that demonstrates the potential danger of equivalence, high-profile New
York Times media coverage represents the proverbial soil that is exceedingly rich in the nutrients
the Russian disinformation campaign will need to take roots and grow. While the Ukrainian
population may suffer unspeakable horrors that result from systemic indiscriminate attacks carried
out by the Russian military, it will be narratives generated in high-profile media coverage that lend
the veneer of legitimacy to Russian atrocities – all while American media organizations reap the
profits and prestige that flow from holding the U.S. government “accountable” externally for
“violations” of international law that were never actually committed. Given these conditions, it is
reasonable to ponder what entity it is that holds the media accountable for the distortions in public
perception created by high-profile coverage of U.S. military operations and, just as importantly,
how advocates in civil society and, now even select elected officials, take advantage of these
distortions to support their own agendas.
Scant Accountability – for Misinformed and Biased Media Coverage
One central theme that emerges from the collection of media coverage reporting on U.S. military
combat operations examined in the present article is that an apparent accountability deficit exists
within the military and it is the role of interested journalists to use their reporting as a forum to
bring public awareness to that deficiency. The critical assessment of the media coverage conducted
herein, however, demonstrates that an accountability deficit does not actually exist in practice and
that the appearance of “scant accountability” is created by distorting legal and policy rules that
actually apply in practice. There has long been a sense in liberal democracies that a primary role of
a free press is to assist with the monumental and essential task of ensuring that the government
remains accountable to The People.
This is the ideal Thomas Carlyle famously espoused in 1787 when he declared that “[Edmund]
Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporter’s Gallery yonder, there sat a
Fourth Estate more important than they all.” According to Carlyle, “Whoever can speak, speaking
now to the whole nation, becomes a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in lawmaking, in all acts of authority.” As the then managing editor of The Farmville Herald succinctly
noted much more recently after referring to Carlyle’s famous characterization of the press, one
“main purpose of the Fourth Estate is to be the people’s watchdog when it comes to all levels of
government.” Another related contemporary perspective suggests that the “press has always had its
eyes on the government, and has always served as the voice of the people, speaking truth to power.”
There is a palpable sense that contemporary media organizations in America and like-minded liberal
democracies zealously embrace this role of being the “people’s watchdog” by keeping “its eyes on
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the government” while “speaking truth to power.” Likewise, it is readily apparent that the
journalists responsible for the media coverage examined herein enthusiastically pursue this role.
Indeed, the reporters responsible for the coverage are keen to point out at any opportunity the
actions and responses senior military officials have directed as a result of NYT coverage of military
operations.
“Fourth Estate” Obsession for Holding Government “Accountable” Contributes to Biased
Journalistic Angles
After Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin sought to be briefed on the details of the Baghuz airstrikes,
for example, Eric Schmitt published an article noting that Austin “requested the briefing after
reading an investigative report published over the weekend by The New York Times detailing the
strike and allegations that top officers and civilian officials sought to conceal the casualties.” Two
days later, Eric Schmitt and Dave Phillips published an article that likewise points out the role of
NTY reporting in prompting the briefing. After Secretary Austin directed the DoD to develop a
“Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan,” a story written by Schmitt, Charlie Savage,
and Azmat Khan points out that the instruction “comes after a series of investigations by The New
York Times into airstrikes that killed civilians, including the cover-up of a strike in Syria in 2019
that killed dozens of women and children and a botched drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan, that
killed 10 innocent people in August” and a separate New York “Times investigation based on a
trove of Pentagon reviews of strikes revealed systemic failures to prevent civilian deaths in its air
war against the Islamic State.” After the action plan was released to the public by the DoD, a NYT
story by the same three journalists points out that the directive “follows an investigative series by
The New York Times into civilian deaths from American airstrikes.”
The sentiment that is implicitly communicated by these observations is clear: changes in
government processes are taking place because of extensive journalistic investigations carried out
by the Times. In this regard, the press is embracing the role of the Fourth Estate – to be the people’s
watchdog while keeping its eyes on the government and speaking truth to power. This sense that the
Times is pursuing an important endeavor to hold the government accountable is apparent not only in
the text of the reporting, but also in remarks presented by reporters and editorial staff off of the
printed page.
In a newsroom ceremony celebrating “an incredible year of journalism” and introducing the “year’s
Pulitzer Prize winners” in May, for example, then-executive director Dean Baquet lauded the team
that “won for international reporting, for the stories of civilians killed in American airstrikes.”
According to Baquet, “Successive administrations boasted of an innovative program of drones and
airstrikes that represented ‘the most precise air campaign in history.’ But we revealed the truth — a
legacy of missed targets, disproportionate destruction and civilian deaths.”
Following his remarks, Baquet cedes the floor to Matt Purdy, who was the deputy managing editor
at the time but has since been promoted to editor at large. While extolling the work of Azmat Khan,
Purdy asserts “Azmat knew more about the truth of the U.S. air wars than anyone outside the
Pentagon, and probably inside it, too.” Purdy goes on to describe that NYT reporter Dave Phillips
“had a tip about an airstrike in Syria that [reportedly] killed 70 civilians, including women and
children,” and that Phillips and Eric Schmitt “confirmed the strike and also reported that the
military had ignored repeated questions about it from within its ranks.” This, of course, is a
reference to what would go on to become coverage of the Baghuz airstrikes – which the critical
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analysis conducted herein demonstrates was deficient from the very beginning due to the erroneous
characterizations presented to the reporters by their sources. Even so, Purdy continues by noting
that other stories by Dave Phillips and Eric Schmitt reportedly “exposed deep flaws in the air
attacks” conducted by the U.S. military during combat operations.
During the newsroom ceremony, Matt Purdy then invites Azmat Khan to present remarks. As she
describes the work that led to coverage of the civilian casualty files and related stories, Khan asserts
“every American deserves to be informed about the wars waged in their names…and about whether
claims of accountability and surgical warfare really stack up.” After reflecting on a number of
salient details regarding her work over the preceding several years, Khan then claims “each
investigation in this series helped reveal a system of impunity” and she “truly believe[s] that this
collaboration represents a radical transformation in the way we report about war, and how
journalists respond to claims of precision in the future.”
Azmat Khan then cedes the floor to Dave Phillips, who describes during his brief comments that he
along with reporters Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti were able to get “inside the top secret Special
Operations strike cell and were able to show, not only that the strikes were killing civilians, but that
there were systematic problems with the rules governing strikes. Furthermore, according to Phillips,
their reporting revealed that “internal reports sounding the alarm” from within the military “were
being ignored.” This work, according to Phillips, “was difficult and important reporting.”
From among these reflections presented at the newsroom ceremony by reporters and their editorial
managers, a central theme that emerges is that a primary role of New York Times coverage of U.S.
military combat operations abroad is to expose existing systemic flaws in military processes to
allow the public to hold the DoD accountable since it is not doing so itself. It is the “scant
accountability” angle that effectively transforms the coverage from a compelling human interest
story about the often hidden human costs of warfare to an award-winning collection of
accountability journalism. The human toll is the tragedy revealed by the reporting, but purporting to
reveal why that tragedy repeatedly occurs and what needs to be done to correct the causal
deficiencies in the future is the journalistic call to action that infuses the journalism with the
apparent sense of accountability.
As the critical analysis conducted in this article reveals, however, the “scant accountability” angle is
an illusion. In order to construct the narrative “demonstrating” that the military routinely fails to
hold troops “accountable” for targeting operations that result in unintended consequences, media
coverage persistently mischaracterizes the legal and policy rules that establish actual standards of
conduct in practice. Even though compliance with relevant “accountability” standards is central to
the reporting, not once does an article examined above present an accurate articulation of the
applicable rules. The media coverage exhibits a seemingly obsessive devotion to the issue of
accountability – but the brand of accountability presented in media coverage is not supported by
law, policy, or, indeed, reality.
Based on the nature of the reporting, it is reasonable to conclude that the discrepancy between
actual accountability standards and the narratives depicted throughout the media coverage are
attributable to two central factors. The first, a deficiency of adequate information from which to
draw balanced and fully informed conclusions related to the attacks that are the subject of media
reporting and efforts by the military to evaluate the potential for adverse personnel action afterward,
is predictable and unlikely to be corrected. Both topics are the subject of deliberations that are
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internal to the military, and routinely releasing substantial amounts of information for public
consumption can pose a serious risk to operational security.
Contravening Standards of Ethical Journalism in Pursuit of Government “Accountability”
The second central factor that likely accounts for the considerable discrepancy between actual
accountability standards and the depictions presented in high-profile media coverage is an inherent
mistrust of internal government processes that members of the vaunted “fourth estate” bring to their
role as journalists. This sentiment is apparent, for example, both in the reporting examined in the
present case study and in the perspectives communicated by the editorial team at the newsroom
ceremony outside of the textual coverage of combat operations. The reporters and their editors are
proverbial hammers in search of opportunities to hold the government accountable from the outside,
and most of the information discovered in the course of investigative journalism looks like a nail.
While this may well be deemed a particularly noble pursuit in a liberal representative democracy
wherein governmental constraint is a core founding principle, the media appears unable to
unilaterally control for the inherent bias generated by the quest for external accountability. One
central component of the New York Times “Ethical Journalism” standards is a section entitled “Our
Duty to Our Readers.” According to this component of the standards for ethical journalism, the New
York Times aspires to treat “its readers as fairly and openly as possible.” According to The Times,
“In print and online, we tell our readers the complete, unvarnished truth as best we can learn it. It is
our policy to correct our errors, large and small, as soon as we become aware of them.”
Standards of Ethical Journalism Applied to Reporting on Baghuz and Taqba Dam strikes
While unquestionably noble in concept, this “duty” did not compel Eric Schmitt and Dave Phillips
to report, for example, that the “extensive review of the facts and circumstances” conducted by
General Michael Garrett related to the Baghuz strikes determined the original inspector general
complaint that formed the basis of the initial NYT coverage “was unsubstantiated.” Nor does the
finding that “a number of assertions made that are not supported by evidence and/or are based on
inaccurate or false information” all along appear in the coverage of the secondary review conducted
by Gen. Garrett. The “two-page executive summary” is described in the story published by the two
journalists along with a link to the official memorandum that presents the executive summary, so
there is no question that the reporters were aware of and had read Garrett’s findings as they drafted
the follow-up story. Rather than Schmitt and Phillips treating NYT “readers as fairly and openly as
possible” and telling “readers the complete, unvarnished truth as best we can learn it” as the
standards of ethical journalism would seem to require, though, the journalists continue to emphasize
in the reporting that Gen. Garrett’s “findings did not call for any disciplinary action.”
While touting that “the series [of NYT reporting] was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for international
reporting” and that the Secretary of Defense ordered development of a new policy involving civilian
harm mitigation “[i]n response to The Times’s investigation,” the journalists persist with the theme
suggesting that the DoD is plagued by a persistent internal failure of accountability. The follow-on
story includes a quote from Eugene Tate, the former inspector general analyst whose complaint was
central to the initial reporting of the Baghuz strikes. “It’s the standard government line: Mistakes
were made but there was no wrongdoing,” according to Tate. Considering that the memorandum
published by Gen. Garrett and linked in the follow-up story includes the finding that Tate’s original
complaint was “unsubstantiated” and “not supported by evidence and/or are based on inaccurate or
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false information” all along, it seems reasonable to expect Schmitt and Phillips to include this
finding in their coverage if the aspiration to tell readers “the complete, unvarnished truth as best”
they can learn it is taken seriously.
The critical analysis conducted in the present inquiry demonstrates that the “scant accountability”
theme that pervades NYT (and other) media coverage is not supported by a doctrinal application of
relevant rules of international law and military policy. Although a more detailed analysis would of
course be permitted by applying operational rules of engagement and other classified doctrinal
sources, material that is readily available to the public is more than adequate to demonstrate the
pervasive flaws in existing high-profile media coverage. That the editorial teams responsible for the
media coverage analyzed herein appear either unable or unwilling to access, assess, and report on
these doctrinal sources raises serious questions regarding the ability of the media to engage in
effective “accountability journalism” in this context as the vaunted “fourth estate” concept aspires
to do. Instead, the driving ambition to keep the government honest on behalf of The People coupled
with an apparent unwillingness or inability to engage in genuinely balanced coverage of internal
disciplinary processes gives rise to an insidious version of “gotcha journalism” that results in an
unjustifiable erosion of public trust in the military as an institution.
Then-Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend claimed during a press conference, for example, “Taqba Dam is
not a coalition target,” but – gotcha! – investigative journalism carried out by the fourth estate
reveals, “In fact, members of a top secret U.S. Special Operations unit called Task Force 9 had
struck the dam using some of the largest conventional bombs in the U.S. arsenal.” This apparent
“correction” of the official narrative is presented to create the appearance that Townsend is either
uninformed or is deceiving the public, notwithstanding that Townsend’s full remarks are taken out
of context in that he actually intended to communicate that the dam is not the object of attack and
that “when strikes occur on military targets, at or near the dam, we use non-cratering munitions to
avoid unnecessary damage to the facility.”
What’s more, according to the impression generated by this specimen of “accountability
journalism,” because of “the dam’s protected status, the decision to strike it would normally have
been made high up the chain of command.” However, as the Taqba Dam case study above
demonstrates, these claims presented by anonymous sources are erroneous since the procedures
related to the “no-strike list” likely did not apply. As analysis presented in case study #3 above in
Part I demonstrates, both exceptions to the standard process of removing an object from the NSL –
that is, 1) ISIS fighters and equipment located on and around the dam qualified as time sensitive
targets, and 2) the attacks actual did qualify for designation as (collective) self-defense strikes since
ISIS fighters engaged in hostile acts and demonstrated hostile intent in relation to SDF partners –
applied in practice. The journalistic claim that “[g]iven the dam’s protected status, the decision to
strike it would normally have been made high up the chain of command” but unnamed “former
officials said the task force used a procedural shortcut reserved for emergencies, allowing it to
launch the attack without clearance” is both ill-informed and misguided.
Nonetheless, this claim gives the appearance of supporting the general “scant accountability”
narrative that pervades and connects this line of NYT reporting. In this instance, it is the assertion,
“No disciplinary action was taken against the task force” according to unnamed officials, while the
“secret unit continued to strike targets using the same types of self-defense justifications it had used
on the dam.” “No disciplinary action” was taken because the strikes did comply with applicable
legal and policy requirements, including collective self-defense provisions of the unclassified
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standing rules of engagement. This conclusion is supportable when applying the facts reported in
the media story to doctrinal sources of international law and use of force policy that are readily
available to the general public, yet there is no mechanism by which to hold the “investigative”
journalists accountable for the distortions in public opinion generated by the ill-informed and
misguided narratives curated in their reporting.
Standards of Ethical Journalism Applied to Reporting on Kabul drone strikes
The same phenomenon emerges from the critical analysis conducted herein of media coverage
involving the Baghuz airstrikes. The initial story sets up the “scant accountability” narrative by
summarizing the official claim that the U.S. “military said every report of civilian casualties was
investigated and the findings reported publicly, creating what the military called a model of
accountability.” This summary of the official claim is followed immediately by the journalistic
claim that “the strikes on Baghuz tell a different story.” A few paragraphs later – gotcha! – the NYT
investigation revealed “regulations for reporting and investigating the potential crime were not
followed, and no one was held accountable” for the strikes. However, the critical analysis of
coverage related to the Baghuz strikes demonstrates that this “scant accountability” narrative is as
ill-informed and misguided as it is for coverage of the strikes on and around Taqba Dam.
The initial investigation correctly concluded that the attacks did not constitute war crimes or other
serious violations of international law and likewise actually did comply as self-defense
engagements pursuant to the SROE. The sources named in the initial NYT story, Lt. Col. Dean W.
Korsak and inspector general evaluator Gene Tate were mistaken all along, and there never was a
“war crime” for the “secretive commando force” to ignore or attempt to cover up. Likewise, the
claim that “Tate could find no evidence that the Joint Chiefs, the defense secretary or criminal
investigators had been alerted, as required” is blatantly misleading since the “requirement” to notify
senior officials applies, in accordance with DoDD 2311.01, when there is “credible information” to
support an allegation that a “violation of the law of war” has been committed. The initial
investigation correctly determined the strikes complied with relevant provisions of the law of armed
conflict, so there was never a requirement to notify senior military leaders.
Although the journalistic narratives developed in the initial article involving the Baghuz attacks
were misleading, coverage of the secondary review directed by Secretary Austin and conducted by
Gen. Garrett was an opportunity to present a more balanced perspective. Instead, the investigative
journalists in effect doubled down on the “scant accountability” narrative by emphasizing Tate’s
“standard government line” claim while omitting the official determination that Tate’s original
complaint was “based on inaccurate or false information.” Again, the unwarranted “scant
accountability” narrative was promoted while the NYT standards of ethical reporting were
incapable of holding the journalists accountable for the biased perceptions presented in their own
reporting.
The same journalistic failure of accountability likewise emerges from the critical evaluation
conducted herein of coverage related to the Kabul drone strike. Like coverage of the Baghuz and
Taqba Dam attacks, media reports involving the Kabul drone strike present an extraordinarily
compelling human interest angle involving the often unseen toll suffered by the civilian population
in armed conflict. Contradicting with painstaking detail the initial characterization presented by
Gen. Mark Milley of a “righteous strike” is likewise a seemingly important component of the
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reporting that was only made possible by the dedication and skill of the NYT visual investigations
team.
Consistent with the suggestion presented herein that official strategic messaging in the U.S.
government involving the conduct of hostilities needs to be reassessed and reimagined, it is
apparent from Gen. Milley’s full remarks that what he meant by suggesting the attack was a
“righteous strike” is that the relevant personnel complied with relevant legal and policy rules. In this
portion of the initial press conference involving the Kabul drone strike, Gen. Milley communicated
the initial belief that proper “procedures were correctly followed and it was a righteous strike.” If
Gen. Milley had omitted the superfluous “righteous strike” comment and instead emphasized that
proper procedures were followed while presenting specific detail regarding that conclusion, one
component of the media coverage demonstrating the outcome of the strike was not “righteous” at all
could have been avoided.
Nonetheless, the “procedures were correctly followed” portion of Gen. Milley’s characterization is
stripped away in coverage of the attack and instead the imprudent “righteous strike” comment is
repeatedly emphasized. Doing so supports the journalistic narrative that although Gen. Milley
“initially called the Kabul drone attack a ‘righteous strike’” – gotcha! – “almost everything senior
defense officials asserted in the hours, days and weeks after it turned out to be false.” A central
component of NYT coverage of the Kabul drone strike is the suggestion that this is but one example
of a systemic failure of accountability within the Department of Defense, but the investigative
reporting never does present a complete and fully informed description of the standards to which
personnel are actually held to account.
Instead, according to the journalistic narrative, pursuing accountability falls upon the fourth estate.
As but one example, the NYT story with the headline “No U.S. Troops Will Be Punished for
Deadly Kabul Strike, Pentagon Chief Decides” points out that the military “had not acknowledged
the mistaken strike until a week after a [New York] Times investigation of video evidence
challenged assertions by the military that it had struck a vehicle carrying explosives meant for
Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul.” However, a previous story points out that the “Times
investigation helped investigators determine that they had struck a wrong target,” which suggests
military officials conducted an unbiased review of the attack and were open to all sources of
credible information – including the remarkable work of the NYT video investigations team. As
such, it is misleading to suggest that media coverage held the government to account rather than
supplemented an already impartial review process.
Although the ultimate effect of this aspect of investigative journalism is debatable – whether it was
necessary to keep an otherwise obstinate military review process honest or whether, instead, it
supplemented an already open-minded official investigation – the second central component of the
ostensive “accountability” journalism indisputably lacks merit. Returning to the story with the “No
U.S. Troops Will Be Punished” headline, senior writer Eric Schmitt asserts that “while the military
from time to time accepts responsibility for an errant airstrike or a ground raid that harms civilians,
rarely does it hold specific people accountable.” This version of “accountability” that is erroneously
centered on the outcome of an attack permeates coverage of the Kabul drone strike. The journalistic
perspective supports the recurring “scant accountability” theme, but in doing so – as demonstrated
by the critical analysis conducted herein – the coverage distorts the actual standards by which
personnel are held accountable in practice.
Page 62 of 87

A scrupulous commitment to the NYT standards of ethical reporting to “tell our readers the
complete, unvarnished truth as best we can learn it” does not appear to include identifying sources
that can present a doctrinal assessment of the legal and policy rules to which military personnel are
actually held to account in practice. Instead, the journalistic narrative indicates, “Critics of the
Kabul strike pointed to the incongruity of acknowledging the mistake but not finding anyone
accountable for wrongdoing.” This claim sets up a quote from Steven Kwon, founder and president
of Nutrition & Education International, asking “How can our military wrongly take the lives of 10
precious Afghan people and hold no one accountable in any way?”
As the critical analysis conducted herein confirms, the expectation that military members should be
held “accountable” for taking “the lives of 10 precious Afghan people” in the absence of an
assessment of the process that led to the attack represents a fundamental distortion of the legal and
policy rules that actually apply in practice. Nonetheless, this misrepresentation of actual standards
of accountability permeates NYT coverage of the Kabul drone strike. This accountability
characterization presented by Kwon in the later “No U.S. Troops Will Be Punished” article, for
example, complements the claims related to accountability described in the earlier “A Botched
Drone Strike in Kabul Started With the Wrong Car” story published days after the findings of the
initial senior-level review were announced to the public. While those characterizations are
examined above in the first case study of Part I, briefly recounting them here is useful in the current
context of evaluating the merits of “accountability journalism” more broadly.
The first “accountability” characterization from a source presented in the earlier story is from John
Sifton of Human Rights Watch, who claims the United States “has a terrible record in this regard,
and after decades of failed accountability, in the context of the end of the war in Afghanistan, the
U.S. should acknowledge that their processes have failed, and that vital reforms and more
independent outside scrutiny is vital.” The second characterization is from a Twitter thread posted
by Luke Hartig of Just Security, who asserts “the way they bungled fundamental operational things
is really troubling and suggests more than a one-off mistake.” Finally, the story closes with a
Twitter post from Senator Chris Murphy, who declares “There must be accountability” because if
“there are no consequences for a strike this disastrous, it signals to the entire drone program chain
of command that killing kids and civilians will be tolerated.”
Like the “hold no one accountable in any way” characterization that is based upon the outcome of
the strike and presented in a later story centered on the Kabul drone strike, none of these three
earlier reflections are founded upon an informed assessment of the process that led to the attack.
Rather than identifying the doctrinal standards of accountability that must be applied by military
officials in actual practice and applying the known facts to these standards, all are based upon the
unintended and tragic outcome of the strike. All of these non-doctrinal characterizations support the
journalistic narrative of senior writer Eric Schmitt, who claims in the later “No U.S. Troops Will Be
Punished for Deadly Kabul Strike” story that “while the military from time to time accepts
responsibility for an errant airstrike or a ground raid that harms civilians, rarely does it hold specific
people accountable.”
Scant Accountability – for Failure to Tell Readers Complete, Unvarnished Truth
All these depictions together support the general “scant accountability” narrative that pervades this
line of NYT reporting. Like the rest of the coverage examined herein, it never does present the
“complete, unvarnished truth” regarding the legal and policy rules that actually apply in practice, as
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the NYT standards of ethical journalism seem to require. If this version of the “truth” is “as best
[the investigative journalists] can learn it,” the biased and uninformed characterizations purporting
to reveal a systemic accountability failure within the U.S. military suggest the media is either
disinclined or unable to present information to the public that is consistent with how accountability
and disciplinary decisions are actually made in practice. It is therefore not genuinely “accountability
journalism” at its best, as one might expect from coverage that was awarded a Pulitzer Prize.
Instead, the collection of journalism more closely resembles “gotcha journalism” at its worst. That
is, the media coverage unrelentingly presents a distorted depiction of the standards that actually
apply in practice in order to support the journalists’ preferred version of “accountability,” which is
based upon the unintended consequences of attacks that occur during combat operations. In doing
so, the biased and seemingly ill-informed journalistic narratives create the appearance of “scant
accountability” that is not consistent with reality. This phenomenon persists notwithstanding the
purported “duty to our readers” to “tell our readers the complete, unvarnished truth as best we can
learn it” purportedly required by the New York Times standards of ethical journalism.
In this unrelenting quest for “accountability” based upon the outcome of attacks, the journalists and
the sources from which they draw for expert analysis have developed a symbiotic relationship that
supports the preferred agendas of both. For the journalists, the perceived role of the vaunted fourth
estate in informing the public and holding the government accountable creates an incentive to
develop and pursue the “scant accountability” narrative, even if it is centered on the outcome of
errant attacks. This perspective explains, as but one example, senior writer Eric Schmitt’s claim that
during “two decades of war against shadowy enemies…the U.S. military has killed hundreds, if not
thousands, of civilians by accident […and] rarely does it hold specific people accountable.”
This version of “accountability” is consistent with the commentary from which Schmitt draws to
support the journalistic narrative he develops in the earlier “Botched Drone Strike” story. Returning
to John Sifton’s claim in this earlier article that the United States “has a terrible record in this
regard, and after decades of failed accountability, in the context of the end of the war in
Afghanistan, the U.S. should acknowledge that their processes have failed, and that vital reforms
and more independent outside scrutiny is vital” helps illuminate the connection between journalist
and source. The purported systemic failure to “hold specific people accountable” described by
Schmitt is consistent with the “terrible record” of “decades of failed accountability” depicted by
Sifton. The preferred outcome described by John Sifton of Human Rights Watch is for some entity
external to the Department of Defense to intervene to finally implement the “accountability” that
has purportedly been so elusive during the past two decades of conflict.
That is, Sifton claims that because existing military “processes have failed,” at present “vital
reforms and more independent outside scrutiny is vital.” This connection between the preferred
perspectives of journalist and source is but one example of an ideological alignment that is
persistently apparent in the media coverage examined herein. The pervasive convergence of
perspectives indicates there is a sector of advocates and activists who provide expert commentary in
media coverage and whose perspectives otherwise feature prominently in public discourse that both
contribute to the “scant accountability” narrative and seek to take full advantage of the distortions in
public opinion generated thereby in pursuit of their own “reform” agendas. As the next section
suggests, the symbiotic alignment of perspectives that exists between journalist and civil society
advocate does not extend to interactions between civil society and the government – and for good
reason.
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Accountability Journalism and the Divergence Between Civil Society Special Interests and Official
Strategic Objectives
Thus far, the focus of the present inquiry has been a critical analysis of intrinsically biased and
largely uninformed recent media coverage of U.S. military combat operations. In constructing and
promoting the narrative purporting to demonstrate that the military is beset by a pernicious and
systemic condition of “scant accountability,” media reporting consistently misrepresents the
standards by which personnel are actually held accountable in practice. In doing so, the vaunted
fourth estate shapes public opinion of military combat operations in a manner that is likewise
inconsistent with actual standards of accountability.
Along with media organizations that benefit from the prestige bestowed upon journalists engaged in
this variety of apparent “accountability journalism,” another sector of groups that also features
prominently in public discourse has demonstrated the inclination to exploit – and indeed often to
contribute to – distortions in popular opinion that result from recent media coverage of U.S. military
combat operations. That group is an industry of civil society advocates that both features in and
capitalizes on high-profile media coverage and the distortions in public opinion generated thereby.
However, the special interests reflected in civil society advocacy do not align with official strategic
objectives of the government.
This alignment in interests between investigative journalists and civil society advocates, along with
the concurrent divergence between civil society special interests and the strategic interests of
government agencies, creates a mutually reinforcing relationship between “accountability”
journalism and civil society advocates. The synergy that exists between the two sectors creates a
powerful incentive for both industries – media and civil society – to cooperate and to amplify
discourse generated by the other in order to encourage systemic changes to DoD targeting and
accountability processes. The endeavor to situate the critical analysis of media coverage conducted
herein transitions now to examine the connections between media coverage and civil society
advocates and to explore the ways in which media coverage is exploited in pursuit of a version of
“accountability” that distorts actual legal and policy standards while advancing civil society special
interests.
Expert Analysis from Civil Society Advocates as a Tool for Accountability Journalism
The present critical analysis of media coverage has already touched upon characterizations
presented in the reporting by John Sifton of Human Rights Watch since these support the “scant
accountability” narrative cultivated by the coverage. Indeed, one essential method by which
reporters construct narratives supporting the apparent “accountability journalism” pursued by media
coverage is to juxtapose operational characterizations presented from official sources with expert
analysis drawn from civil society experts. In a primary NYT story involving the Kabul drone strike,
for example, Sifton’s claim that the U.S. military “has a terrible record” regarding civilian harm
mitigation practices “after decades of failed accountability” is set against journalistic commentary
observing that “new details” about the strike, “which the Pentagon initially said was necessary to
prevent an attack on American troops, show the limitations of such counterterrorism missions even
when U.S. forces are on the ground.”

Page 65 of 87

The same story involving the Kabul drone strike later presents a quote from then-CENTCOM
commander General Kenneth McKenzie observing that external observers should not “draw any
conclusions about our ability to strike in Afghanistan against ISIS-K targets in the future based on”
the outcome of the engagement. This official characterization of the strike is followed immediately
by commentary drawn from Luke Hartig’s Twitter thread claiming that the way the military
“bungled fundamental operational things is really troubling and suggests more than a one-off
mistake” and evinces “some massive flaws in targeting methodology.” Like the preceding claim
regarding “decades of failed accountability” presented by John Sifton, this observation from Luke
Hartig is set against characterizations from official sources in a manner to create the appearance that
the experts to whom the investigative journalists turn for analysis are either better informed or are
more forthcoming than government officials.
This story goes on to describe and provide a link to an official study of civilian casualties conducted
by National Defense University in 2018 at the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
That study concludes, among other findings, that existing military practice presents “clear written
guidance and oversight regarding civilian casualty mitigation for deliberate and dynamic strikes”
and demonstrates “a widespread priority to minimize civilian casualties from the highest to lowest
levels.” The story paraphrases a finding related to the targeting process of achieving positive
identification by noting the official study “concluded that there was ‘sufficient guidance and
structure’ in the targeting process, which did not increase the risk of civilian casualties.” This
official characterization is followed immediately by journalistic commentary describing that “two
members of the study team — Lawrence L. Lewis and Sarah Holewinski, civilian casualty
specialists — disagreed with the report’s conclusions and urged more research on the issue.” A
quote provided by Larry Lewis to the journalist(s) is then presented as expert commentary to
contradict the conclusion of the official report: “I just wish we could start fixing these problems
instead of writing them off as ‘mistakes.’”
In a similar fashion, a later NYT story involving publication by the DoD of the Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) presents expert commentary by civil society
advocates to support the journalistic suggestion that official processes are inadequate and that it
falls upon the fourth estate to hold the government to account for these apparent shortcomings. The
“accountability” journalism narrative is set up with a quote from Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin
claiming implementation of CHMR-AP will ensure the DoD is “well prepared to prevent, mitigate
and respond to civilian harm in current and future conflicts.” This quote is followed immediately by
expert commentary from civil society advocates indicating that the plan will not, in fact, adequately
ensure the DoD is so “well prepared” to do so.
The first quote is from Marc Garlasco of PAX. Although the NYT story presents a quote from
Garlasco observing that the action plan “will ensure fewer people will die and create a way for the
Defense Department to respond when civilians are killed” if it is resourced and implemented
correctly, this note of optimism is accompanied with an air of caution. Among a number of
purported gaps in the action plan, according to observations summarized by the journalists, is that
the plan does not provide specific details regarding “whether individual officials or commanders
would be held accountable for violations.”
This would be a genuine deficiency, of course, if a failure to hold individuals or commanders
“accountable for violations” were actually demonstrated to be a systemic problem. However,
neither the expert commentary presented by Marc Garlasco nor the collection of NYT
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“accountability journalism” involving military combat operations convincingly establishes this to be
a shortcoming that exists in current DoD practice that the action plan would actually need to
address. The venture by the fourth estate to draw upon expert commentary to demonstrate a
fundamental flaw in the CHMR-AP, then, is more illusory than reality.
This misdirected example of “gotcha journalism” is followed by additional expert commentary
presented for the purpose of demonstrating apparent deficiencies in the recently-published DoD
CHMR-AP. The observations from Marc Garlasco of PAX are followed immediately by journalistic
commentary indicating that the action plan “also does not say whether the new efforts will include
reopening or studying past incidents that resulted in civilian deaths.” This commentary sets up a
quote from Annie Shiel of the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). According to the NYT
story, Shiel reportedly cautions, “Investigating and making amends for past harm is critical to
achieving the kind of accountability and learning that the action plan rightly strives for.”
If the CHMR-AP fails to require “reopening or studying past incidents that resulted in civilian
deaths,” as the accountability journalists observe, then, the expert commentary from Shiel suggests
the plan will not achieve “the kind of accountability and learning” the DoD needs to implement. Yet
again, there is no convincing suggestion from the commentary or from high-profile media coverage
that achieving “accountability” for civilian harm is a deficiency in actual military practice. The
same is true regarding the appeal for the DoD to investigate and make amends for past harm caused
from military operations. An investigation would be necessary if there is any indication that
personnel committed serious violations of international law in the conduct of hostilities, but no
actual evidence has been presented in public discourse to support such a finding. The call for
investigations and amends for harm caused in the past is centered on the outcome of attacks rather
than the processes that led to the strikes. That the CHMR-AP does not provide for “reopening or
studying past incidents that resulted in civilian casualties” is not a deficiency in the plan,
notwithstanding the commentary that would suggest otherwise by civil society expert Annie Shiel
presented in the NYT story.
Collectively, the expert analysis presented from civil society advocates as sources in media
coverage supports the journalist’s campaign for “accountability” in performing the role of the fourth
estate. However, the expert analysis actually serves the purpose of supporting what the present
inquiry above characterizes as “gotcha” journalism. In essence, the narratives paraphrase or directly
quote claims made from official sources, then – gothca! – official sources are “exposed” as
misleading or misinformed. A primary tool relied upon by accountability journalists, along with
claims often attributed to unnamed government sources, is commentary from civil society advocates
selected by the reporters that gives the appearance of refuting characterizations from official sources
regarding combat operations.
Accountability Journalism as a Tool to Advance Civil Society Special Interests
As the critical analysis conducted herein establishes, narratives developed in high-profile media
coverage distort the standards by which personnel are actually held accountable in practice. These
distortions align with the special interests pursued by civil society advocates, and this alignment
generates a mutually reinforcing relationship since civil society advocates likewise draw extensively
on media coverage as purported proof that existing targeting processes and accountability practices
are systemically deficient across the DoD. The present inquiry transitions now to explore how
distorted narratives developed in high-profile media coverage are utilized as a primary foundation
Page 67 of 87

upon which civil society advocates rely to make the case that existing military processes are
fundamentally and irrevocably deficient and, as a result, the DoD should be forced to adopt
recommendations presented by advocates external to the military if senior leadership remains
reluctant to do so of their own accord.
Center for Civilians in Armed Conflict and Media Reporting as an Advocacy Tool
Among the civil society advocacy groups that feature prominently in high-profile media coverage of
U.S. military combat operations is the Center for Civilians in Conflict, or CIVIC. As the analysis
immediately above describes, Annie Shiel of CIVIC provides expert commentary in a NYT story
involving publication of the CHMR-AP, with Shiel cautioning that the plan does not explicitly
require the DoD to investigate or make amends for past harm caused by U.S. military combat
operations. While this commentary is utilized in media coverage seemingly engaged in
accountability journalism to support the suggestion that the CHMR-AP is potentially deficient, the
media coverage itself is, in turn, a centerpiece of Annie Shiel’s own commentary intended to
demonstrate that DoD practices – including the CHMR-AP – are unsatisfactory and that, as a result,
the military should adopt recommendations developed by her and by CIVIC.
In an article posted on Just Security as CHMR-AP was still in development, for example, Annie
Shiel makes extensive use of NYT media coverage as evidence in support of the policy reform
suggestions for which she advocates. As the title of the article, “DoD Can’t Move Forward on
Civilian Casualties Without Looking Back” suggests, Shiel calls for an extensive accounting of past
civilian harm in order to inform future mitigation and response practices. In her concluding
remarks, Shiel claims doing so “could ensure acknowledgement for victims and survivors waiting
for recognition and justice and allow the U.S. military to learn for the future.”
This policy suggestion is built upon an effects-based approach by focusing on “recognition and
justice” for “victims and survivors” of attacks without regard for processes that led to potential
incidents of civilian casualties. In contrast, the doctrinal application of applicable provisions of law
and policy that is actually applied in military practice is focused on the process that leads to an
attack, as the analysis conducted in the case studies above demonstrates. In the process of
developing and advocating outcome-based policy recommendations, Shiel refers to and repeatedly
draws upon characterizations presented in recent “investigative reporting by the New York Times” to
demonstrate the apparent need to adopt the favored recommendations in practice.
A similar dynamic between civil society policy suggestions and recent NYT investigative reporting
is evident in a separate article posted to Just Security a week later by Annie Shiel of CIVIC and coauthor Sarah Yager of Human Rights Watch. In this subsequent article, Shiel and Yager advocate in
favor of a pair of bills that had been introduced in both chambers of Congress that would impose
extensive legislative requirements for DoD civilian harm mitigation efforts. The relative merits of
these provisions and the constitutional authority for Congress to impose the requirements are
examined below. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that recent NYT media coverage
purportedly revealing “systemic flaws that led to civilian deaths and injuries” features prominently
in the depiction developed by Shiel and Yager of the apparent deficiencies the legislation seeks to
address.
As an organization, CIVIC has long drawn upon high-profile media coverage, particularly from the
New York Times, as apparent “evidence” of deficiencies in U.S. government security practices that
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can be “corrected” by recommendations presented by civil society activists. Indeed, the first NYT
story involving civilian casualties published by Azmat Khan and co-author Anand Gopal in 2017,
which seeks to discredit U.S. coalition casualty figures that are not claimed by official sources to be
complete and accurate, asserts that the NYT investigative “reporting, conducted over 18 months,
shows that the air war has been significantly less precise than the coalition claims.” The NYT story,
which lauds the efforts by CIVIC that “culminated in legislation that established a fund to provide
Iraqi victims of American combat operations with nonmonetary assistance,” is, perhaps not
surprisingly, in turn extolled on the CIVIC website as an article that “should be required reading for
all those involved in Operation Inherent Resolve, which the Pentagon often refers to as the most
precise air campaign in history.”
This page on the organization’s website expresses that CIVIC activists “are obviously dismayed by
the findings” of Khan and Gopal. According to CIVIC, the media investigation demonstrates “it is
obvious much work remains,” and as a result CIVIC renews its call for “militaries and governments
to place civilian protection at the center of their planning.” Of course, seeking to characterize
civilian casualty figures as inaccurate when the government does not claim the figures are complete
and accurate, as Khan and Gopal seek to accomplish, does not indicate the U.S. military fails to
“place civilian protection at the center of their planning” as CIVIC asserts. Nonetheless, the
organization calls for the story to be “required reading” for all military members involved in combat
operations in Iraq and Syria.
A similar symbiotic dynamic is evident in more recent high-profile NYT media coverage of U.S.
military combat operations. For example, in another article posted on Just Security, this in late
December 2021, CIVIC advocates John Ramming Chappell and Ari Tolany claim that “legislative
action is needed…not only to investigate and make amends for civilian harm, but to implement
strong policies concerning the protection of civilians in U.S. and partner military operations.” This
appeal for intensifying legislative assertiveness in U.S. military combat operations set the stage in
support of bicameral legislation that would be introduced a few weeks later as the second session of
the 117th Congress got underway. According to the CIVIC advocates, expanding legislative
intervention is needed in part because a NYT investigation found that the DoD “failed to investigate
properly several civilian casualty incidents in Syria, including the March 2019 airstrikes in Baghuz
that killed as many as seventy civilians.” Likewise, according to the CIVIC narrative, “This
reporting, along with five years of other in-depth New York Times investigations, illustrates the
systemic failures of accountability for civilian casualties which have plagued U.S. air wars in Syria,
Iraq, and Afghanistan.”
As the critical analysis of the cited media coverage conducted herein demonstrates, however, the
claim that the Baghuz strikes constituted potential war crimes that were insufficiently investigating
were unfounded from the outset, and the “systemic failures of accountability” actually afflict NYT
investigative reporting rather than “U.S. air wars in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.” Nonetheless, the
CIVIC co-authors rely on NYT investigations that purportedly “demonstrate a lack of DOD
transparency and failure to self-regulate that requires legislative action.” Based on systemic
deficiencies inherent in the media coverage on which the CIVIC advocates rely to justify the need
for assertive congressional intervention, the concluding call to action for legislators to “ask hard
questions of DOD in light of recent revelations of civilian harm, thoroughly investigate
longstanding shortcomings, and work to facilitate transparency and amends for twenty years of
civilian harm in the so-called ‘war on terror’” rings hollow.
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For yet another example of the symbiotic relationship between NYT “accountability” journalism
and policy recommendations presented by CIVIC to “improve” DoD accountability mechanisms,
the present inquiry returns to claims made by Annie Shiel, this following the official announcement
of the results of the secondary review of the Baghuz airstrikes. In a statement posted to the CIVIC
website, Shiel claims the review of the initial investigation “illustrates again systemic shortcomings
in how the U.S. military prevents, investigates, and transparently responds to civilian harm.” In
support of the apparent “systemic shortcomings,” the statement presents a hyperlink to a NYT story
that, according to Shiel, reveals the secondary review “of the Baghuz strike classified all adult
males at the site as fighters, whether they were armed or not.” However, this assertion from the
NYT story, which is presented by unnamed “officials familiar with the findings” of the review, is
not relevant to a doctrinal assessment of whether responsible personnel complied with applicable
provisions of law and policy in conducting the attack. As the executive summary of the secondary
review, to which the NYT story provides a link, determines, the “ground force commander”
responsible for the strikes “repeatedly received confirmation that no civilians were in the strike
areas” and was unaware at the time that “civilians were within the blast radius.”
Like the NYT story published by Eric Schmitt and Dave Phillips, Annie Shiel of CIVIC refrains
from acknowledging that the “extensive review of the facts and circumstances” conducted by Gen.
Michael Garret in the secondary assessment concludes the initial claim of war crime and coverup at
the center of the initial NYT story “was unsubstantiated” and “not supported by evidence and/or are
based on inaccurate or false information.” Instead, Shiel condemns the review as yet another
example of “systemic shortcomings in how the U.S. military prevents, investigates, and
transparently responds to civilian harm.” A primary exhibit supporting this apparent “scant
accountability” narrative is a claim offered by unnamed sources presented in a NYT story and that
is irrelevant to the issue of LOAC compliance and the adequacy of both the initial investigation and
the subsequent review.
PAX and Media Reporting as an Advocacy Tool
Although the analysis in the present section has thus far focused on connections in public discourse
between New York Times reporting and activism from the Center for Civilians in Conflict, CIVIC
is not the only civil society group for which a symbiotic relationship exists with NYT accountability
journalists. For another article posted on Just Security, for example, Erin Bijl of PAX and Archibald
Henry of InterAction make the case, as the title indicates, that the U.S. Department of Defense
“needs to rethink its civilian casualty reporting mechanism.” After beginning with a brief narrative
describing efforts of Somali civilians who “approached an international civil society organization
for help with filing a report regarding alleged harm experienced at the hands of the U.S. Africa
Command,” the opening section is titled, “This is Not New: Shortcomings In Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response.” The first sentence of this initial section presents a link to “The Civilian
Casualty Files” NYT story and claims, “A series of New York Times investigations have revealed
persistent gaps in U.S. military efforts to prevent, respond to, and learn from incidents of civilian
harm, including civilian deaths, injuries, and damage to infrastructure and property.”
The main point of the article is to present the findings of a PAX study that purportedly
demonstrates, as the title of the second section describes, “New Research Finds DoD Should Do
More to Improve Civilian Harm Reporting.” In their concluding remarks, the co-authors from PAX
and Interaction assert that “civilians affected by conflict should have the right to report the human
toll of war and be able to trust that their reporting will lead to concrete actions to remedy the harm
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inflicted.” Throughout the article, no authoritative provision of existing domestic or international
law is identified as the source of the right “to report the human toll of war” and “to trust” the
reporting “will lead to concrete actions,” yet NYT reporting is cited as the primary evidence
purportedly demonstrating the existence of “persistent gaps in U.S. military efforts to prevent,
respond to, and learn from incidence of civilian harm” that must now be ostensibly addressed and
corrected.
While these civil society advocates associated with PAX and InterAction have relied on NYT
reporting as “evidence” of the need for DoD to adopt their preferred policy prescriptions, NYT
investigative journalists have likewise drawn on commentary from PAX advocate Marc Garlasco
for expert commentary regarding various aspects of U.S. military targeting practices. In one story
presenting an analysis of official records “by The Times’s Visual Investigations unit [that] found
that a number of allegations of civilian casualties had been dismissed as ‘noncredible’ based on
flawed reviews of evidence,” for example, one quote from Garlasco claims, “I’ll tell you what it is:
That’s negligence.” According to Garlasco, the NYT methodology represents “the most basic level
of investigation that they [DoD practitioners] should be doing, and not to do it is completely
negligent.”
As the present inquiry demonstrates, however, very little information of value regarding compliance
with relevant rules involving the use of force can be drawn from a robust post-strike analysis of an
engagement. A “most basic level” of investigation requires an assessment of information that was
reasonably available to personnel responsible for an engagement at the time of the attack, along
with an evaluation of the intent of the personnel in conducting the strike. Although engaging in a
thorough post-strike analysis to verify the authenticity of an allegation of civilian casualties and to
develop any potential lessons from the engagement is certainly prudent practice, failure to do so is
not negligence “plain and simple” as Garlasco claims. If conclusions following “the most basic
levels of investigation” were developed primarily from the outcome of attacks, Garlasco’s claim of
“negligence” would be entirely reasonable. This is not the case, yet expert commentary by Marc
Garlasco of PAX is relied upon by the NYT accountability journalists to “demonstrate” the
systemic flaws in existing government practice the journalists seek to expose.
In a later story involving the perceived merits of the DoD CHMR-AP when the policy was made
public, NYT investigative journalists return yet again to Marc Garlasco (along with Annie Shiel of
CIVIC) for expert analysis. According to this later NYT story, “Garlasco said the plan did not fully
address several questions, including how the military would improve its ability to estimate civilian
casualties; how information from outside groups would be incorporated into the Pentagon’s civilian
harm assessments; and whether individual officials or commanders would be held accountable for
violations.” As the analysis in the preceding paragraph indicates, however, improving the DoD
“ability to estimate civilian casualties” is not a necessary component of evaluating compliance with
existing legal and policy rules, and, as such, failure to present specific guidance on this topic is not
an indication that CHMR-AP is fundamentally flawed. Likewise, the narrative purporting to
demonstrate that “individual officials or commanders” are not currently “held accountable for
violations” has been manufactured by unaccountable investigative journalists and exploited in turn
by civil society advocates. Failure to address this apparent deficiency in DoD practice is not a
limitation of the CHMR-AP since the “scant accountability” narrative the plan would set out to
correct, pursuant to the prescription presented by Garlasco, is the product of fiction rather than fact.
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As might be expected based on the analysis of methods by which CIVIC advocates rely on media
coverage to support preferred policy outcomes, Marc Garlasco of PAX likewise draws upon NYT
reporting in his own commentary in public discourse as evidence of apparent deficiencies inherent
in the DoD CHMR-AP that must be addressed. Indeed, Garlasco notes in an article providing his
assessment of CHMR-AP that was published on Lawfare soon after the plan was made available to
the public, “the New York Times reported on the dozens of civilians killed in Syria by U.S.
airstrikes, and the newspaper’s Pulitzer-prize-winning series on other civilian deaths from U.S.
airstrikes earlier this year continued to put pressure on the Pentagon.” However, careful scrutiny of
these observations provides additional evidence revealing the ways in which civil society advocates,
in this case Marc Garlasco of PAX, both contribute to and exploit misleading narratives developed
in media coverage of military combat operations.
For example, the story regarding “dozens of civilians killed in Syria by U.S. airstrikes” includes
coverage of the Baghuz strikes, in which an indeterminate number of civilians were reportedly
killed in an attack that was misleadingly characterized in NYT coverage as a potential war crime
and ensuing coverup. Likewise, media coverage of the attacks on and around Taqba Dam in Syria
created the appearance that personnel responsible for attacks manipulated rules involving the use of
force to secure approval for the strikes, yet the doctrinal analysis conducted in the present inquiry
confirms the strikes in fact complied with relevant legal and policy rules – despite the appearance to
the contrary developed in media coverage. While it is undoubtedly true that the NYT “Pulitzerprize-winning series on other civilian deaths from U.S. airstrikes…continued to put pressure on the
Pentagon,” this series of investigative journalism repeatedly relied upon non-doctrinal analysis from
civil society advocates to develop the narrative purporting to demonstrate that a pernicious “scant
accountability” condition seemingly plagued military combat operations. As the present inquiry
transitions now to explore, both PAX and CIVIC participated in a coalition of civil society
organizations that combined to both shape the narratives developed in high-profile media coverage
of combat operations and exploited the narratives in support of policy reform suggestions presented
by the civil society coalition.
Civil Society Coalition and Media Reporting as an Advocacy Tool
The appearance that the U.S. military is plagued by a condition of “scant accountability” involving
the conduct and evaluation of targeting operations has been cultivated primarily by a symbiotic
relationship between high-profile “accountability” journalism and civil society advocacy. Although
CIVIC and PAX have featured prominently in public discourse involving this apparent military
accountability gap, these organizations are not alone in the pervasive advocacy campaign. Although
a full accounting of civil society activism in this area is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, the
analysis in this section considers two examples for which CIVIC and PAX joined a coalition of civil
society groups demanding DoD policy reforms while drawing on high-profile media coverage as
“evidence” of the systemic problems that purportedly must be corrected in U.S. military practice.
The first example considered herein is a letter signed in December 2021 by more than 20 civil
society groups, including CIVIC and PAX, and addressed to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.
The subject line presented in the letter is, “Defense Department Civilian Harm Policies and
Practices,” and the opening sentence indicates the organizational signatories “write to express our
grave concerns about the Department of Defense’s civilian harm policies and practices and their
impact.” The primary factual examples cited as evidence by the letter that raises “grave concerns”
about DoD civilian harm policies are incidents reported in NYT media coverage that, according to
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the letter, are “emblematic of twenty years of U.S. operations that have killed tens of thousands of
civilians in multiple countries.”
As the civil society organizations point out, NYT reporting involving the Baghuz strikes, for
example, “raises grave concerns about the U.S. military’s commitment to accountability and
adherence to international humanitarian law, including the duty to investigate potential war crimes
and hold responsible individuals to account.” As the doctrinal analysis conducted in the present
inquiry demonstrates, however, the appearance of a potential war crime and coverup was the
product of mistaken impressions presented to journalists by their sources initially and then further
developed in relevant media coverage. Coverage of the Baghuz strikes is cited as but one example
in a pattern of “unwillingness to thoroughly investigate and acknowledge civilian harm” that is
purportedly “often the reality across the Department of Defense.” The actual reality, though, is that
“thorough investigation” in practice involves an assessment of the process that led to an attack
rather than the outcome of a strike – whether or not a strike becomes the subject of a high-profile
media investigation.
A similar dynamic emerges from a critical analysis of a letter sent from a coalition of dozens of
nongovernmental organizations, including CIVIC and PAX, to President Joe Biden a few months
after the letter directed to Secretary Austin. This later letter, which refers to and cites the previous
dispatch, urges the commander in chief “to lead a much-needed overhaul of U.S. civilian harm
policies and practices.” The problem statement described by the coalition of NGOs as a call to
action is, “Recent New York Times investigations into U.S-caused civilian harm have documented
significant shortcomings in how the U.S. government prevents, investigates, and responds to
civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects.” According to the letter, the “findings” of these
media “investigations” demonstrate “legal and policy flaws that our groups and others have
repeatedly raised with the U.S. government for many years.” As a call to action, the letter requests
that President Biden “publicly recognize the longstanding structural flaws in how the U.S.
mitigates, investigates, and responds to civilian deaths and injuries in its operations, and to” accept
a number of recommendations presented by the coalition.
These suggestions are reportedly designed to ensure “the U.S. government can finally account for
and reckon with the civilian deaths, injuries, and other harms of the last twenty years.” However,
recent NYT “investigations” have not, in reality, demonstrated “significant shortcomings in how the
U.S. government prevents, investigates, and responds to civilian casualties and damage to civilian
objects.” As the critical analysis in the present inquiry reveals, the focus of military officials in
practice is on compliance with doctrinal legal and policy rules.
Neither media “investigations” nor civil society studies have convincingly demonstrated the
existence of “longstanding structural flaws in how” officials in the U.S. government assess
compliance with doctrinal provisions of LOAC and ROE. This divergence in perspective must be
accounted for in order to illustrate the reasons civil society recommendations are met with
resistance in actual practice. Likewise, clarifying the causes for the divergence in approaches among
military practitioners and civil society advocates can illuminate the motivation for civil society
groups, including the coalition responsible for the letters analyzed immediately above, to both
contribute to and exploit distortions in public opinion generated by high-profile media coverage.
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Divergence Between Civil Society Interests and Government Strategic Objectives
Uncovering the discord in perspectives between civil society groups and military practitioners
begins with illuminating the divergence in the strategic vision and mission of both camps. The
mission of the U.S. Department of Defense, for example, is “to provide the military forces needed
to deter war and ensure our nation's security.” In support of this mission, the DoD is organized by
seven geographic combatant commands and four functional combatant commands. As an example
of a geographic combatant command, the mission of U.S. European Command is to execute “a full
range of multi-domain operations in coordination with Allies and partners to support NATO” and, if
required, “to fight alongside Allies and partners to prevail in any conflict.” As an example of a
functional command, the vision of U.S. Special Operations Command is to field a develop a group
of professionals “relentlessly seeking advantage in every domain to compete and win for the Joint
Force and the Nation.”
From a doctrinal perspective, the commitment for the military to “prevail in any conflict” or “win
for the Joint Force and the Nation” requires “leaders at all echelons [to] exercise disciplined
initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission.” Likewise, military
doctrine establishes that “actions of military personnel and units” must be “framed by the
disciplined application of force, including specific” rules of engagement. While restraint in
exercising military capabilities “is essential for success,” military doctrine emphasizes that the
“principle of restraint does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate
and authorized, to display US resolve and commitment.”
This strategic mission, vision, and perspective on the application of force is not shared by civil
society groups. Returning to the coalition of NGO signatories to the letter sent to President Biden in
February 2022, a sampling of the declared missions and visions of a number of members of this
coalition helps illustrate this point. According to the mission and vision presented on the CIVIC
website, for example, the organization “envisions a world in which no civilian is harmed in
conflict.” One of the guiding principles listed on this page is that “[a]rmed actors are responsible
and must be held accountable for preventing and addressing civilian harm.” (emphasis added)
Likewise, the website for PAX – or Protection of Civilians – avows that “protection of civilians
living in conflict is at the heart of our work.” In support of this work, the organization seeks to
“enable civilians to hold security actors to account” while encouraging security actors to “civiliancentered protection strategies.” International Rescue Committee, in turn, is guided by the
commitment to “help restore health, safety, education, economic wellbeing and power to people
devastated by conflict and disaster.” The website for Win Without War expresses that the group “is
a diverse network of activists and organizations working for a more peaceful, progressive U.S.
foreign policy.” Human Rights Watch seeks to “create an undeniable record of human rights
abuses” by partnering with groups “to help hold abusers to account and bring justice to victims.”
And so on. For each one of these civil society groups, the outcome of civilian protection is at the
center of the organizational mission and vision. Holding armed actors accountable for civilian harm,
as CIVIC seeks to achieve, detaches the group’s advocacy pursuits from doctrinal application of
relevant rules of law and policy since the latter is centered on the process that led to harm rather
than the harm itself. The goal for PAX of enabling civilians to hold security actors accountable is
likewise disengaged from doctrinal sources such as LOAC and rules of engagement. The same is
true for the Human Rights Watch goal of bringing justice to victims. Similarly, while working for a
more peaceful and progressive American foreign policy may be an honorable pursuit for members
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of Win Without War, this strategic objective does not necessarily align, for example, with the
European Command mission to “prevail in any conflict.”
In short, civil society groups such as CIVIC and PAX approach incidents of civilian harm that occur
during the conduct of hostilities from a perspective that is detached from the requirement to
“exercise disciplined initiative” that is “framed by the disciplined use of force” required for the
military to fight and prevail in armed conflict. This infuses civil society advocacy pursuits with
institutional bias that does not align with the strategic interests of the Department of Defense. As
Michael Schmitt succinctly observes on the topic, “NGOs and others are…unfettered in pushing the
balance” between military necessity and humanity “in the direction of humanity” in part because
“they pay no price for forfeiting a degree of military necessity.” According to Schmitt, this results
in “a frequent assertion of lex ferenda” by NGOs “in the guise of purported” lex lata. (the text of the
article actually describes “a frequent assertion of lex ferenda in the guise of purported lex ferenda,”
though the duplication of lex ferenda at the end of the sentence appears to be a typographical error
given that the author correctly states this point earlier in the article by noting that “the desire to
protect human beings” expressed by international tribunals may be noble, but “such
pronouncements are more suited to proposals of lex ferenda than claims of lex lata.”)
The institutional bias that leads civil society advocates to be “unfettered in pushing the balance in
the direction of humanity” creates a divergence in perceptions of accountability among military
practitioners and NGOs. As the book On Civilian Harm, which was published by PAX in 2021,
notes, “From the perspective of the civilians being harmed, the motive behind a decision causing
harm often matters very little: Survivors will have to deal with violence induced trauma regardless
of whether the perpetrator was directly out to harm them or was unable to avoid harming them.”
From this civilian-centric perspective, those who experience harm “will need to rebuild or relocate
regardless of whether the house was destroyed with malicious intent or as ‘collateral damage.’”
From the perspective of a military commander determining whether to impose adverse personnel
action following an attack that results in incidental damage, in contrast, the intent of those
responsible for the engagement is of primary importance, while the outcome of the attack is of
almost no consequence.
The resulting divergence in approaches and perspectives results in the persistent reluctance by the
DoD to adopt recommendations presented by civil society advocates related to civilian harm
mitigation and response. Personnel are held accountable for compliance with doctrinal provisions of
relevant law and policy in actual military practice. The DoD, therefore, would remain reluctant to
adopt “structural changes to prioritize civilian protection and accountability for civilian harm,” as
the letter submitted to Secretary Austin by a coalition of civil society groups. (emphasis added)
Likewise, demands for revised policies involving more robust investigations based on harm caused
during the conduct of hostilities will be met with reluctance in military practice. Returning to the
letter submitted to Defense Secretary Austin by a coalition of NGOs, including CIVIC and PAX, for
example, the authors note that “twenty years before” the Kabul drone strike, “independent rights
groups, family members, and others have documented and submitted numerous credible reports of
civilian harm from U.S. operations around the world” yet “the vast majority have been underinvestigated [and] unacknowledged.” As the DoD Law of War Manual observes on the topic of
investigating purported incidents of civilian harm, however, while “battle damage assessments or
other after-action reviews or investigations of whether and how many civilians were harmed by an
attack may serve a number of useful purposes, the actual results of an attack do not always provide
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useful information in assessing” compliance with LOAC rules such as proportionality. Compliance
with doctrinal rules is assessed “based on the information available” to personnel at the time of an
attack rather than “with the benefit of hindsight” that develops from a post-strike investigation.
The same reluctance to adopt civil society suggestions is also apparent, for example, related to
advocacy involving demands for the DoD to provide more robust amends when civilian persons or
objects are harmed in attacks. To continue the point regarding “under-investigated [and]
unacknowledged” incidents of civilian harm during the “twenty years before” the Kabul drone
strike, for example, the civil society letter to Secretary Austin also criticizes that “the vast majority”
of incidents remain “without compensation or amends” offered or provided by the military.
However, as the DoD Law of War Manual notes on the topic of amends, “although indemnification
is not required for injuries or damage incidental to the lawful use of armed force, compensation may
be provided as a humanitarian gesture.”
This passage from the Manual cites to a statement presented by a State Department legal advisor,
Abraham Sofaer, to the House Armed Services Committee in 1988 recognizing three basic
principles of international law. According to the statement provided by Sofaer three decades ago
and more recently cited by the Manual in 2016, “First, indemnification is not required for injuries or
damage incidental to the lawful use of armed force. Second, indemnification is required where the
exercise of armed force is unlawful. Third, states may, nevertheless, pay compensation ex gratia
without acknowledging, and irrespective of, legal liability.” While civil society advocates may
object to the fact that “the vast majority” of incidents of civilian harm are not accompanied by
offers of “compensation or amends” by the Department of Defense, indemnification is merely
discretionary unless the attack violates international law.
The focus on compliance with doctrinal provisions of law and policy by military practitioners and
the concomitant emphasis on investigating, holding personnel accountable for, and indemnifying
civilian on the basis of civilian harm encourages civil society advocates to engage in what I have
previously described as “lawscaping.” That is, “the endeavor to shape relevant provisions of the law
to support an advocated outcome that is not necessarily implemented as a method of warfare.” (the
practice of governments “using – or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve an operational objective” would be widely recognized as lawfare rather than lawscaping,
which is centered on private actors rather than governments.) Returning to the assessment of the
balance between humanity and military necessity described by Michael Schmitt, what I describe as
“lawscaping” results in “a frequent assertion of lex ferenda” by advocates “in the guise of
purported” lex lata that supports civil society strategic objectives.
As the letter from the civil society coalition directed to Secretary Austin claims, for example, “The
Kabul and Baghuz strikes also illustrate long-standing problems with the U.S. military’s
interpretations of its international humanitarian law obligations and its response to civilian harm,
including failures to investigate, publicly acknowledge, and offer amends for harm, and ensure
accountability in the event of wrongdoing.” However, this opening sentence of the section labeled
“Failures of Response and Accountability” relies on narratives generated in New York Times
reporting as purported evidence of “secretive Special Operations strikes that apparently
circumvented legal and policy civilian protection safeguards and raised alarm among Defense
Department and CIA personnel, as well as U.S. military officials’ attempts to conceal a possible war
crime at Baghuz.” As the present inquiry demonstrates, the New York Times reporting is itself
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plagued by failures of accountability rather than the U.S. military combat operations covered
thereby.
Just like the biased and ill-informed media coverage on which this style of advocacy relies, there is
no mechanism in public discourse by which to hold civil society advocates accountable for claiming
the U.S. military is plagued by “long-standing problems with…interpretations of its international
humanitarian law obligations and its response to civilian harm” in the absence of actual evidence to
support this (mis)characterization. These mischaracterizations of relevant provisions of law and
policy may well support civil society missions such as enabling “civilians to hold security actors to
account” for PAX or ensuring “[a]rmed actors are responsible and must be held accountable for
preventing and addressing civilian harm” for CIVIC. However, the actual armed actors, such as
members of the U.S. Department of Defense, must apply doctrinal sources of law and policy in
actual practice in support of the requirement “to fight alongside Allies and partners to prevail in any
conflict,” as the European Command mission observes.
In short, the actions of military personnel actually engaged in the conduct of hostilities must be
“framed by the disciplined application of force,” which may include the use of “overwhelming
force, when appropriate and authorized, to display US resolve and commitment.” The strategic
objectives of civil society advocates, in contrast, encourage the use of lawscaping in support of the
campaign to demand that organizations such as the U.S. Department of Defense hold personnel
accountable for incidents of civilian harm. As Michael Schmitt observes, the “raison d’être” of
“NGOs and others” is to push the balance between military necessity and humanity “in the direction
of humanity,” and these civil society advocates “pay no price for forfeiting a degree of military
necessity.” The divergence between the strategic objectives of military organizations such as the
Department of Defense and civil society organizations such as CIVIC and PAX generates
reluctance among military practitioners to adopt suggestions developed by civil society advocates
involving operational and accountability practices.
This reluctance of military organizations, in turn, provides motivation for advocates to both
contribute to and exploit scandal and outrage in the endeavor to influence public opinion and
generate pressure on organizations such as the DoD to adopt civil society recommendations.
Striving to hold the government accountable while performing the role of the fourth estate creates
an inherent motive for “accountability journalists” to call upon civil society advocates seeking their
own version of accountability – for the outcome of civilian harm – for expert commentary.
Likewise, because there is no requirement for investigative journalists to themselves be particularly
familiar with doctrinal sources of law and policy, these purveyors of media narratives may not even
be aware that the sources to whom they turn for expert analysis are inclined to offer lex ferenda in
the guise of lex lata when provide commentary to reporters. As the concluding substantive section
of the present inquiry now examines, there is another institution populated with individuals who are
not required to be particularly familiar with doctrinal sources of law and policy or the divergence
between perspectives between military practitioners and civil society groups to which advocates can
turn in pursuit of their organizational strategic objectives: the United States Congress.
Congressional Overreach in U.S. Military Targeting Operations Abroad
One day before the correspondence examined in the previous section was addressed to Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin, nearly the same collection of civil society groups published a letter to select
lawmakers requesting “urgent congressional oversight of U.S. civilian harm policies and adherence
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to international humanitarian law.” Like the letter directed to Secretary Austin, the dispatch to
Congress relies on “New York Times reporting” to establish the parameters of the apparent
problems that require assertive legislative intervention. Reporting involving “the 2019 Baghuz
strike and the alleged cover-up of a possible war crime,” for example, purportedly has “raised
serious concerns about the U.S. military’s commitment to accountability and adherence to
international law, including the duty to investigate possible war crimes and hold responsible
individuals to account.” Likewise, media coverage involving the Kabul drone strike reportedly is
part of a persistent “failure to implement lessons learned from twenty years of repeated civilian
harm without meaningful investigations, acknowledgement, or accountability.”
The critical assessment of the narratives presented in recent high-profile media coverage involving
U.S. military combat operations that is the primary focus of the present inquiry and upon which the
coalition of civil society advocates relies need not be recounted in full here. For current purposes,
the call to action reflected in this dispatch to Congress is of primary importance. According to the
institutional signatories, “Over the years, many of our organizations have worked to engage the
Department of Defense to improve its policies for preventing civilian harm and investigating,
acknowledging, and providing compensation and amends for harm when it occurs.” After
chronicling a number of such endeavors, the letter laments, “Despite years of good-faith
engagement, we have seen little to no progress on implementing many of these recommendations.”
Following a number of specific requests offered to the various congressional committees of which
the recipients are members, the letter claims, “Accountability and transparency are foundational to
democratic governance and legitimacy, and the protection of civilians is a moral, ethical, legal, and
humanitarian imperative.”
Due to the systemic deficiencies in DoD practice purportedly enumerated by the letter, the
signatories implore the recipient lawmakers “to take urgent action to prevent and address civilian
harm.” This letter directed to the chair and ranking member of both the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees, then, makes much the same case as the correspondence examined above
directed to Secretary Austin and President Biden regarding apparent persistent and systemic
deficiencies in the manner in which the U.S. military conducts combat operations and accounts for
them afterward. A perceptible change in tack for this letter directed to lawmakers, though, is an
appeal to Congress to force the military, through legislation, to adopt suggestions perennially issued
by civil society advocates to the executive branch given that “years of good-faith engagement” have
now yielded “little to no progress on implementing many of these recommendations.”
What is missing from this appeal for assertive intervention by Congress is an accounting of why the
Department of Defense has remained persistently reluctant to adopt these “reform” measures
presented by civil society groups, advocates, and activists. As the section immediately above
examines, the persistent reluctance demonstrated by military officials is attributable in large part to
the divergence in priorities and strategic objectives that exists between the Department of Defense
and civil society groups. While a non-governmental organization such as CIVIC may prioritize
holding armed actors “accountable for preventing and addressing civilian harm,” (emphasis added)
or groups such as PAX may declare that “protection of civilians living in conflict is at the heart of
our work” such that the organization seeks to “enable civilians to hold security actors to account,”
defense organizations such as U.S. European Command must persistently be prepared “to fight
alongside Allies and partners to prevail in any conflict.”
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If “years of good-faith engagement” with the military by civil society groups have yielded “little to
no progress on implementing many” of the recommendations presented to the Department of
Defense, this is largely a function of the divergence in strategic objectives that exists and will
inherently persist as between the military and civil society advocates. While civil society groups and
advocates contribute to distortions in public opinion generated by biased and ill-informed highprofile media reporting and then engage in a campaign of lawscaping to take advantage of the
scandal and outrage created thereby, practitioners within the military continue to apply doctrinal
provisions of law and policy during targeting operations in support of strategic priorities and while
making determinations related to accountability after mishaps that lead to incidental damage do
occur. This dynamic is not reflected in the letter presented by the coalition of civil society advocates
to the leadership of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee. Unfortunately for the
continued capability of the Department of Defense to carry out the assigned mission to “deter war
and ensure our nation’s security,” an appreciable proportion of the 535 lawmakers elected to
Congress appear to be either incapable of recognizing, or disinclined to recognize, this dynamic and
its impact on the advocacy that is directed toward them and on their resultant legislative endeavors.
Correspondence from Congress Denouncing “Substantial Flaws in the US Military’s Procedures”
After Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin directed the DoD to develop an action plan designed to
facilitate the implementation of enhanced civilian harm prevention and response practices, two
separate coalitions of legislators directed correspondence to Secretary Austin to present their
guidance for the plan. The first letter was signed in March 2022 by a group of 46 members of the
House of Representatives, while the second dispatch was signed just over a month later by a group
of seven senators. Because both letters are extraordinarily similar in substance, the two dispatches
can be analyzed together in tandem.
Both letters set the stage for the respective congressional interventions by claiming recent New
York Times reporting “brought to light substantial flaws in the U.S. military’s procedures to
prevent, investigate, and respond to civilian deaths in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.” The apparent
inability or unwillingness to engage in an independent critical assessment of the appearance that
high-profile media reporting has indeed “brought to light substantial flaws” in military practice
represents cause for concern in the opening paragraphs of each letter given that the signatories are
elected officials with the responsibility and authority to, among other duties, deliberate and adopt
the annual must-pass National Defense Authorization Act. The recommendations that follow in both
dispatches, even more troublingly, could be mistaken for suggestions written directly by the same
coalition of civil society groups that “continue to urge the systemic reforms needed to address the
longstanding issues raised in” their own earlier letter (fn 4).
Indeed, the primary categories of topics about which the two separate dispatches from lawmakers
address as areas of concern in DoD practice could be extracted directly from the letter cited
immediately above that was addressed to President Biden in the weeks before the congressional
letters were signed. The primary categories, which are each denoted by a separate subheading,
presented in both legislative dispatches are: resources and staffing, targeting procedures, tracking
and analysis, investigations, amends, lessons learned, accountability, and Center of Excellence. A
review of the civil society letter addressed to President Biden weeks earlier, as well as the
correspondence from a coalition of civil society groups directed to the respective leadership of the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees, reveals that the matters addressed in the letters
signed by legislators directly.
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One component all the dispatches have in common is the claim that New York Times reporting has
exposed systemic flaws in DoD targeting and accountability practices in the context of civilian
harm. However, the same civil society priorities that have reportedly resulted in “little to no
progress on implementing” despite “years of good-faith engagement” with the DoD have now been
elevated to congressional concerns by virtue of the correspondence directed to Secretary Austin by
the two separate coalitions of legislators. As the above analysis related to divergent strategic
objectives demonstrates, however, the primary reason “years of good-faith engagement” have
resulted in “little to no progress” is that official priorities of the military responsible for preparing
for and, when necessary, winning in armed conflict do not align with civil society priorities. By
partnering with Congress, civil society groups seek to alter that dynamic in favor of their own
objectives.
Congressional Dispatches Endorsing Civil Society Lawscaping and Advancing Civil Society
Priorities
Indeed, not only do the priorities expressed in civil society and congressional dispatches impeccably
align, some examples of civil society lawscaping reflected in, for example, the letter directed to
President Biden are copied almost verbatim in the correspondence signed by legislators. For one
such example, the civil society letter addressed to the commander in chief demands “full,
independent, and transparent investigations of all credible reports of civilian harm” that “meet
international standards for independence, thoroughness, and impartiality, and should evaluate
conduct according to the applicable international human rights and international humanitarian law
standards.” The later correspondence signed by 46 members of the House of Representatives, in
turn, copies that language to the letter, while the still later letter signed by seven senators calls for
investigations of civilian harm that are “held to the highest standard of applicable international law
and be conducted thoroughly and impartially.”
Although two of the three letters utilize identical wording for this demand for investigations of
civilian harm, while the relevant language of the third dispatch deviates slightly from that of the
first two, the underlying call for investigations of civilian harm is misguided – regardless of the
precise verbiage used. Official investigations in actual practice are centered on assessing
compliance with doctrinal provisions of law and policy and, therefore, focus on the process that led
to an engagement rather than a thorough evaluation of the harm caused by the attack. Likewise,
there are no “international standards for independence, thoroughness, and impartiality” related to
investigations of civilian harm since, among other reasons, any “international standards” that do
exist, which is itself a doubtful proposition, involve investigating compliance with LOAC and ROE
rather than on investigating the result of an engagement. Furthermore, according to Department of
Defense doctrine, “international human rights law” is not “applicable” at all in the context of
targeting operations since the law of armed conflict is the lex specialis that applies during the
conduct of hostilities. The suggestion, then, that investigations of “civilian harm” should comply
with international human rights law would be contrary to DoD practice even if such “international
standards” could be identified.
This characterization regarding “international standards” for investigations of civilian harm is not
the only example of lawscaping reflected in civil society correspondence that is reproduced in the
congressional dispatches to Secretary Austin. Returning to the letter written by the coalition of civil
society groups and addressed to President Biden, for example, the authors claim that the findings of
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New York Times investigations “illustrate systemic legal and policy flaws that our groups and
others have repeatedly raised with the U.S. government for many years.” The critical analysis
conducted in the present inquiry demonstrates the assertion that recent media coverage has indeed
illustrated “systemic legal and policy flaws” in U.S. military targeting and accountability processes
to be unsubstantiated. Nonetheless, both letters from lawmakers to the Secretary of Defense express
the belief that because targeting operations “all too often” miss “the presence of civilian
bystanders,” it is crucial for the DoD “to examine targeting processes to ensure tactical and
operational improvements comply with the Law of Armed Conflict principles of distinction and
proportionality.”
This legislative recommendation is fundamentally flawed for at least two primary reasons. First, a
targeting operation that misses “the presence of civilian bystanders” does not, by definition,
implicate the LOAC distinction and proportionality rules. If the presence of civilians is not detected
by the attacker, civilians cannot be said to be made the object of attack, which is required to sustain
an allegation that the distinction rule was violated. Likewise, if there is no anticipated incidental
damage, an attack, by definition, does not violate the LOAC proportionality rule as long as some
degree of military advantage is expected. As I have explained elsewhere, there are “two specific
requirements” for the proportionality rule to be relevant. “First, the attacker had to expect that
incidental damage would occur. Second, some quantum of military advantage had to be
anticipated.” Even if targeting operations “all too often” miss “the presence of civilians,” then, this
concern does not implicate the “Law of Armed Conflict principles of distinction and
proportionality” as both legislative dispatches suggest.
The phenomenon of adopting civil society suggestions as congressional priorities is evident as well
involving demands for accountability. As the civil society letter directed to President Biden urges,
the United States government must provide “meaningful accountability to civilian victims and
survivors of U.S. operations by publicly and transparently acknowledging deaths and injuries,
providing amends or redress, and appropriately holding civilian leaders and military commanders
responsible for their actions, including by addressing findings of wrongdoing through disciplinary
measures or prosecutions.” Yet again, the letter addressed to Secretary Austin a few months later by
the coalition of 46 members of the House of Representatives copies this language word for word.
The letter signed by seven senators deviates slightly from the verbatim transcript by calling on the
Secretary of Defense to hold “civilian and military leaders and military commanders responsible to
include any and all disciplinary measures or prosecutions, as appropriate” as a means to “provide
meaningful accountability to the families of civilians killed and injured survivors resulting from
U.S. military operations.”
Of course, actual accountability practices and disciplinary proceedings are not evaluated on the
basis of whether an attack results in death or injury to civilians. Doing so is a strategic imperative
for civil society groups and advocates since the outcome of attacks is of paramount importance.
Likewise, the aspiration to provide “meaningful accountability” to civilians harmed in attacks is a
priority for a civil society organization such as PAX that is committed to enabling “civilians to hold
security actors to account.” However, military organizations engaged in the actual conduct of
hostilities are responsible for holding their members to account for complying with doctrinal
provisions of relevant law and policy with almost no regard for whether an engagement results in
incidental damage.
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Nonetheless, legislators who have signed correspondence demanding systemic “reform” of targeting
and accountability practices within the Department of Defense are either unwittingly or, worse,
deliberately pressing the U.S. military to adopt changes that align with civil society objectives
rather than national security priorities. In doing so, language from civil society dispatches is copied
into congressional correspondence word for word on occasion, and sometimes the substance is the
same even if the text is paraphrased for letters from lawmakers. Either way, the seemingly obsessive
emphasis on accountability among all the correspondence, civil society and lawmaker alike, along
with the conspicuous yet undisclosed nature of the behind-the-scenes collaboration, raises
significant concerns regarding the processes by which civil society advocates and legislators are
themselves held to account, as the present inquiry now transitions to address while considering and
presenting some concluding reflections.
Concluding Reflections
Although the analysis of recent high-profile media coverage of U.S. military combat operations
conducted in the present inquiry has been unflinchingly critical, the commitment of the reporting to
expose the often untold story of the human tragedy and suffering inflicted by warfare is
commendable. As the description that accompanies Azmat Khan’s “Human Toll” story notes,
“Airstrikes allowed America to wage war with minimal risk to its troops. But for civilians on the
ground, they brought terror and tragedy.” This is undoubtedly true, and bringing this angle to light
in the global public consciousness while giving a voice to the suffering voiceless – to the often
uncounted and unknown casualties of armed conflict – constitutes a momentous contribution to the
field of international reporting.
While this aspect of the media coverage truly is a credit to the journalists, teams, and organizations
involved, the second central theme of the reporting is decidedly less commendable. Drawing this
time on the summary accompanying the NYT “Civilian Casualties File” story, “The promise was a
war waged by all-seeing drones and precision bombs. The documents show flawed intelligence,
faulty targeting, years of civilian deaths — and scant accountability.” In reality, the “promise”
presented by all-seeing drones and precision bombs is not that civilian casualties will not occur –
potentially on an unimaginable scale, depending on the circumstances of the conflict – even with
advanced weapons technology. The critical analysis conducted herein casts doubt on the claim that
NYT reporting genuinely has revealed that combat operations are beset by systemic flaws in
intelligence or targeting procedures.
Nonetheless, it is the “scant accountability” angle of both the “Civilian Casualties Files” story, and
indeed the compilation of recent high-profile NYT coverage of U.S. military combat operations
abroad, that is misleading and, therefore, of dubious character. In cultivating the “scant
accountability” narrative, relevant NYT stories routinely misstate the standards by which personnel
are actually held to account in reality. The narratives habitually draw upon commentary of
unascertainable credibility and authority presented by unnamed sources as well as expert opinions
from identified sources with a discernible ideological bias. The cultivated journalistic narratives
emphasize details and commentary that appears to contradict official characterizations while also
selectively disregarding factors that repudiate the validity of the preferred “scant accountability”
theme.
In doing so, the favored narratives and sources draw conclusions from insufficient data and
evidence. Likewise, doctrinal sources of law and policy that actually do apply to combat operations
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are either not represented at all or, when they are described, are profoundly mischaracterized.
Above all, the brand of “accountability” developed by journalistic narratives and source
commentary is centered on the outcome of attacks – the prevention of and response to civilian harm
– rather than on the process involved in the attacks. In contrast, the doctrinal standards for targeting
operations and accountability processes are centered on the process that leads to an engagement,
while little information of value in terms of “accountability” can be derived from battle damage
assessments and other post-strike analysis.
The true condition of “scant accountability,” then, exists in relation to the media enterprises that
create and market this brand of gotcha journalism to a global audience and to the civil society
advocates and organizations that both contribute to and capitalize on the distortions in public
opinion that are generated by high-profile press coverage of military combat operations. While there
can be no doubt that the U.S. military should always seek to optimize existing practice in relation to
the prevention of and response to incidents of civilian harm, the claim that the Department of
Defense is plagued by a persistent and systemic condition of “scant accountability” in this regard is,
at its core, an illusion. Although the coverage and commentary on which it relies is misleading and
untrustworthy, viable options do exist to bring accountability to the protagonists who have, to date,
distorted doctrinal standards and, with them, public opinion, with impunity.
In relation to the narratives cultivated in media coverage, New York Times publisher A.G.
Sulzberger can commission an external inquiry to investigate whether the “civilian casualties files”
line of reporting violated The Times standards of ethical reporting. As far as I am aware, the
legitimacy of this collection of media reports has not been subjected to a comprehensive external
critical analysis – save for the present inquiry. While I am merely one researcher who is presumably
an unknown source of commentary for The New York Times Company, further inquiry is warranted
if the characterizations and conclusions presented herein are assessed to be potentially credible.
According to the narrative presented to the public regarding the members of the board of directors
for The New York Times Company, Sulzberger “has invested heavily in investigative journalism,
pushed The Times to expand into new digital formats like audio and multimedia, and has been an
outspoken defender of the free press in the United States and abroad” during his tenure as publisher.
The critical analysis of relevant NYT media coverage conducted during the course of the present
inquiry has directly challenged the validity of journalistic narratives presented in a centerpiece
component of Company investigative journalism and multimedia reporting. With the great power
associated with being the self-described “most influential and award-winning English-language
news organization in the world” comes great responsibility. An external review to determine the
validity of the critical characterizations presented herein is merited if the assessment and
conclusions developed in the present inquiry are determined to be credible.
If such an inquiry determines relevant members of the editorial and journalistic teams violated NYT
standards of ethical journalism, the external review should present recommended measures to
remedy past transgressions and to ensure similar breaches do not occur again in the future. In the
interest of trust and transparency, the proceedings, results, and recommendations of any such
external review should be made public. Committing to this suggestion will bring a measure of
accountability to high-profile media coverage the present inquiry characterizes as unaccountable
journalism.
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The critical analysis of media coverage conducted herein also exposes the prospect of “scant
accountability” involving the civil society advocates who contribute to and take advantage of
distortions in public opinion that are generated by the investigative reporting that is the focal point
of the present inquiry. Given the remarkable similarities, and indeed on occasion the verbatim
duplications, that are apparent in correspondence published by civil society advocates and elected
officials alike, it is reasonable to conclude that relevant advocates are coordinating directly with
select lawmakers to influence legislative agendas and, indeed, the very text of draft legislation itself.
In many, perhaps most, contexts, the term “influence” is adequate and appropriate. In the context of
influencing a Member of Congress or other qualifying public official, however, this activity can be
described by another, more specific, term of art: a lobbying activity.
According to relevant legislation, the term “lobbying activities” means “lobbying contacts and
efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research and other
background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination
with the lobbying activities of others.” If relevant civil society advocates and groups are indeed
determined to be engaged in lobbying activities and have not registered as lobbyists and do not
comply with established requirements for lobbyists and lobbying activities, the individuals and the
organizations for which they advocate are violating federal law unless a qualifying exemption or
exception applies. My research of the databases of registered lobbyists for the Senate and House of
Representatives is unable to identify names of individuals or organizations that appear to be
involved in what seem to qualify as lobbying activities, and I am unable to definitively determine
whether an exception to activities or an exception from registration applies without access to
relevant internal records of applicable organizations.
While the present inquiry is not in a position to confirm compliance with federal law involving
lobbying activities, the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives
are conferred with the responsibility to monitor compliance. Both offices are charged with the
responsibility to “notify any lobbyist or lobbying firm in writing that may be in noncompliance
with” federal law and to “notify the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia that a
lobbyist or lobbying firm may be in noncompliance with” relevant federal law. The USADC, in
turn, is responsible for enforcement actions and for submitting a semiannual report to Congress that
presents “the aggregate number of enforcement actions taken by the Department of Justice” in
relation to requirements involving lobbying activities. Section 1606 of the relevant provision of
federal law provides for a civil fine of “not more than $200,000, depending on the extent and
gravity of the violation” of the law as well as a criminal penalty of “not more than 5 years”
imprisonment for any person convicted of “knowingly and corruptly” failing to comply with federal
law involving lobbying activities.
A separate provision of federal law provides for the denial of tax-exempt status for otherwise
qualifying organizations such as charities because “a substantial part of the activities of such
organization consists of carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation,”
unless an exemption applies. The Internal Revenue Service is responsible for publishing an
“appropriate notice to taxpayers of” a suspension “and of the fact that contributions to such
organization are not deductible during the period of such suspension.” For individuals or
organizations deemed not to be in compliance with federal law involving lobbying activities or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation, suspension of tax-exempt status, as well as
appropriate civil and potentially criminal liability, could introduce a measure of accountability for
otherwise unaccountable civil society advocates and organizations responsible for contributing to
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and exploiting distortions in public opinion created by high-profile media coverage of U.S. military
operations.
Individual lawmakers are themselves largely immune from true accountability in the present context
since it is reasonably unlikely that a significant proportion of constituents are particularly
knowledgeable related to the law involving armed conflict and whether Congress is adequately
holding the DoD to account in this regard. As Harold Koh noted during a 2017 Brookings lecture,
international law involving armed conflict “in many ways stands as the most discussed, but least
understood, of these evolving bodies of transnational public law.” The reasons underlying this
phenomenon and its effect on the quality and nature of discourse involving “the emerging law of
21st century war” is an important topic that is beyond the scope of the current concluding
reflections. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the “least understood” aspect of Koh’s
astute observation means, in the current context, that politicians are largely insulated from electoral
accountability regarding votes they may cast for legislation addressing DoD civilian harm
mitigation and response practices.
Nonetheless, it is manifestly apparent based on the nature of the commentary originating from select
lawmakers that Congress as an institution is either unwilling or unable to become sufficiently
informed on the topic of civilian harm mitigation and response. This makes lawmakers, to be quite
frank, derelict in the dispatch of their legislative duties. Members of Congress are not well equipped
to be experts, for example, regarding the law and policy that applies to targeting operations in
combat. This observation is sensible, since constitutional authority informs the competence of
Congress.
The executive is vested with the constitutional responsibility to serve as the commander in chief of
the United States armed forces, and in this capacity the president is in command of the Department
of Defense. The DoD, in turn, has been described as “the largest employer on earth.” It is the
mission of the Department of Defense “to provide the military forces needed to deter war and
ensure” America’s security, and the entire workforce of the world’s largest employer is engaged in
support of that singular purpose. A member of Congress, in contrast, typically employees a small
staff of legislative assistants, one of whom is often focused on international affairs on behalf of the
elected official. Prior military experience, of course, is not among the qualifications for public
office enumerated in the United States Constitution, and there is likewise no requirement for staffers
to be experienced in, or even knowledgeable about, military operational and accountability
practices.
This general lack of familiarity with relevant sources of doctrinal law and policy is easily
identifiable in remarks presented in public discourse by members of Congress. According to a
current page on the website for Senator Elizabeth Warren, for example, this long-serving lawmaker
and former presidential candidate “has long led the call for accountability for U.S. military
operations that kill innocent civilians.” This brand of accountability, of course, aligns well with the
civil society version that is centered on the outcome of attacks, but it constitutes a gross
misapplication of the doctrinal law and policy that actually applies to targeting operations in
practice. The same is true regarding the call for the United States to “provide meaningful
accountability to the families of civilians killed and injured survivors resulting from U.S. military
operations” expressed in a letter signed by Senator Warren and six other senators (emphasis added).
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A dispatch sent from Senator Warren to the Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Senator Jack Reed, demonstrates a similar troubling lack of familiarity with doctrinal provisions of
law and policy that actually apply to combat operations. In this letter, for example, Senator Warren
claims that New York Times reporting involving the Baghuz strikes “raises serious questions about
the U.S. military’s adherence to international humanitarian law (IHL) – particularly requirements
for positive identification of combatants and proportionality assessments – as well as the duty to
investigate potential war crimes and hold responsible individuals to account.” As the critical
analysis conducted herein of media coverage of the Baghuz strikes demonstrates, however, the
appearance that the incident and the DoD response afterward “raises serious questions about the
U.S. military’s adherence to” the law of armed conflict is more closely aligned with fiction than
fact.
Nonetheless, the narratives generated in this collection of NYT reporting form the basis for
assertive legislative intervention to “correct” the condition of “scant accountability” that
purportedly persists in existing DoD practice. Investigative journalists, civil society advocates,
lawmakers, and legislative staffs alike have thus far been immune from accountability for the
distortions in public opinion that are generated and exploited by these individuals and groups to
support their own objectives. For the sake of constitutional integrity and American national security,
this actual condition of scant accountability must change.
There is no quick and easy solution to the challenges raised in these concluding reflections and,
more broadly, in the present inquiry in general. One immediate course of action that should be
implemented by the respective leadership of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees is
to omit all draft legislation involving civilian harm mitigation and response from the final version of
the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act that ultimately gets signed into law. In July, the
Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Mike Rogers,
reportedly noted during NDAA markup that if a proposed legislative provision “doesn’t help the
warfighter, it doesn’t need to be in this bill.” This is the correct approach for a bill that is supposed
to be centered on national defense.
Select members of Congress have adopted the special interests of civil society advocates for their
own legislative agendas, and may well have violated rules involving lobbyists and otherwise
influencing elected officials in the process. In order to determine the full extent to which the
legislative agenda of Congress has been corrupted, both chambers can hold hearings that can be
scheduled for future congressional sessions. Likewise, the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of
the Senate can initiate inquiries to determine whether lobbying rules have been violated in the past
and to develop remedial measures for the future.
At the time of the current writing, however, the current session of Congress is in recess until
immediately after the November election. When Congress returns from recess, work will begin
again on the draft NDAA in both chambers. Given the likelihood that the legislative agenda has
been corrupted by distortions in public opinion generated by recent high-profile media coverage and
by influencing activities that may constitute violations of federal law and congressional rules,
HASC and SASC leadership must ensure that any draft legislative provision involving civilian harm
mitigation and response is omitted from the final bill. The Department of Defense recently
published an impressive Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, and this significantly
changes the landscape of the civil-military relationship on the topic of the prevention of civilian
harm.
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There will certainly be a role for Congress to monitor and resource implementation of CHMR-AP in
the months and years ahead. However, the appearance that the DoD is beset by a condition of scant
accountability that requires assertive intervention by Congress to correct is an illusion. The
Department of Defense needs to be trusted to take the lead on CHMR-AP implementation, and this
includes coordinating with Congress to determine what resources are needed to measure the
effectiveness of implementation. Current proposed provisions of the NDAA related to civilian harm
mitigation help civil society advocacy groups rather than warfighters, and as Representative Rogers
notes, these provisions do not “need to be in this bill.”
As for the actual measure of accountability at the center of the high-profile media reporting that is
the subject of the present inquiry, a remark during a 2017 press conference by then-Lieutenant
General Stephen Townsend, who was at the time the commander of Combined Joint Task ForceOperation Inherent Resolve, provides an appropriate note in closing. According to the transcript of
the press briefing, to which the NYT story involving the Baghuz strikes presents a link, Townsend
notes that the CJTF-OIR-led “coalition freely and transparently takes on the responsibility to act in
accordance with the law of armed conflict, in all of our operations.” Regardless of public
perceptions generated in high-profile media coverage of U.S. military combat operations, this is the
true measure of whether the Department of Defense is plagued by a systemic condition of “scant
accountability.”
Military personnel are expected to act in accordance with the law of armed conflict in all combat
operations, and this forms the standard by which personnel are held accountable after an attack –
regardless of whether the engagement causes incidental harm. Although there is always room to
improve military targeting and accountability processes, compliance with relevant doctrinal
provisions of law and policy is the standard to which individual personnel are held. Investigative
journalists, civil society advocates, and elected officials may well prefer a version of the law that
would hold personnel accountable for the outcome of an attack, but this constitutes a fundamental
misapplication of actual rules of law and policy. To the extent that journalists, advocates, and
legislators insist on engaging in effects-based condemnation of U.S. military combat operations
abroad, it is this movement wherein the true condition of “scant accountability” is to be found.
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